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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I argue that, all appearances to the contrary, Hegel does not attempt to
achieve a complete systematization of reason in a self-reflexive sense in his system of
philosophy. Quite the opposite, I maintain that the absolute Idea is the actuality of the selftranscendence of the divine. Along these lines, I argue (in agreement with Slavoj Žižek) that the
absolute “Idea” is non-total and incomplete; in this sense, Hegel is neither a modern thinker nor a
post-modern thinker, but rather he presents a version of thinking that is both modern and postmodern, while neither merely one nor the other considered alone.
Subsequently, I argue that both Hegel’s (of his Science of Logic) and Schelling’s (of his
Weltalter) positions on the beginning are metaphysically consistent. I demonstrate the deep
connections between the two works by delving into the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic
and how it compares to the beginning of Schelling’s Weltalter. In these two works, both thinkers
overcome a strict dichotomy between materialism and idealism.
Finally, I argue that both Hegel and Schelling state that philosophy begins as the selftranscendence of the Absolute, which they understand as the actuality of divine freedom. I agree
with Žižek’s contention that Hegel and Schelling both posit similar contours with regard to the
overall metaphysical movement (the two thinkers both contend that Absolute Spirit commits
itself to self-sacrifice, for instance). However, my argument is novel insofar as I argue that
Schelling’s account is more comprehensive, since he provides a direct (and explicit) response to
the question of why the movement occurs in the first place: for the purpose of the divine’s
revelation of itself as love qua freedom.
v

INTRODUCTION
0.1) Introduction to My Argument
The main argumentative thrust of this dissertation is the following: all appearances to the
contrary, Hegel does not attempt to achieve a complete systematization of reason in a selfreflexive sense in his system of philosophy. On the contrary, both Hegel and Schelling attempt to
think of an Absolute that is simultaneously immanent and transcendent. Along these lines, I
maintain that Hegel’s (of his SL) and Schelling’s (of his WA) positions are metaphysically
consistent insofar as a repetition of emptiness1 stands at the beginning of both of their systems of
philosophy. The self-disappearing movement of divine substance represents the divine’s
awakening to knowledge of itself as love from out of its own emptiness. In Hegel’s Science of
Logic, God repeats its emptiness at the beginning: the notion that God’s love stands at the
beginning of the system is present in an implicit way. In Schelling’s Weltalter, Schelling starts
from the same insight, however in a more explicit fashion.
Although I acknowledge that my interpretation is not the classical reading of the
Hegelian corpus, in order for Hegel’s system of conceptual structures (as he presents it in the SL)
to make sense at all, the Notion must be conceived as a contingent-necessity: retroactively
understood as a result2 of an original unity with empty substance in the Notion’s otherness from

1

On the notion of the repetition of emptiness at the beginning of Hegel’s SL, see Rebecca Comay and
Frank Ruda, The Dash—The Other Side of Absolute Knowing (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018),
48, 84, 94.
2
For more on the notion of the Absolute as a result and “retroactivity”, see Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil:
Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2014), 4, 28, 73, 74, 148, 353,
379.
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itself – on the order of a doubling of an original emptiness in which thought is simultaneously
identical to itself and also beyond itself qua the disappearing movement of nothingness as such.
But, if this is the case, then the Notion could not possibly completely explain itself, since the
origin of thought in the purity of empty material substance (which, according to Hegel, is divine)
is inherently more profound than conceptual structures are able to fully grasp. The Notion itself
is incomplete3; in fact, it is defined by its openness to otherness. The arrival of rationality on the
scene therefore entails a paradox: reason arrives from out of that which never was and yet,
always must be so.4 Hegel’s beginning of philosophy in the SL is therefore actually consistent
with Schelling’s major thesis from the WA: the nature of divine freedom is co-eternal with the
self-sacrifice of the Absolute.
Contemporary scholars of German Idealism, such as Manfred Frank and Andrew Bowie,
tend to hold the view that the late Schelling critiques Hegel for his supposed attempt to provide a
completely explicative, self-reflective account of rationality. However, even if this argument
were an accurate assessment of the late Schelling’s critique of Hegel, it would not hold much
weight (at least in this particular regard). This is because the metaphysical kernel of Hegel’s
philosophical system is in fact similar to Schelling’s “unprethinkable being” (das
Unvordenkliche): that which thought cannot fully get behind or before, and yet is a necessary
presupposition of reason. Along these lines, Žižek argues that the roots of “dialectical

3

Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso,
2014), 381.
4
Comay and Ruda, The Dash, 23 ff.
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materialism”5 are to be found in Schelling’s WA.6 Hegel’s genuine beginning, as we will see, is
in fact “(un)dialectical.”7 But, if this is the case, then Hegel is only able to claim the necessity of
the beginning “retroactively” 8– the necessity of the beginning is a contingent-necessity. It is
only afterwards that we can “look back” and consider it as necessary: the Notion has come to be
in time. Likewise, on Schelling’s account, the beginning of rationality (qua “unprethinkable
being,” which makes negative philosophy possible) is contingent;9 experience as such is the
ground of conceptual determinations. This is to say that Hegel is not as much of a thinker of
rational identity as even Schelling contends, since Hegel’s “Notion” is itself “grounded” in the
emptiness of emptiness. As we will see, Schelling’s and Hegel’s positions on the beginning are
therefore, in fact, quite similar. In addition, both an intuitive knowledge of the Absolute as well
as Hegel’s dialectics are ultimately grounded in the same metaphysical insight: the transcendence
of divine substance from out of the abyss of freedom is that which gives rise to thought as such.
0.2) How is Thought Related to Being?
The main, driving philosophical question of German Idealism could be stated as follows:
how is thought related to being?10 Upon the rejection of naïve realism (the notion that things are

5

Throughout this paper, I follow Žižek’s usage of the term “dialectical materialism” to characterize
Hegel’s philosophy in a way that is similar to how Žižek employs the term in his book, Absolute Recoil.
Although Hegel is often traditionally identified as a dialectical idealist and Marx as a dialectical
materialist, I intentionally use the term in order to achieve a two-fold purpose. First off, I use the term to
emphasize how Hegel overcomes the strict dichotomy between idealism and materialism. Secondly, I
employ the term to remind the reader that reason is non-total on Hegel’s account.
6
Kelsey Wood, Žižek: A Reader’s Guide (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 119.
7
See Chapter Three, section 3.4. When I use the term “(un)dialectical”, I use it in a way that is influenced
by Nuzzo’s reading, but also slightly differs from how Nuzzo uses the term. When I use the term, I use it
to mean that the beginning (as a movement of nothingness) is therefore both undialectical and dialectical,
but in this sense it is also neither.
8
Žižek, Absolute Recoil, 381.
9
Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism (New York: Continuum, 2011),
136.
10
Ibid., vii.
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just as we perceive them) philosophy is historically led to a second position: the position of
empiricist skepticism in which things are not as they seem. Subsequent to this position, Kant’s
transcendental idealism is an idealist position that deems knowledge as always limited by the
categories of the rationalist subject that fundamentally structure all possible experience.11 As is
well known, on Kant’s account, it is possible to know the limits and bounds of the understanding
and reason respectively, but one cannot attain knowledge of noumena. On the contrary, as
Andrew Bowie states, Hegel’s goal is to display the unity of thought and being:
philosophy for Hegel, as it did for the other Idealists, is to show how thought and being
are inseparable. This makes them ‘identical’ in Hegel’s particular sense, so Kantian
worries about knowledge being only of the way the world appears to us, rather than of
things in themselves, are eliminated. The question is how this identity is to be revealed
and what exactly is meant by the way it is revealed.12
Hegel aims to provide his unique account of the way in which thought and being are unified in
order to overcome Kant’s doubts about gleaning genuine knowledge of the things in themselves.
Part of the main kernel of my argument is that Hegel’s response to the question of the
relationship of thought to being is a paradoxical one: the repetition of the emptiness of substance
(as we see in Chapter 1 of Book 1 (“The Doctrine of Being”) of the SL, when Hegel begins with
“Being, pure Being, --”) ensures the arrival of rational thinking (in terms of judgments) on the
scene, but it also simultaneously implies that there is no discursive evidence for the origin of
thought – the only evidence that could possibly be supplied is “nothing” at all.13 Hegel’s position
is therefore “circular” but in a very precise sense: it implies that thought desires to return to a
beginning that always is, and yet, never was.14 As Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda point out,

11

This discussion of the particular historical shapes that consciousness passes through is Hegel’s own as
he presents it in the Encyclopedia Logic, as we will see.
12
Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche (second edition) (New York:
Manchester University Press, 2003), 286.
13
Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda, The Dash—The Other Side of Absolute Knowing, 94.
14
Ibid., 23 ff.
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Hegel refers to this in terms of a wound that is its own healing. Hegel writes, “the wounds of
spirit heal…and leave no scar (PhG §669).” 15 This is to say that the unity of thought and being
(thought that is aware of itself as being) is simultaneously a unity on the order of material
substance without subjectivity16: identity, in other words, simultaneously implies difference.17
Hegel’s position on the relationship of thought and being also implies a number of unique
consequences, which I will address with more consideration in further chapters. Here, I will
simply state a few of the preliminary ones. First of all, Hegel contends that thought is capable of
achieving genuine “knowledge” of the things in themselves because he posits neither an
epistemological nor ontological divide between subject and object on the order of a conscious
subject. Hegel’s position implies that thought is always already bound up with being. Thought
and being are not strictly divided – rather, there is in some sense no thought “prior” to being,
since the only way that we experience thinking in the first place is via a repetition of empty
substance. Second, Hegel’s position also implies that thought can achieve genuine “knowledge”
of the Absolute (although the specific nature of such an Absolute and the type of knowledge to
be gleaned will need to be clarified), since thought has always already transcended itself in its
self-constitution. Hegel’s philosophy thus implies a circular structure – thinking recollects its
unity with the divine when thought passes beyond itself in its return to emptiness. Hegel’s
beginning of the SL is therefore similar to Schelling’s beginning of his WA in a very precise
sense: the two philosophers agree that the beginning of philosophy is one with God’s meditation
on itself (as a God that is always already beyond itself).

15

G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §669, quoted from ibid., 80.
Slavoj Žižek, “Hegel and Shitting: The Idea’s Constipation,” in Hegel and the Infinite: Religion,
Politics and Dialectic, eds. Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett, and Creston Davis (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011), 231.
17
Ibid., 229.
16

5

In Slavoj Žižek’s book, Absolute Recoil, Žižek provides a concise summary (in outline)
of the major contours of Hegel’s EL and the historical moments that consciousness passes
through in terms of its position toward objectivity. The major movements of thought as Žižek
presents them there are the following: “(the first attitude): 1) naïve realist metaphysics (the
second attitude): 2) empiricist skepticism 3) transcendental criticism (the third attitude): 4) direct
intuitive knowing of the Absolute, 5) dialectical thinking, and 6) speculative thinking proper.”18
Žižek further comments on the two main forms of the third major position or attitude of
consciousness toward objectivity (the third major form of thought includes #4-6). He states:
The first form of this third attitude of thought towards objectivity is an immediate or
intuitive knowing which posits a direct access to the Absolute beyond (or beneath) all
discursive knowledge—Fichte’s I=I, Schelling’s Identity of Subject and Object, but also
direct mystical intuition of God. The second form, of course, is Hegel’s dialectics, which
does exactly the opposite with regard to intuitive knowing: instead of asserting a direct
intuitive access to the Absolute, it transposes into the Thing (Absolute) itself the gap that
separates our subjectivity from it.19
In many ways, my dissertation is an engagement with, and partial defense of, Žižek’s position on
the third major position of thought toward objectivity. I agree with Žižek’s claim that absolute
substance is immanent-transcendent. In addition, I further elaborate on what Žižek has stated
here about these two forms of thought under the third attitude (above identified by #4-#6). On
my understanding, however, these three ways of thinking need not be conceived as
fundamentally different from each other. In alignment with the main insight of dialectics, the
fifth and sixth major forms of thinking may be understood as exhibiting a relation of “nonrelation.”20 In addition, the notion of a direct intuitive knowing of the Absolute is actually the

18

Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso,
2014), 16.
19
Ibid.
20
As we will see in later chapters, this is also how Comay and Ruda will suggest to read the relationship
between Hegel’s Phenomenology and the Science of Logic. See Comay and Ruda, The Dash, 18, 43.
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seed of dialectics – the fact that thought is able to realize that the gap between the Absolute and
itself is internal to the Absolute may be read consistently with the notion of a direct experience
of absolute Spirit. There is not a fundamental inconsistency between these two accounts, since
thought’s remembrance of unity with the divine is consistent with an Absolute that is organic and
coming to be in time. This is to say that the Absolute is constituted by the experience of itself as
both same and other. Similarly, the very movement between subject and object could be said to
constitute the identity of the Absolute. In other words, the notion that an experience of the
emptiness of emptiness returns one to one’s divine nature is consistent with the notion that the
Absolute itself is incomplete.
As we will see in the next section, Hegel’s dialectical thinking essentially leads him to his
position on the Absolute as an “immanence of transcendence.”21 This means that God is present
within experience as that which is beyond itself. In later chapters of my dissertation, I argue that,
similarly, it is possible to arrive at a genuine experience of the Absolute via direct intuition, as
long as, in this experience too, thought passes beyond itself into the emptiness of “material”
substance.
Hegel’s fundamental position implies an ontology of movement—our knowledge of the
Absolute is never complete when it is garnished from one-side of the dialectic. Hegel’s
philosophy encourages the thinker to think from the standpoint of both Reason and the
Understanding, but never to utilize merely one or the other. According to Hegel, Reason is a

21

Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing (London: Verso, 2012), 7. See also Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s
Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 2008), 125 ff.
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capacity primarily responsible for synthesis and the Understanding is a capacity on the order of
determinative cognition in terms of fixed determinations of thought.22
That said, Hegel does not conceive of the relationship between the Understanding and
Reason as a strict or one-sided dichotomy. On the contrary, as Adrian Johnston points out:
Counterintuitively, the determinations of the understanding sublationally (als Aufhebung)
pass over or are transubstantiated into the fluidity of the moments of reason precisely at
the (tipping) point of their maximum degree of ‘fixity’ or ‘rigidity’ (that is, nonfluidity).
In a coincidence of opposites, fixed/rigid Verstand transitions into fluid or supple
Vernunft specifically at the very height of its fixity/rigidity; the understanding comes
closest to reason exactly when the former appears to be at the greatest distance from the
latter, when Verstand contracts into the most extreme, exaggerated versions of its
(seemingly) subrational (qua neither dialectical nor speculative) defining characteristics
(such as the understanding’s insistence on the absoluteness of classical bivalent logic).23
Indeed, Hegel states that the “usual practice of separating understanding and reason is, from
every point of view, to be rejected.”24 As Angelica Nuzzo notes, “Hegel transforms
‘understanding’ and ‘reason’ from subjective mental ‘faculties’ to formal ‘moments’ of
‘objective thinking’.”25 This is to say that Reason and Understanding exhibit a dialectical
relationship. The fulfillment or culmination of the Understanding (as its sublation) is Reason26,
which I explore in more detail in later chapters. One important point to note here is that although
the Absolute inherently limits itself, it simultaneously strives to arrive at a deeper knowledge of

22

G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, ed. H.D. Lewis (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969),
610-611. Henceforth, Science of Logic, unless otherwise noted (in the case of the usage of a different
translation, I will note specifically).
23
Adrian Johnston, A New German Idealism: Hegel, Žižek, and Dialectical Materialism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2018), xviii-xix ff. For more on Hegel’s conception of the relationship
between the Understanding and Reason see Johnston, A New German Idealism, xviii ff.
24
G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, 612. For more on the understanding and reason, see also 610-612.
25
Angelica Nuzzo, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How does Hegel’s Logic Begin?,” in The
Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, ed. Nectarios G. Limnatis (New York: Continuum, 2010), 12.
26
Ibid., 16. See also Adrian Johnston, A New German Idealism: Hegel, Žižek, and Dialectical
Materialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), xviii ff.
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itself. Indeed, as we will see, self-limitation is what drives the whole process forward in the
constitution of the Absolute.
0.3) The Fundamental Movement at Work in Hegel’s Metaphysics
The fundamental and primordial ontological movement at work from the beginning of
Hegel’s metaphysics (as evinced by the “Doctrine of Being” in the Science of Logic) is the
“negation of negation.” This movement implies major consequences for how we are to
understand Hegel’s thought and it is the primary interpretive framework that I will utilize
throughout this dissertation in order to think along with Hegel. As we will see, on Hegel’s
account, everything in existence is defined by its negation. In fact, in the beginning, pure
negativity repeats itself and Hegel identifies this movement as the Absolute.
With regard to the notion that every determinate thing is defined by negation, in section
91 of Hegel’s EL, Hegel makes a specific reference to Spinoza. He writes there, “the foundation
for every determinacy is negation (omnis determinatio est negatio [all determination is negation]
as Spinoza says.” 27,28 Hegel’s own example from section 81 of the EL is the basic example of
considering human beings as “mortal.”29 In the format in which the Understanding functions, to
call a human being “mortal” is to apply a universal term of identity and categorization. All
mortal things are living, of course. To identify a living being as a mortal (in terms of the
Understanding) is then to group all living beings together under the term “mortal.” The problem
is that, for the Understanding, “dying is then regarded as something that has its cause in
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extraneous circumstances only.”30 Hegel’s point here is that internal to the universal term applied
by the Understanding is actually its opposite. It is not that there are merely two different
properties at play here. Rather, internal to the concept of life as such is death. As Hegel
continues, “The true way to construe the matter, however, is that life as such carries within itself
the germ of death and that, generally speaking, the finite contradicts itself in itself and for that
reason sublates itself.”31 Lastly, in the final stage of Logic, Reason comes to the third stage in
which there is a grasping of a unity of the two prior stages – a unity of identity as well as one of
difference. However, and this point is crucial to my entire dissertation – even such a unity must
not remain an abstract unity conceived on the order of the mere Understanding alone.
This is to say that for Logic to truly reach the third stage, both the Understanding and
Reason must pass beyond themselves into each other. When Reason and the Understanding reach
a harmony, they in fact achieve a concrete unity – this is a unity on the order of “concrete
universality.” And, in fact, Hegel himself tells us that this is the case. Hegel writes in the EL, “If
we say, for instance, ‘the absolute is the unity of subjective and objective,’ this is, to be sure,
correct but one-sided insofar as only the unity is expressed here and emphasis is placed on it
alone, whereas in fact the subjective and the objective are indeed not only identical but also
distinct.”32 Hegel’s point here is crucial to the entire argument of my dissertation. Hegel attempts
to demonstrate how in a concrete unity, each term of the union is simultaneously one but also
different. Slavoj Žižek elaborates on this notion, stating: “[Hegel’s] point...is not only that
identity is always the identity of identity and difference, but that difference itself is also always
the difference between itself and identity.”33 This is significant, since it implies that Hegel is
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always a thinker of the “both and…”34 Significantly, Hegel does not remain a thinker on the
order of a unity that is static or provide a conception of identity that either the Understanding or
Reason could reach of its own accord. Rather, on Hegel’s account, the Understanding and
Reason only achieve a true harmony of an ontological type via a process of sublation – a process
in which the culmination of the Understanding is its sublation into Reason.35 But, since the
whole movement is one of the Absolute, this means that God’s nature is one of selftranscendence.
0.4) Hegel’s Metaphysics of “Transcendence-In-Immanence”36
On my account, Hegel is a mystic philosopher in the sense that he shows how the
inaccessible as such is actually internal to genuine knowledge. Again, Hegel himself explains
how this is the case in his EL.37 He writes there:
As regards the significance of the speculative, it bears mentioning here that the same
thing is to be understood by it as formerly used to be called the mystical, especially when
referring to religious consciousness and its content. When one speaks of the mystical
today, it is normally taken to be synonymous with the mysterious and the
incomprehensible, and the mysterious and incomprehensible are then – depending on the
respective educational background and mindset – regarded by some as something
genuine and true, but by others as belonging to superstition and deception. In this regard,
it should be noted first that the mystical is indeed something mysterious, but only for the
understanding, whereas the mystical (taken as synonymous with the speculative) is the
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concrete unity of those determinations that count as true for the understanding only in
their separation and opposition.38,39
According to Hegel, a complete account of knowledge must allow for incompleteness on the
order of the Understanding. If the Understanding and Reason are fundamentally bound together
in the way in which Hegel explains, then neither the Understanding nor Reason alone is able to
provide a coherent view of the whole. On Hegel’s account, both the Understanding and Reason
must participate in the concrete (substance, material), in which a genuine unity exists beyond the
mere subjective order. But if what is mystical is rational according to Hegel (if the inaccessible is
made accessible) it is so only via a repetition of emptiness – in other words, the mystical is only
made rational to the extent that the subjective ego itself must undergo the possibility of its own
non-existence.
Along these lines, Hegel’s metaphysical position regarding the fact that each and every
thing in existence ultimately contains its opposite latent within it, also applies to his conception
of the Absolute. The most elegant way to think of the Absolute is in terms of a transcendentimmanent, since for Hegel, in order to truly understand God, we cannot think of God as either
merely transcendent or immanent. God must in some ways be both transcendent and immanent.
In fact, it is God’s otherness itself that is present on Hegel’s account.
However, it is my contention that Hegel’s point is not just that God is as the transcendent
Other. Rather, due to Hegel’s conception of the concrete universal, Hegel also thinks that God is
present in all of experience. For a person to arrive at genuine knowledge of the Absolute would
mean that reason passes through a genuine experience (a concrete participation) in a transcendent
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substance. However, this simultaneously implies an incompleteness of the sort of knowledge that
could possibly be gleaned of the absolute when it comes to conscious, subjective rationality (if
rationality is conceived as the rationality of a conscious subject).
0.5) A Brief Review of Some Traditional Interpretations of Hegel
To begin with, it is important to remember that Hegel is not a thinker of the mere
Understanding alone. Indeed, Hegel reminds us over and over again that we cannot think the
genuine Absolute from the standpoint of the mere Understanding. Bowie puts it well, then, when
he comments on the “labyrinthine nature of [Hegel’s] texts, the huge divergences between his
interpreters from his own time until today, and the fact that some of the philosophers who now
invoke him come from an analytical tradition noted for its insistence on a clarity not always
encountered in Hegel himself.”40 My point is that Hegel’s philosophy implies a movement
between the Understanding and Reason, not a one-sided position.
In my review of some of the traditional interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy, I will use
the following question to guide my own system of comparison: does Hegel think that reason is
able to achieve full explicative power of its origin? Why or why not? I will refer to the first set of
thinkers as those who categorize Hegel as a thinker of identity (they respond to the first question
in the affirmative). These thinkers generally espouse the view of Hegel as a thinker who believes
that reason is capable of a complete reconciliation as well as a self-reflexive explanation, in the
sense that reason is able to explain its own coming to be in a system. The latter are those
philosophers who would inherently rule out this possibility, since they would categorize Hegel as
primarily a “thinker of difference.” There is something definitely correct about this
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interpretation, in that I agree that reason in principle cannot be fully explicative on Hegel’s
account, as evinced by the fact that the Logic itself begins in the emptiness of substance. That
said, there is something missing from this account in terms of the nature of dialectical
materialism.
On the classical reading (as suggested by thinkers such as Manfred Frank or Andrew
Bowie), Hegel is typically presented as a rationalist, idealist philosopher who propounds an
identity philosophy on the order of the Begriff (“Concept”). Ultimately, the Concept comes to
know itself in its otherness from itself – there is in some sense only the Concept and “nothing”
besides. I concede that there is something definitely correct about this reading in the sense that
there is “nothing” besides the Concept. However, where we disagree is with regard to the
importance of this “nothing” to Hegel’s system. On my reading, the “nothing” (what I often refer
to as emptiness) itself becomes fundamentally constitutive of the entire absolute subject. For this
reason, claims to self-reflexive completeness are inherently flawed, since the Concept itself is
inherently constituted by its own passage through nothingness. As Ruda and Comay note,
Hegel’s style throughout the Logic further evinces this point along the lines of a repetition of
emptiness at the beginning of the system itself.41 Furthermore, I agree with Žižek that Hegel’s
philosophy is a type of “dialectical materialism.”42 On this interpretation, Hegel’s beginning is
both material and ideal, but it is only known as such after the fact. At the beginning of Hegel’s
entire metaphysical system stands a repetition of empty substance. A repetition of empty
substance results in a division of that which subsequently demonstrates itself as that which must

41

Comay and Ruda, The Dash, 94.
As Žižek writes “...dialectical materialism is the only true philosophical inheritor of what Hegel
designates as the speculative attitude of thought towards objectivity.” Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil:
Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2014), 4. See also Žižek, Less
Than Nothing.
42

14

have always already been unified at the start (qua nothing), as the difference between the two
elements is simultaneously preserved and overcome (via sublation). I argue that, for this reason,
the deepest kernel of Hegel’s spirit is actually not that of a scientist at all – but rather that of a
sage.
On my interpretation, as we will see, Hegel is a thinker of both identity and difference.
On Hegel’s account, reason is only able to claim the necessity of its coming to be retroactively
and therefore, its coming to be is never fully explained by (nor reduced to) the system as such. In
this sense, Hegel’s position on the beginning is actually similar to Schelling’s position at the
beginning of the Weltalter (this fact also crucially entails that Hegel must acknowledge the
primordial and fundamental importance of both identity and difference at the same time).
0.5.1) Hegel as Primarily a Thinker of Identity (or System)
The first traditional reading of Hegel that I will consider presents Hegel as primarily a
thinker who provides a system of explicative reason. In this reading, philosophers (consider as
one example, for instance, Charles Taylor) categorize Hegel primarily as a thinker of rational
identity. Under this conception of Hegel, Hegel’s primary aim is to provide an ultimately rational
(and complete) account of metaphysics in which the system itself is capable of achieving full
transparency to itself. As Andrew Bowie writes, “most histories of German Idealism see Hegel
as making the vital steps towards a complete systematic philosophy which goes beyond the
limitations of Fichte and Schelling (for example, Kroner 1924).”43 Philosophers who read Hegel
in this way ultimately aim to demonstrate Hegel as a philosopher who aims to display
rationality’s internal coherence with itself.
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There have indeed been many philosophers who have interpreted Hegel in this way
throughout the history of philosophy. As Wendell Kisner observes, “the criticism launched at
Hegel for allegedly subsuming difference and otherness under an all-encompassing absolute
spirit... goes back at least to Heidegger’s lecture course on Hegel and is no doubt exacerbated by
the interpretations put forward by Bradley and McTaggart (and later by Charles Taylor and
David Inwood.)”44 In fact, Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda further note how this line of critique
of Hegel goes as far back as Kierkegaard. They write:
Hegel’s critics from Kierkegaard onward, have never stopped reviling Hegel’s absolute
idealism as a philosophy of identity (or of narcissism, if you wish): it swallows
contingencies, it smothers singularities, it cancels out time, it consigns historical suffering
to the slaughter bench of history.45
Tracing this historical line of critique even further back, Stephen Houlgate comments on the
historical impact of Schelling’s critical reception of Hegel’s philosophy:
The claim that Schelling’s critique of Hegel has exercised considerable influence on
subsequent generations of philosophers is undeniably true. Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, and
Engels all heard Schelling lecture in the years after Hegel’s death in 1831 and were
receptive to his critique of the Hegelian system.46
Indeed, many of Hegel’s contemporaries were influenced by Schelling’s 1827 critique of Hegel.
Schelling’s rejection of the beginning of the Hegelian system had a lasting historical influence.
Many of the later philosophers who reject Hegel’s system on similar grounds could be
considered historical inheritors of Schelling’s critical position in his 1827 critique of Hegel
(which I address in Chapter Five).
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Let us now examine Charles Taylor’s view of Hegel in more detail.47 Taylor’s view is
essentially one of a cosmic Geist that posits itself in order to come to know itself in finite human
subjects. Taylor’s interpretation of Hegel is that, eventually, contingency is overcome by the
higher-order unity of rational necessity that is, most fundamentally speaking, that of Geist’s selfpositing. As Taylor writes:
Hence we get beyond the problem of a contingent or merely given starting point by rising
above it to a vision of ontological necessity which englobes it. We rise to a vision of
seamless necessity, and from this vantage point we see that our original starting point,
along with everything which is, is part of the same web. So that nothing is left outside,
nothing is merely given; and Geist as wholly self-positing is truly free, truly infinite, in
an absolute sense that has no parallel with finite spirits.48
Taylor’s interpretation is that Hegel ultimately aims to display the necessity of Geist in a
conceptual, ontological sense. Although there is certainly something right about Taylor’s view –
for instance, that Spirit comes to be in time and that Spirit is not fully aware of itself in the
beginning as itself, etc., Taylor’s view is also incomplete. The irony is that Taylor’s view is
incomplete insofar as he does not sufficiently emphasize49 the incompleteness of Geist itself.
We see this perhaps most clearly in Taylor’s discussion of contingency in Hegel’s
system. Taylor admits that there is space for contingency in Hegel’s system, but that this
contingency must ultimately be derived from higher-order necessity. Taylor writes, “but this play
of interstitial contingency, as it were, does not introduce an element of the simply given, which
Geist has not derived from himself. On the contrary, contingency and its place in the universe is
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itself derived by necessity from the requirements of absolute subjectivity.”50 Here, however,
Taylor fails to acknowledge the fact that necessity itself is ontologically bound up with
contingency on Hegel’s view. My point (and here I am in agreement with Žižek, Comay, and
Ruda) is that it is not only that contingency is derived from higher-order necessity, but that an
“experience of the impossibility of experience”51 stands at the basis of necessity as such.
The general inadequacy, so to speak, with “identity” readings of Hegel, then, is the
fundamental claim that Hegel ontologically prioritizes identity over difference. On my
understanding of Hegel’s position, identity and difference are co-primordial. The issue with these
readings, then, is that they are incomplete insofar as the role of incompleteness to the overall
system is not sufficiently conceptualized in its profundity. These thinkers tend to claim (or at the
very least their interpretation could lend itself to the view) that Hegel’s position is that reason is
ultimately able to explain its own origin. I disagree with this interpretation of Hegel. On my
understanding, Hegel is actually a dialectical thinker of the “both…and...”52 In fact, Hegel
himself reminds us repeatedly that one-sided views of the dialectic are partial. In other words,
Hegel is not a thinker of mere identity or difference. Rather, he is a thinker of both identity and
difference simultaneous with neither mere identity nor difference considered alone.
Another reason why I argue against the interpretation of Hegel as an identity philosopher
(of this specific type) is that Hegel himself explains that the only way in which reason is fully
unified is in terms of the concrete universal (the unity of reason with material substance) –
however, in such a unity, thought actually passes beyond itself in its union with its opposite. This
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means that a philosophy of identity must be careful not to prioritize identity on the order of
thought over an identity on the order of the unity of thought with being (which implies both
identity and difference and neither merely one nor the other considered alone). In other words, a
genuine identity is achieved when both thought and being are unified, but this simultaneously
implies their difference from each other.
One other way in which those who argue in favor of Hegel as a thinker of identity (who
attempts to explain reason in a completely self-reflexive way) might support their argument
could be to point to the way in which Hegel refers to Aristotle at the end of his Philosophy of
Spirit (from the EL). In his paper, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” Paul Redding explains how
Hegel refers to Aristotle at the end of that work. Redding astutely observes:
Crucially, Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit concludes with a quote from Aristotle’s account
of divine thinking in Metaphysics Λ.9 (Hegel 1971: §577) in which ‘theos’ is
characterized as a process of pure thinking that is directed to no object independent of
itself, but which is, somehow, its own content (see Vol. 1, Ch. 5). Divine thinking is just
the thinking of thinking itself: ‘noesis noeseos noesis’ (Aristotle 1935: Λ.9 1074b 3335).53
On my interpretation, however, this quote is not further evidence in favor of the interpretation of
Hegel as a totalizing thinker. Although I acknowledge Hegel’s reference to Aristotle here and
Aristotle’s notion of divine thinking as “the thinking of thinking itself,” on my interpretation, this
quote is actually further evidence of the way in which Hegel conceives of a primordial unity of
thought and being. This is because on my understanding, when Aristotle refers to nous thinking
itself, there Aristotle refers to thought’s unity with being – a sort of meditative self-reflection that
need not imply a reflection of a totalizing nature. To give the full context of the passage from
Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Metaphysics 1072b), Aristotle writes there:
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And thought thinks itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it
becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that
thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the
object of thought, i.e. the substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this
object...and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best.54
On my interpretation of this passage, here Aristotle refers to thought’s awareness of itself in its
union with being – when thought empties itself out to take on the object of intelligible actuality
as such. In other words, thought’s contemplation of itself (in its unity with being) need not imply
that rationality is completely self-reflexive.
My interpretation of this passage is further supported by my reading of Aristotle’s De
Anima III.5. There, divine nous, insofar as it is actual, is the divine counterpart to the active nous
(νου̃ς ποιητικός) in the human soul. To put it briefly, the meditation of divine nous on itself in
actuality is a meditation on the order of both thought and being, not a meditation merely on the
order of thought.55
In the context of a discussion about different religious attitudes, Redding further notes
how “Hegel was confident that his logic provided a framework within which such disparate
elements could be ultimately reconciled.”56 However, my point is that a reconciliation of
disparate elements (in the way in which Hegel conceived of reconciliation, specifically) need not
imply a complete explanation or reduction. In fact, on Hegel’s account, it could not possibly
imply such an explanation. Furthermore, even if we concede Redding’s point that “Hegel was
consistently opposed to any such attempts to base a religious or any other orientation on the
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feelings of the ‘heart’ rather than on the conceptuality of reason,”57 it is also true that from the
standpoint of his own conceptual system, Hegel must acknowledge the emptiness of divinity as
ontologically fundamental to the conceptuality of a developed reason. Thus, the ultimate irony is
that if Hegel is the thinker at the extreme when it comes to the development of conceptual
rationality, his conceptual system is actually grounded in a similar insight as Schelling’s system
(the thinker who is more traditionally acknowledged as the one who thinks beyond idealism).
This is to say that the abyss at the base of reason is concurrent with the abyss at the base of
freedom, even if the two thinkers approach metaphysics from a fundamentally different
conception (here I am specifically thinking in terms of style). Schelling (especially in his
Freiheitsschrift and onward) consciously starts from the standpoint of the heart, whereas Hegel
begins from the standpoint of reason (which in fact, ironically, takes him back to the depths of
the heart in its union with divine substance).
0.5.2) Hegel as Primarily a Thinker of Difference (or Freedom)
The second position that I consider is the notion of Hegel as most fundamentally a
thinker of difference. For instance, on this reading, one could characterize Hegel as a postmodern thinker. One might contend, for example, that Hegel attempts to think of difference itself
as the primary ontological feature of metaphysics. However, this, too, would be to misconstrue
Hegel’s view. Rather, Hegel hopes to show how both difference and identity are internal to the
Absolute at the same time. Although Hegel at one moment claims that reason ultimately
demonstrates its necessity, he is only able to make such a claim retroactively. This means that
there is a primordial moment of contingency, even on Hegel’s account. Despite this fact, Hegel is
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always functioning as a thinker of both identity and difference (considered together) within his
system of metaphysics.
On a related note, on my view, Hegel’s philosophy itself is a sublation (Aufhebung) of
Kant’s transcendental philosophy. This means that there is something retained from Kant’s view,
while Hegel simultaneously transcends the Kantian viewpoint. In agreement with Adrian
Johnston, I think that Hegel comes historically after Kant, but simultaneously thinks beyond
Kant.58 Hegel gathers the main insight of transcendental philosophy. However, on Hegel’s
account, the gap between subject and object is not limited to the reason of a knowing subject.
Rather, on Hegel’s view, the gap between subject and object is constitutive of the Absolute as
such.59
Along these lines, my interpretive camp is not merely post-modern. I do not claim that
Hegel is the father of post-modernity. This is to say that Hegel does not aim to demonstrate the
fundamental priority of mere difference. Rather, he aims to show something even more radical:
he aims to show that a repetition of emptiness “grounds” the heart of the Absolute.
0.5.3) Hegel as a Thinker of Both Identity and Difference (Both System and Freedom,
taken together, in a precise sense)60
For the reasons noted above, in this dissertation, I am primarily concerned with a Hegel
who thinks at the intersection of modernity and post-modernity (in this sense, my reading is
closely aligned with Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Hegel). My reading could be characterized as
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located in the camp of the “New Hegelians,” here I am thinking in particular of thinkers like
Žižek and Johnston.61 Of course, as Gavin Hyman has noted, not all of the “New Hegelians”
agree on every aspect of their interpretation of Hegel.62 However, these thinkers are unified
insofar as they attempt to achieve two aims: 1) to explain how Hegel reconceives of terms that
have traditionally been understood to constitute a dichotomy (notions such as “form” and
“content” or “necessity” and “contingency”), but to simultaneously think them in terms of their
identity as well as difference and 2) to reject both the notion of a “metaphysical” Hegel
(propounded by thinkers such as Derrida, Levinas, Adorno, Deleuze, and Bataille) as well as the
“deflationary” accounts of Hegel (proposed by thinkers such as Pippin, Brandom, Pinkard and
Lewis and others).63
In their rejection of the metaphysical caricature of Hegel, the New Hegelians reject the
notion of a Hegel who subsumes all of reality under a higher-order identity of self-explicative
rationality. I agree with this “New Hegelian” rejection of such an interpretation. On my
understanding, this could not possibly represent a correct interpretation of Hegel’s view, since in
the Science of Logic, the beginning of reason as “Being” is in fact located in the emptiness (and
negativity) of material substance.64 This means that even if one can retroactively claim the
necessity of reason, ontology will always be incomplete when it comes to rationality’s selfreflexive reconstruction.
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0.6) Entäußerung65,66: God’s Self-Emptying and Hegel’s account of the Absolute
Hegel aims to provide an account of how it is the case that consciousness could arrive at
genuine knowledge of the Absolute (although his account will in fact imply that such a
knowledge is inherently incomplete). That said, on Hegel’s thinking, the accounts of his
predecessors have been inadequate in various ways. As one example, Kant’s account of
metaphysics removes the possibility of genuine knowledge of the Absolute. As Kant famously
states in his Critique of Pure Reason, “I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.”
(Bxxx) 67 Hegel differs from Kant, however, since on Hegel’s account it is possible to have
genuine knowledge (although what we mean by knowledge here will need to be clarified) of a
transcendent God (albeit as long as one acknowledges that he or she genuinely participates in the
Absolute as substance when passing beyond individualistic reason). The notion of Entäußerung
(“divestment”) is therefore crucial to understanding Hegel’s metaphysics, both in the sense of
God’s primordial action of emptying itself out as well as one’s participation in divinity by
following suit. In his “Translator’s Note” to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Terry Pinkard
comments on the theological importance of Hegel’s usage of the German term, a term that
Luther had also employed in reference to God’s kenosis in the Bible.68 As we will see, since the
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action of divestment is ontologically primordial on Hegel’s account, even the reflexivity of
consciousness could never imply a complete, conscious self-knowledge of the Absolute.
On Hegel’s account of metaphysics, all of reality, including God’s becoming, is initially
granted by an act of Entäußerung 69 (“divestment”). In the beginning, God divests itself from out
of itself. In other words, in the beginning there is pure negation (empty substance beyond even
the concept of negation or the concept of nothingness). Hegel then comments on how this
original act of negation (beyond the possible attribution of a predicate on the order of the
Understanding) which results in an apparent immediacy, in fact displays itself as always already
mediated, since it stands in some relation to its opposite. Consequently, Hegel argues that God’s
initial act of emptying itself out (pure negation) eventually unveils itself as a positive act of selfconstitution (qua the negation of negation). That said, God’s original act of emptying itself out
always simultaneously implies a transcendence that could never be fully captured by conscious
reason. This is because substance itself is always deeper than what a conceptual structure could
possibly capture in conscious reflection.
Hegel’s description of the Absolute is also what enables him to develop a position of
consciousness toward objectivity, which, according to Hegel, is the most advanced position of
thought towards objective reality that is possible. At this final stage, thought arrives at the view
that its self-transcendence is one with its identity. In other words, God comes to know itself as
itself in its otherness from itself. Despite this fact, Hegel’s notion of reflexive reason does not
claim to capture the process in its entirety via concepts. Despite recognizing a certain implicit
conceptual structure to the process, Hegel does not claim to capture the fullness of reality in his
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Logic, since God’s self-divestment is a movement that inherently transcends what conceptual
thinking could possibly grasp.
0.7) Schelling and Hegel on das Unvordenkliche
In Schelling’s drafts of the Weltalter, he writes of das Unvordenkliche (“unprethinkable
being”). Unprethinkable being is Schelling’s term for that which thinking must retroactively
presuppose as always already there in order for reason to be possible at all. This is because for
thought-determinations to be possible at all, there must already be a logical “space” or domain
that opens up the possibility for such determinations to take place.
Schelling writes of the “unprethinkable” in a fragment:
It is what comes before and precedes even whatever is thinkable; were it not otherwise
the unprethinkable, the first? It is not something posited, for it posits itself. But it is not
even that this self-positing could be thought of as a particular thinkable act. Instead, it is
to be understood in that sense with which one says that something makes itself, but only
in order to stress that it occurs of itself, without our doing anything. It is that which any
positing whatsoever already presupposes, what is already there before we give it a
thought or stumble upon it. In this way it has always already assumed the place of
unconditionality, regardless of how early we come upon it.70
Of course, one cannot think the unprethinkable directly nor can one provide an explanation for it,
since it precedes any possible thought-determination. Later on in this dissertation, I draw out
some of the significant similarities and differences between Schelling’s account of
unprethinkability and Hegel’s beginning in the Science of Logic. As one example, both Hegel
and Schelling agree that the beginning of philosophy is located beyond the order of objective
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thinking. On both accounts, something like the unprethinkability of being stands at the beginning
of philosophy.71
Contemporary scholar Markus Gabriel also writes about Schelling on the unprethinkable
in his book, Transcendental Ontology:
unprethinkable being is the ‘starting point’ that exists ‘before all thinking.’
Unprethinkable being is unprethinkable in the sense that it is precisely that which we
cannot not think, that which is at play in all thought but about which no grounded or
groundable thought can be presupposed as possible. Unprethinkable being is thus only
the name for the very structure of presupposition of all determinations, and not some
transcendent je ne sais quoi.72
Many scholars (consider Andrew Bowie or Manfred Frank as two of the most prominent
proponents of this position) argue that Schelling and Hegel differ on the point of whether or not
the “beginning” of reason is explicable. In these traditional interpretations, what distinguishes
Schelling’s view from Hegel’s is that on Hegel’s account the system ultimately becomes fully
rational and transparent to itself. According to Hegel, these scholars argue, the beginning is
eventually explained via the totalizing nature of reason. On the other hand, the beginning for
Schelling is inexplicable qua unprethinkable being.
My argument is distinct from these traditional interpretations in that I argue that Hegel
grounds his dialectical metaphysics in a notion that is akin to Schelling’s notion of
unprethinkable being. Žižek makes a similar argument that Schelling’s WA stands at the basis of
dialectical materialism. As Kelsey Wood notes, “Žižek locates the origin of dialectical
materialism in a particular moment or problematic in the philosophy of Schelling.” 73 As Žižek
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observes in his book Indivisible Remainder, “For Schelling, then, the primordial, radically
contingent fact, a fact which can in no way be accounted for, is freedom itself, a freedom bound
by nothing, a freedom which, in a sense, is Nothing; and the problem is, rather, how this Nothing
of the abyss of freedom becomes entangled in the causal chains of reason.”74
We find a similar explanation of Schelling’s beginning in Gabriel’s description of
unprethinkable being as beyond the notion of “nothing” conceived as a determinate nothing. He
writes, “[unprethinkable being] is not some causa sui or absolute I in an idealistic sense. It is
itself nothing, and even this is incorrect: it is nothing that could be said to be identical to itself;
thus it is not even nothing.”75 Interestingly enough, here I note the connection to Žižek’s book on
dialectical materialism entitled, Less than Nothing (incidentally, this phrasing for the title reiterates Hegel’s phrasing from the beginning of the SL in Chapter One (“Being”) of the
“Doctrine of Being” where Hegel states that the beginning as “Being...is in fact nothing, and
neither more nor less than nothing.”76) In his book, too, Žižek notes the connection between the
starting point of dialectical materialism and Schelling’s notion of unprethinkability.
I argue in favor of the point that Hegel and Schelling arrive at similar notions here, since
for Hegel’s account of the coming to be Spirit to make sense at all, Hegel must acknowledge that
reason is only able to arrive at knowledge of its beginning as itself via a process that takes place
in time. In other words, there is a moment of genuine contingency even in Hegel’s position on
the beginning: Hegel’s beginning, too, is only necessary in a contingent sense.77
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On Gabriel’s account, Hegel and Schelling differ on the point about whether that which
opens up the possibility for thinking to take place is itself contingent or necessary. Gabriel
writes:
That there is reflection, in other words, that thinking and theory building processes take
place, that the world thematizes itself and a logical space of possibility is opened, is
according to Schelling a contingent fact. Hegel, on the contrary, endorses a strong
anthropic principle, as it were, which states that of necessity something and thus logical
space is given and that therein reflection came to be. Hegel has it that finite thinkers qua
the place of reflection could not not have taken place.78
In many ways, my dissertation is an attempt to show how, even if Hegel’s stated aim is to show
the necessity of the givenness of logical space, Hegel himself must in fact resort to a more
primordial contingency. In other words, due to the terms of Hegel’s own system, the givenness
of logical space is only contingently necessary (once it arrives on the scene, it appears that it
must have always already been the case) in such a way that Hegel and Schelling’s position on the
beginning are actually quite similar.79,80
0.8) Hegel of the Science of Logic and Schelling of the Ages of the World
Along similar lines, I argue that both Hegel of the SL and Schelling of the WA express
similar metaphysical positions. Both philosophers agree that the highest standpoint of
consciousness is when consciousness arrives at a knowledge of the unity of subject and object
(but this leads both of them to develop dialectical materialist positions). Both philosophers argue
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against the limitations of a one-sided dialectical position in which such a unity is conceived on
the order of the Understanding alone. Hegel and Schelling both take the unity of consciousness
with divine substance as their metaphysical starting point. And both philosophers also agree that
there is a moment when the divine alienates itself from itself in order to come to know itself.
The positions of Hegel and Schelling differ, however, insofar as Schelling provides a
more explicit answer to the question of why God differentiates itself from itself in the first place.
On Schelling’s view, God’s original being (which Schelling in his 1811 WA draft conceives as a
will that wills nothing) is co-eternal with a will that desires to know itself. This co-eternity of
wills develops in God in order for God to come to know itself as love. Although an ontology of
dialectical materialism is consistent with the metaphysical positions of both philosophers,
Schelling provides more of a direct response to the question of why the Godhead divests itself
from out of itself in the first place. On Schelling’s account, via an act of contraction, the
Godhead creates a space in which God is able to genuinely differ from itself for the sake of an
experiential knowledge of freedom. Schelling’s conception of freedom here is so radical that
God creates the possibility for evil to exist out of its love for creation and in recognition of the
nature of freedom. On Schelling’s account, for creation to be made in love, even the devil must
be given the freedom to align its will with God’s will (to love) rather than to will evil.
0.9) The Overall Structure of My Argument
By way of a conclusion, I will introduce the main topics of each chapter:
In Chapter One, I explain how consciousness learns of its self-sacrificial nature at the end
of the Phenomenology of Spirit and how this relates to the beginning of Hegel’s Science of
Logic. In Chapter Two, I further comment on this connection in relation to the overall task of
Hegel’s SL. There, I also consider different possible interpretations of the relationship between
30

Hegel’s Phenomenology and his Science of Logic including the notion of a “non-relation”81 as
suggested by Comay and Ruda. In Chapter Three, I return to the topic of the beginning of
Hegel’s SL and the nature of the beginning. For example, is the beginning dialectical or (Un)dialectical (as both and neither?) In Chapter Four, I present my argument for the unity of
Schelling (of the WA) and Hegel’s (of the SL) position on the beginning of metaphysics. In
Chapter Five, I examine further connections between Hegel’s Phenomenology and the Logic in
relation to Schelling’s Ages of the World. I argue that both thinkers understand the dual-natured
task of metaphysics and the divine as present in all of experience (they are both thinkers of a
pantheistic monism). In addition, I analyze Schelling’s 1827 critique of Hegel’s SL. I explain
one way in which I disagree with Schelling’s critique and demonstrate some of the metaphysical
consistencies between the accounts of the two thinkers. I also examine some of the deeper
connections to Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation (1841). However, while both thinkers are
metaphysically consistent, I argue that Schelling provides a more developed account of why the
process occurs in the first place – the entire process is for the purpose of the revelation of the
divine as love.
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CHAPTER ONE
ABSOLUTE KNOWING AND THE EMPTINESS OF SPIRIT IN HEGEL’S
PHENOMENOLOGY
1.1) Introduction
In this chapter, my primary task is to interpret the meaning of “Absolute Knowing” in
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Absolute knowing is important to the topic of my dissertation,
insofar as it pertains to the question of whether or not Hegel believes that rationality is ultimately
of a totalizing nature.82,83 One mainstream, traditional reading of this section of the
Phenomenology of Spirit has been that absolute knowing is where reason arrives at knowledge of
the self-reflexivity (and completeness) of its own nature. This is to say that, after passing through
the historical shapes of the Phenomenology, reason finally arrives at a complete grasp of its own
nature and the nature of the world as rational. For thinkers who adopt this view, it might seem
that this section represents the moment at which consciousness (in its unity with the Absolute)
attains a complete knowledge of itself and the rationality of the world. Žižek refers to this
interpretation – one on which reason imparts a telos from out of itself and all of creation works
towards the unfolding of the identity of Spirit – as that of the “textbook Hegel.”84
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I consider contemporary philosopher Tom Rockmore a proponent of this classical
interpretation of Hegel when it comes to his view of absolute knowing. For example, Rockmore
writes of the section on “Absolute Knowing”:
For Hegel, the highest form of knowledge turns out to be self-knowledge, or knowing
oneself in otherness and otherness as oneself. He sees the problem of knowledge as coming
to an end in the subject's full conceptual grasp of itself.85
Here, it is clear Rockmore’s interpretation is that Spirit attains a conceptual knowledge of the
identity of identity and difference in absolute knowing. In other words, Spirit attains knowledge
of the fact that it remains itself even in its otherness from itself. Furthermore, Rockmore
contends that Spirit arrives at a complete conceptual knowledge of itself. For these reasons,
Rockmore’s view here seems aligned with what Žižek refers to as the “textbook Hegel.” The
interpretation of this particular section as one of a complete conceptual knowing of Spirit is
connected with the more general interpretation of Hegel as a thinker of synthesis (as an identity
philosopher).
There is, of course, something right about Rockmore’s view, in the sense that Spirit does
attain a type of knowledge of itself as the Absolute here. Indeed, in the “Introduction” to the
Phenomenology, Hegel discusses Absolute Knowing in the context of a discussion of how
consciousness, historically speaking, arrives at a genuine understanding of the relationship
between itself and the Absolute. The topic there is a familiar one – how to develop a science
based in a proper understanding of the relationship between consciousness and the Absolute. At
the end of the “Introduction,” Hegel writes:
In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a point at which it
gets rid of its semblance of being burdened by something alien, with what is only for it,
and some sort of ‘other’, at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, so
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that its exposition will coincide at just this point with the authentic Science of Spirit. And
finally, when consciousness itself grasps this its own essence, it will signify the nature of
absolute knowledge itself.86
On the surface, this portion of text may seem to provide further support for the reading of Hegel
as an identity philosopher. However, on my interpretation, what Hegel says here does not merely
eliminate difference from the Absolute. Rather, absolute knowing represents the moment at
which consciousness understands difference as internal to itself – i.e., the moment when
consciousness understands that it is internally incomplete. In other words, for “appearance” to
become identical with “essence” means that appearance itself takes on the form of the other as
itself. Also of note, the German word that is translated here as “grasp” is not begreift but it is
actually erfäßt. Although the two words are sometimes synonymous (when meaning “grab hold
of” or “grip”), erfäßt could also be translated as “comprehend,” “apprehend,” or “ascertain.” On
my reading, for consciousness to “erfäßt sein Wesen” (comprehend its essence) need not imply
completeness, but rather in this case it actually implies knowledge on the order of Spirit’s selftranscendence. Where Rockmore and I seem to disagree, then, is with regard to what it means for
consciousness to “know” its essence. On my interpretation, for consciousness to grasp its essence
here is simultaneously for consciousness to grasp its essence as ungraspable. This is also why
Hegel repeatedly emphasizes the importance of “divestment” to absolute knowing (as we will
see more in later chapters).
In this discussion, let us not forget either that earlier in this same section during a
discussion of how consciousness eventually arrives at genuine knowledge of its nature in relation
to the Absolute, Hegel alludes to the “Stations of the Cross,”87 a process in which consciousness
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“may purify itself for the life of the Spirit.”88 Hegel has in mind a process during which
consciousness must repeatedly purify itself in order to come to know itself as one with the
Absolute. Even so, unity with the Absolute is never of a totalizing nature. In fact, just a few
pages later, Hegel comments on the self-transcendent nature of consciousness. He notes how,
“Consciousness, however, is explicitly the Notion of itself. Hence it is something that goes
beyond limits, and since these limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself.”89 The
nature of consciousness is to transcend itself. Indeed, this is consistent with Hegel’s statement a
few pages later where he characterizes the Phenomenology as a science that is immanent to
consciousness. As Hegel writes there, “since what consciousness examines is its own self, all
that is left for us to do is simply look on.”90
Along these lines, as we will see in this chapter, I argue that we ought to be precise about
the type of knowledge that Spirit gains – what Spirit really comes to understand is a “knowledge”
of a unique type. In order to understand such a knowing more deeply, I pose a couple of
questions: 1.) What would it mean for God to genuinely sacrifice itself? What sort of knowledge
could Spirit come to know via self-sacrifice?
My task in this chapter is therefore two-fold: 1) to elaborate and support my
interpretation of this section and 2) to explain how it fits in with my interpretation of Hegel as a
philosopher who thinks at the interstices of identity and difference. If I can show that Hegel does
not posit the closure of reason (in a completely self-reflexive sense) at the end of the
Phenomenology, then that would provide some support in favor of rejecting the notion of Hegel
as a thinker of totality (or mere identity). That said, there are multiple possible interpretations of

88

Ibid.
Ibid., 51.
90
Ibid., 54.
89

35

the meaning of Absolute Knowing at the end of the Phenomenology by means of which Hegel
would not thereby posit the closure of reason. For example, consider the two versions presented
below:
1.1.1) Two Versions of the “Knowing of Unknowing”
a.) On this interpretation, absolute knowing represents a version of a doctrine of
Socratic ignorance or a kind of “docta ignorantia”91,92 in a broad sense. This version
of the docta ignorantia is consistent with an intellectual virtue of humility in
recognition of the fact that the nature of the divine transcends all possible human
knowledge.
b.) As a subset of the docta ignorantia more broadly construed, Hegel’s type of
docta ignorantia is a specific one (and here, I agree with Žižek that it is unique in the
sense that it pertains to God’s own subjection to emptiness).93 Hegel does not merely
describe a knowing of unknowing (a knowing in which one knows the limits of
one’s knowledge). Rather, more specifically, Hegel suggests that absolute knowing
is an experience in which consciousness itself passes through emptiness. This, I take
it, is analogous to consciousness submitting itself to the same process of crucifixion
as Christ does, when Christ takes on the form of matter, dies, and genuinely
experiences the transcendent. Therefore, Hegel’s reference to the Stations of the
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Cross is a pointed one, since the process is analogous to consciousness preparing
itself for crucifixion in order to become the divine Spirit.
I argue in favor of b.) (the more radical thesis). By arguing in favor of this more radical
interpretation, I provide further support for my reading of Hegel as a thinker of incompleteness.
1.2) Absolute Knowing as a Knowing of God’s Self-Sacrificial Nature
I subsequently argue that the type of knowledge that Spirit attains in absolute knowing is
a knowledge of its own nature construed as a nature of self-sacrifice, divestment, letting go, and
freedom. There is some discussion in the literature that maybe Hegel is not truly a thinker of
incompleteness, due to some of his later views such as he presents them in his Lectures on the
Philosophy of History, as one example.94 In this sense, there may be a historical question about
whether or not the later Hegel is consistent with the insights he presents in his earlier works, such
as the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic.
However, I agree with Žižek’s intuition here that Hegel understands the deepest moment
of Christianity as the claim that the nature of the Absolute is to sacrifice itself out of love.95 For
this reason, the deepest moment of Christianity is not the intellectual virtue of humility. Deeper
even than that is the lived experience of the emptiness of Spirit: God’s self-divestment out of
love for the world. If Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing” is a knowing of unknowing, then it is so in
this precise sense.
1.3) Hegel’s Schellingian Insight
Throughout Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, originally published in 1807, Hegel
describes the concrete historical shapes (or moments) of the being of consciousness that
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consciousness has passed through during the course of history. In this specific sense, the
phenomenology is a “science” (die Wissenschaft) of consciousness, which observes the various
historical moments of the being of consciousness. Each of the historical shapes of consciousness
is contingent – in the sense that they could have been otherwise – yet, it is also the case that each
is simultaneously necessary, insofar as the course that history actually took is the necessary
course that history has taken in the coming to be of Spirit in time (in other words, the path of
consciousness through history is contingently necessary).96 At the same time, Hegel sees how
contingency and necessity are always dialectically bound together in such a way that to speak of
one always already implies its other – in the sense that to understand one it is necessary to think
the other (but more on this later on).
In any case, at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Spirit has arrived at the standpoint
of Absolute Knowledge (das Absolute Wissen). After passing through the previous shapes of
consciousness (of morality and revealed religion most proximately), consciousness comes to the
shape of “Absolute Knowing.” Hegel describes Absolute Knowing as “a reconciliation of
consciousness with self-consciousness”97 and furthermore, along these lines, he writes:
Spirit is this movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its
substance, and also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the
substance into an object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference
between objectivity and content. 98
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Here, Hegel arrives at an insight that Schelling often imparts. If we think of Spirit along the lines
of the three persons (the Trinity) of God internal to the Godhead in Schelling’s account, then the
contours of the overall movement remain the same. Absolute Spirit (what is originally the
Godhead, in Schellingian terms) divests itself (creates a space within itself, negates itself). This
is God’s action out of love. God empties itself out into matter. At the same time, from the
standpoint of matter, the emptiness of substance repeats itself in a return to subjectivity. All the
same, there is no genuine difference between subject and substance. Most properly speaking, the
relation between the two is a “non-relation,”99 as we will see. Spirit is thus the movement of
God’s eternal self-sacrifice – on this point, Hegel and Schelling agree.
1.4) Spirit as both Subject and Substance (and also neither mere Subject nor Substance)100
For the purposes of this dissertation, what is most important here is that as Spirit,
subjectivity is simultaneously both subject and substance (in fact, it is subject that knows itself as
substance), and what this implies is that it is also neither mere subject nor substance.101
Subject which knows itself as substance is also substance “without a subject,”102 since
subject that knows itself as substance recognizes that its own constitution is fundamentally
founded in genuine otherness. As we will see, the subject who knows itself is also the one who
has experienced the lived experience of emptiness to such an extent that even the determinations
of the finite or infinite are conceptually uncertain.
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In other words, the identity of subject and substance is not an identity on the order of a
formal identity such as A=A. Nor is such an identity one that could be stated merely on the order
of an identity statement like “Spirit is the unity of identity and difference.” Although there is
something correct about each of these formalizations of Spirit, the essence of Spirit is in fact a
deeper dialectical “movement,” as Hegel explains. In other words, Spirit is, as living spirit. What
this means is that Spirit is deep enough that only through its own death (which in God is an
eternal, primordial self-sacrifice) could it possibly come to know itself as alive at all. This is why
Hegel explains how the difference between objectivity and content is simultaneously canceled
through Spirit’s self-movement (into substance as subject). As Žižek puts it elsewhere, Spirit, as
a dialectical process without subject, is concurrent with the notion of the Absolute as both
substance and subject.103 In this section of the Phenomenology, the truth of the paradoxes of
Spirit are placed before our eyes very clearly. Spirit as Subject is simultaneously substance
“without a subject,”104 since the Spirit that genuinely knows itself as substance is the lived
experience of a substance-subject in which a separate subject is not perceivable. As Žižek notes,
“[Hegel’s] point there is not only that identity is always the identity of identity and difference,
but that difference itself is also always the difference between itself and identity.”105 Identity’s
self-consciousness of identity simultaneously entails a genuine emptiness that is beyond the mere
difference of identity and difference (or the unity of identity and difference, for that matter): it is
the emptiness of emptiness as such that gives birth to genuine life.
In agreement with Žižek, I consider Hegel’s point here a profound one. It is a point that
has perhaps been misunderstood, and one that is pivotal to how we read Hegel. When Hegel
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asserts the identity of Substance (without subject) as Subject, I believe that he is making a twofold claim: (1) Spirit posits its own negation from out of itself such that the subject itself is
constituted by a lack on the objective order and (2) It is also the case that any identity that Spirit
achieves through this process is simultaneously dissolved: Spirit passes through the genuine
emptiness of emptiness as such. In fact, this dissolution is precisely what constitutes its identity.
1.5) The “Identity” of (In)completeness106
This is to say that identity is constituted by difference, but even so, self-consciousness of
the tension between identity and difference allows for the possibility of the simultaneous
affirmation as well as negation of such tension. In other words, if one is to say that identity is
constituted by the “identity of identity and difference,” then on the Hegelian understanding, one
ought to simultaneously acknowledge that such a unity is also at the same time bound up with
the “difference between itself and identity.”107 These two moments ought to be thought together
— Hegelian dialectics is itself (in)complete (any possible completion is attained via
incompletion and simultaneous with it).
To the extent that any completion could possibly be achieved, then, it simultaneously
points beyond itself and, in that moment, reveals its true finitude and, therefore, its
(in)completion. In other words, on Hegel’s account, the living nature of Spirit’s identity implies
that identity does not simply settle, and thus, as we will see, the genuine Science of Logic is not a
dead one, but a living one on the order of the emptiness of emptiness. Indeed, Hegel writes about
this in the section on “Absolute Knowing” in the Phenomenology of Spirit. There, he writes:
…it is only when the ‘I’ communes with itself in its otherness that the content is
comprehended [i.e. in terms of the Notion]. Stated more specifically, this content is
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nothing else than the very movement just spoken of; for the content is Spirit that traverses
its own self and does so for itself as Spirit by the fact that it has the ‘shape’ of the Notion
in its objectivity.108
In other words, Spirit (as that which is “less than nothing”) divides itself from itself and unites
itself with its other. And as Žižek notes, most properly speaking, there is no Spirit aside from this
very processual movement.109 Spirit becomes as that which goes through the process of division
from itself and finds itself in genuine emptiness only to be re-born and repeat the process all over
again. And, as we will see, Spirit’s other-ing of itself must be so profound that we only come to
know it as Spirit after the fact: there is a moment in which Spirit genuinely loses sight of itself as
Spirit as it passes through the abyss of freedom.
Another way of stating this thesis is to pose the question: what is “Absolute Knowledge”
if not the realization that Spirit’s wholeness is simultaneously its emptiness? Is not the emptiness
of emptiness simultaneously the fullness of fullness? Hegel makes a statement along these lines
when he writes, “the self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or
its limit: to know one’s limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself.”110 Here, I find it interesting
that Hegel equates self-knowledge with sacrifice and even more noteworthy, Hegel makes this
claim in the section of the PhG on “Absolute Knowing.” Hegel’s point here is that there is a
value and wisdom in sacrifice, even in an ontological sense, since even absolute Spirit’s identity
is fundamentally constituted by divestment. Spirit’s knowledge of itself is achieved via a
sacrifice and passage into emptiness. This is why Hegel is a thinker of both identity and
difference, considered together. According to Hegel’s metaphysics, there is no such thing as
identity that is not always already in relation to difference. When it comes to Spirit (as the
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passage through the emptiness of substance) the possibility for higher-order identity or difference
always hangs in the balance, just as the passage between necessity and contingency is ultimately
decided upon by life itself.
1.6) The Self-Sacrificial Nature of the Notion
In the “Introduction” to the book, Hegel and the Infinite, Clayton Crockett and Creston
Davis review a history of thinkers such as Levinas, Derrida, Lyotard and Deleuze, all of whom
they claim have failed to fully appreciate the possibility for genuine difference in Hegel’s
thought. As the main thesis of the book, Crockett and Davis therefore argue in favor of a revival
of the profundity of Hegel’s thought and hope to reveal the possibility for genuine otherness in
Hegel’s philosophy. On the topic of absolute knowledge and the thesis of the book, they state:
Here we merely repeat Slavoj Žižek’s thesis originally submitted
in Le plus sublime des hysteriques: Hegel passé, namely, that Hegelian ‘dialectics
is for Hegel a systematic notation of the failure of all such attempts—‘absolute
knowledge’ denotes a subjective position which finally accepts ‘contradiction’ as an
internal condition of every identity.’ In other words, Hegelian ‘reconciliation’ is not a
pan-logicist sublation of all reality in the Concept but an affirmation of the fact that the
Concept itself is ‘not-all’ (to use this Lacanian term).111
Here again, notice the importance of sacrifice to absolute knowledge. Absolute knowing is not a
totalizing knowledge of self-identity on the order of self-sameness. On the contrary, absolute
knowing is coming to terms with the reality of the tension between completeness and
incompleteness, and recognition of the dialectical nature of identity – every identity is
simultaneously in dialogue with its other. In fact, Hegel explicitly states:
The self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit:
to know one’s limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the
externalization in which Spirit displays the process of its becoming Spirit in the form of
free contingent happening, intuiting its pure Self as Time outside of it, and equally its
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Being as Space.112
Here, Hegel describes a process in which Spirit comes to know itself via self-externalization. Its
coming to know itself is therefore never complete. This entails that the knowledge Spirit gains is
not merely knowledge on the order of an “identity of identity and difference,” since it does not
represent knowledge in the form of a relation of unity; rather Hegel’s point is even more
profound: absolute knowing is an experiential self-transcendence of thought as being.
Along these lines, I agree with Žižek, Crockett, Davis and others here on the point that
Hegel is not a mere thinker of sameness or totality. On the other hand, I believe that Hegel
recognizes how every identity is bound up with difference, even in its fundamental constitution
(we will see this in more detail in my discussion of Hegel’s beginning of the SL in Chapter
Two). If difference in fact goes all the way down to the core of identity, then we ought to think
through the profound consequences of this understanding.
Žižek himself makes a similar point in his own essay contribution to the anthology edited
by Crockett and Davis. In Chapter 11, he writes:
Hegel introduces this notion of ‘oppositional determination’ in his logic of essence, when
he discusses the relationship between identity and difference. His point there is not only
that identity is always the identity of identity and difference, but that difference itself is
also always the difference between itself and identity…113
Here, Žižek’s point is similar to the one I stated at the beginning of this dissertation. As a
consequence of reasoning along these lines, I will hope to show throughout the rest of this
dissertation how Hegel is not a mere thinker of identity (even on the order of the identity of
identity and difference).
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In the SL, Hegel recognizes the fact that there is a two-way relationship between identity
and difference. Surely, one could argue that the identical is capable of uniting itself with its own
other; however, Hegel recognizes further that the dialectical relationship between difference and
identity is such that in order for this to be the case, it must simultaneously be true that difference
is also the difference between difference and itself. Žižek’s point here is that dialectics is not
merely one-fold or two-fold, but in fact, the implications of dialectics are actually four-fold (at
minimum): the other side of the dialectic of the “identity of identity and difference” is the
“difference between itself and identity.”114,115 In recognition of this fact, there must be a third
moment in which difference and identity are affirmed and a subsequent moment in which this
new identity is negated once more. What are we left with? The emptiness of emptiness: life itself
in its genuine, living actuality.
But one might wonder: how is any of this discussion significant when it comes to
Absolute Knowing? In response to this question, I pose the following as a response: Absolute
Knowing is an experiential awareness that has always already been brought before the emptiness
of emptiness. Hegel writes about this in the section on “Absolute Knowing” of the PhG, in the
context of a discussion about the harmony of consciousness and self-consciousness. About this
knowledge, Hegel writes about Spirit’s knowledge not merely of the “in itself” or the “for itself,”
but of the “in and for itself” (which, incidentally, simultaneously implies knowledge of neither).
He writes:
For in it [the unification of consciousness and self-consciousness] Spirit attains to a
knowledge of itself not only as it is in itself or as possessing an absolute content, nor only
as it is for itself as a form devoid of content, or as the aspect of self-consciousness, but as
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it is both in essence and in actuality, or in and for itself. 116
Here, Hegel explains how Spirit’s knowledge of itself is not mere wholeness in the sense of
knowledge of the complete content of itself, nor mere emptiness in the sense of being completely
empty of content of itself. Rather, Spirit’s knowledge of itself (as absolute knowing) is an
awareness and recognition granted by Spirit’s very self-emptying. If the “in itself” would be
absolute content, and the “for itself” would be form empty of content, then the “in and for itself”
represents that which ruptures the very dichotomy between form and content, and in doing so,
constitutes Spirit’s genuine actuality – a relation that is qua (non)relation (as a movement that
opens up the possibility for relationality as well as the overcoming of relationality). Spirit’s
passage – as a repetition of emptiness as such – is that which grants it its constitution as living,
genuine Spirit.
Significantly, while commentaries on the Phenomenology have tended to focus on this
section as Hegel’s discussion of the identity of the Absolute in its coming to know itself, I argue
here that what it means for Spirit to attain to a knowledge of itself is actually precisely for Spirit
to attain to an experiential knowledge on the order of emptiness. Thus, Spirit’s knowledge is not
a propositional knowledge on the order of a “knowledge that” but instead, an experiential
knowledge – this is Hegel’s phenomenology, after all. The section on “Absolute Knowing”, then,
represents the wisdom of the experience that the Absolute learns during its death to itself.
Along these lines, interestingly enough, when it comes to dialectics, Hegel also mentions
how good and evil are dialectically bound together in this section. He writes, “so far as this selfsundering is the process of becoming for itself, it is evil; so far as it is the in-itself, it remains
good.” 117 The parallel here is that what is actually good is able to transcend a merely one-sided
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oppositional thinking. Furthermore, genuine goodness is able to transcend the notion of a
shallow unity of the two (a mere unity of good and evil). Rather, if we consider goodness and
evil in terms of the structure of dialectics, then the opposition between good and evil is not
merely a shallow difference that is simply overcome via first-order unity. On the alternative,
conscious thinking is stretched beyond itself to such an extreme degree that rational cognition
can lose itself in emptiness as such – where the salvation of genuine goodness remains a
possibility that we can only, albeit genuinely, hope for. Thus, after passing through and
overcoming a false illusory divide between goodness and evil, it remains a possibility that
genuine goodness will reveal itself as the actuality of divine grace and salvation in the
phenomenology of spirit.
Hegel similarly explains how to think of Geist as simultaneously Substance and Subject
and what that entails. Below I provide the full quote mentioned earlier:
Spirit, however, has shown itself to us to be neither merely the withdrawal of selfconsciousness into its pure inwardness, nor the mere submergence of self-consciousness
into substance, and the non-being of its [moment of] difference; but Spirit is this
movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its substance, and
also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an
object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between object and
content. 118
Hegel rejects one-sided interpretations in which either Subject or Substance considered alone
plays the role of a monad. On the other hand, on Hegel’s account, Spirit is that which passes
between both – the subject is constituted out of the difference between substance and itself, while
it is simultaneously true that from the other side, substance is not merely pre-given. This is why
the notion of emptiness and its role are so crucial to understanding how Hegel thinks about Spirit
and Absolute Knowing.
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The emptiness of emptiness – that which, as Gabriel and Žižek often remind us, is “not
even nothing”119 indeed bears the potential to constitute the Spirit insofar as emptiness plays a
fundamental role in the dialectical relationship between subject and substance. Through the
negation of the negation, the subject comes to be constituted. Spirit does not leave a mark that
would gesture toward from whence it came – all the same, and paradoxically so, God (as
absolute Spirit) is an immanent-transcendent on the Hegelian account.
1.7) Living Spirit as Both Substance and Subject
Hegel had already commented on such a relationship between Substance and Subject in
the “Preface” to the work (in a discussion about the limitations of intellectual intuition
considered separate from the actuality of experience):
In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything
turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.
At the same time, it is to be observed that substantiality embraces the universal, or the
immediacy of knowledge itself, as well as that which is being or immediacy for
knowledge. If the conception of God as the one substance shocked the age in which it
was proclaimed, the reason for this was on the one hand an instinctive awareness that, in
this definition, self-consciousness was only submerged and not preserved…120
This is a crucial passage. Here, Hegel begins to comment on some different ways to think of the
Absolute. Hegel proposes three alternatives. There is (1) in which substance is thought as total
but it is not maintained as self-conscious substance. In other words, a substance-monistic view,
but one in which substance is devoid of self-consciousness. The criticism of this view is that we
lose the other side of the dialectic in which substance is also self-conscious thought; we think of
the absolute as substance and lose sight of its own movement as self-consciousness. In (2) we
think of the Absolute as substance again, but on this conception, the content of substance is
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actually the mere form of thought. In (3) we realize our unity with the Absolute in intellectual
intuition; however, since intellectual intuition is immediate recognition, Hegel’s concern is that
such a position might represent a dead Absolute and not the true, genuine, and living Absolute.
Hegel rejects all three of these ways of thinking of the Absolute insofar as any one of them taken
by itself fails to achieve a proper mediation between Substance and Subject.
Hegel’s task is thus to mediate his thinking of the identity of Substance as Subject in such
a way that he can show how Subject is as Substance – that is, as living Spirit. In the following
paragraph, Hegel goes on to add:
the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth
actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its selfothering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this
very reason the bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and
again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis [the immediate
simplicity]. Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself
– not an original or immediate unity as such – is the True… 121
In this passage, Hegel expands upon his understanding of the Spirit of the living Substance (i.e.,
the Spirit of the living Absolute as instantiated in humanity). As Hegel explains, the living
Substance mediates its own difference from itself. What this actually entails is that in the process
of substance becoming identical to itself, its identity is actually simultaneously changing and
therefore its self-relation changes as well. Substance here plays the role of the “vanishing
mediator” that relates itself to itself as both other and same to itself. In fact, its sameness can
only be established via its self-othering and vice versa. This is why Hegel describes the
“negation of this indifferent diversity” and “of its antithesis” as well. Even if the Subject is
conceived as the process of its own becoming, what becomes does not remain the same
throughout the process. And here is where we can really see how Hegel is open to genuine
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difference. In the sentences that follow, he describes the process as “the circle that presupposes
its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning.”122 What is significant here, then, is that
in the process of Spirit’s development, the telos of the process in fact changes. Due to this fact,
the beginning also changes in light of this development (since its relation to the goal has
changed) – what can possibly be identical to itself at all changes via each repetition of difference.
1.8) “The Labor of the Negative”
This notion of the importance of negation and difference in the constitution of the self is
also why Hegel writes about the importance of “suffering” and “the labour of the negative” to the
life of the Absolute.123 He continues:
Thus the life of God and divine cognition may well be spoken of as a disporting of Love
with itself; but this idea sinks into mere edification, and even insipidity, if it lacks the
seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative.124
In other words, here Hegel cautions against an understanding of the Absolute that is devoid of
the actuality and openness of life. This passage is essential to our reading of Hegel, especially
given the fact that many commentators charge Hegel with the criticism that his Notion is
ultimately on the order of a mere intellectual nature, and one that subsumes all genuine
difference in its absolute, totalizing, intellectual form. In this passage, we see how Hegel is
actually completely opposed to such a view. Hegel recognizes that there must be a dimension of
sacrifice to the life of the divine, since form and content are so primordially and essentially
bound together. If the life of God is the behavior of Love, then that also implies a connection to
Love’s self-sacrifice: there can be no identity (and no real life) without the divine’s willingness
to subject itself to the actual possibility that things could be otherwise. Indeed, the depth of
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divine Love is so profound that it is able to empty out any particular identity and pass through
the emptiness of emptiness as such. Hegel’s thought here is extreme: the divine must be able to
experience the possibility of its own inexistence. As Žižek notes, “[Absolute Knowing] means
fully assuming the big Other’s inexistence.”125 In addition, Žižek is not all that concerned with
the classical reading of Hegel as a thinker of all-consuming rationality, since he notes how Hegel
understands “the fundamental lesson of Christianity…the Absolute itself pays the price,
irretrievably sacrificing itself.”126 If the divine identity is one of love, it is not to be conceived as
love’s self-play on the order of a mere self-sameness. Rather, love displays itself through the
divine’s willingness to sacrifice itself and subject itself to negation.127
For this reason, passages such as this one raise serious challenges to the notion of Hegel
as a totalizing thinker. Hegel was well aware that the Absolute must be capable of genuine
difference. If, analogously, consciousness plays the role of mediator to itself, it does so in fact by
dying to itself (it is the “vanishing mediator” of itself). In this way, we can understand why
Hegel and Žižek both claim that Substance as Subject is equally Substance “without a
Subject.”128
The divine life is thus not to be understood as the mere form of thinking (in the sense of
abstract universality). On the contrary, the divine consciousness alienates itself from itself to
such an extreme degree that it must pass through genuine nothingness in its own constitution.
Here, however, it is important to point out that it is only after the fact that we can come to
recognize this process as one that belongs to consciousness at all. In other words, Hegel’s
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difference from Kant is that rather than positing a self-conscious thinking subject at the basis of
cognition, on Hegel’s account, the Absolute as subject simultaneously entails that the Absolute
must be able to die a genuine death: Substance as Subject is simultaneously Substance without
Subject, as Žižek puts it.129
With this point (that we only come to recognize this process as one which belongs to
consciousness after the fact) in mind, I draw a connection to Hegel’s subsequent discussion of
why we ought to think of the Absolute as a result. Hegel writes:
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating
itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a
result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its
nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself.130
In order that we do not misinterpret Hegel here when he says, “the True is the whole,” this
passage ought to be read in the context of the overall discussion. When Hegel says “the True is
the whole,” I do not consider him as making a totalizing claim, all appearances to the contrary.
On the other hand, Hegel’s discussion of the truth as holistic here again ought to be read in the
light of his thoughts about retroactivity and the role of retroactivity in how we think about the
constitution of Absolute Spirit. If Hegel’s comment that, “the True is the whole” is read in this
way, then we can develop a reading of Hegel in which he recognizes that the true Absolute must
be open to genuine difference.
Let us further consider the implications of such a reading on Hegel’s understanding of
time. Rather than a linear understanding of time – conceived as a succession of consecutive now
points or moments – Hegel’s conception of time here ought to be developed in light of his
understanding that Substance passes through genuine emptiness in its very constitution. As such,
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Hegel’s notion of time itself could be one in which time itself passes through, and is constituted
out of, genuine nothingness. In this way, time itself would always remain open to the possibility
of genuine difference. It would only be after the fact (retroactively) that time could be
understood as time at all. This is likewise the case with the Absolute: a living god is one that
continuously dies to itself and remains open to the possibility of rebirth. This is how I understand
what Hegel means when he says that the Absolute is as “a result.”131
We find further evidence in favor of Hegel as a dialectical thinker, one for whom genuine
difference is fundamental to the constitution of identity, as Hegel continues his discussion in this
section with examples from the subject-predicate structure of language as well as the inadequacy
of any single principle to express the Absolute in its entirety. For starters, Hegel mentions how
the word “God” obviously could not possibly contain the entire meaning of the Absolute, since,
taken by itself, it is a mere subject-term and therefore empty.132 Insofar as the Subject must
become external to itself and extend out to the predicate in order to have a meaning, language
itself evinces the dialectical nature of truth.
1.9) “God is Love”: Hegel on the Subject-Predicate Structure of Language
Let us consider one of the examples that Hegel himself provides: “God is love.”133 If the
subject and predicate terms (“God” and “love” respectively) are different in their placement in
the sentence, then prima facie we have a dialectical understanding of the sentence if we read “is”
here as functioning as the mediator between our two disparate elements, “God” and “love.” On
this understanding, a unity (identity) is constituted out of identity (subject) and difference
(predicate). However, a further step is to realize that difference is in fact so fundamental to
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identity that God could not be God without the possibility of God’s own difference from itself in
the first place: the subject’s own apparent self-identity as a totality in fact requires the potential
positing of an infinite number of potential predicates: God’s ability for self-erasure is thus
required for a genuine self-understanding of God as love.
Thus, Hegel is keen on the fact that “God as love” does not settle into a meaningless
identity in which we merely equate one term with the other. Analogously, this is why the
difference of difference from itself must be thought alongside with identity. My selfconsciousness of God as love is insufficient if my understanding of the term “love” settles on a
propositional meaning in which the content of love is not actual (and this can happen both in the
case that I understand love as mere form without content or mere content without form).
Ultimately, the next step is to realize that the sentence itself is only truly understood when the
meaning of the terms involved are actually experienced. In this case, the meaning of love must
be capable of being experienced as genuine self-sacrifice (losing oneself in emptiness to such an
extent that love can shine forth in life itself), in this way, then, the Absolute could come to
genuine self-conscious knowledge. If we are to continue using the analogy from language and
subject-predicate structure, then, if God is really to be love, on Hegel’s account, it is not enough
to merely state the identity of God as love (as the identity of identity and difference), rather, for
God’s identity to be love entails that God has already been subjected to infinite negation
(absolute otherness) in its constitution, and is experientially constituted such that the will of love
is the genuine will of Spirit in time. In other words, if God is really love, then love must show
itself capable of overcoming even the tension between absolute sameness and absolute difference
in the freedom and living of life itself.
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For this reason, I understand Hegel’s conception of the Absolute’s transcending of itself
as analogous to his explanation of the meaning of a sentence in linguistic discourse as beyond a
fixed, formal meaning based on a unity of formal meanings. In the Absolute’s reaching out
beyond itself, the subject itself is subsequently changed, since the predicate could not possibly
have been anticipated from the start. The whole of the Absolute is therefore retroactively
constituted in time (and continuously so). It is just as if we consider the term “God” alone; it is
meaningless and empty. The sentence “God is love,” represents one possible unification of
subject as substance. However, since the Subject in this case could be represented as any
possible substance from an infinite number of possible substances, Hegel’s point is that the
process can be repeated ad infinitum: the infinite future continuously sacrifices itself to the
infinite past, and in this process, the present itself functions as the “vanishing mediator.” If the
whole is a circle in which the beginning meets the end that it presupposes and requires from the
start, it is simultaneously true that the beginning and the end are re-conceived in each and every
moment in light of their development through time.
As a consequence of this view, a single principle cannot be true when considered in and
of itself. This is Hegel’s basic refutation of an atomistic philosophy that would start with a single
foundational principle (consider the Cartesian “cogito”, for example). A philosophy that would
start with the “I think” as its most basic founding assumption is easy to refute as inadequate,
since it one-sidedly posits a subject as its most foundational element and is blind to the context in
which the subject is constituted in the first place. This is why Hegel says that a first principle
could equally be shown to be false just as much as it could be shown to be true. He writes,
“Hence, the mere anticipation that the Absolute is Subject is not only not the actuality of this
Notion, but it even makes the actuality impossible; for the anticipation posits the subject as an
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inert point, whereas the actuality is self-movement.”134 A single principle considered in and of
itself that posits the Absolute as Subject can be shown as false, since it can be easily refuted as a
false notion of identity – one that does not demonstrate consciousness of the fact that the
constitution of any self-identity is fundamentally bound up with difference. Therefore, Hegel
eliminates the possibility that a single principle could be adequate to express the Absolute.
1.10) The Absolute as “a Result”
Since a single principle is inadequate to express the Absolute, Hegel explains further that
the Absolute ought to be conceived as a result.135 Hegel writes about the process of arguing
against a principle, and showing it to be inadequate, saying:
The refutation consists in pointing out its defect; and it is defective because it is only the
universal or principle, is only the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is derived and
developed from the principle itself, not accomplished by counter-assertions and random
thoughts from outside. The refutation would, therefore, properly consist in the further
development of the principle, and in thus remedying the defectiveness, if it did not
mistakenly pay attention solely to its negative action, without awareness of its progress
and result on their positive side too – The genuinely positive exposition of the beginning
is thus also, conversely, just as much a negative attitude towards it, viz. toward its
initially one-sided form of being immediate or purpose.136
Here, we see how the demonstration of the inadequacy of any single principle in fact aids a
further purpose: it also shows how the single proposition is in fact a mere part of a larger
movement. In other words, even the assertion of the identity of identity and difference displays
itself to be part of a larger, actual process. Also, this proposition comes to be seen as a
proposition that does not stand by itself (since it is bound up with its always-already dialectical
opposite). We are to conclude from this that the genuine Absolute is a living one, and any
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principle (if it is to be actual), must saturate itself in the depths of genuine content (being-initself).
Indeed, Hegel himself next discusses how the genuine Absolute is only actual as
system137 and it is safe to say that he also intends to imply this in the sense of a result, since he
had explained so prior in his discussion of the Absolute as “a result,”138 as I mentioned
previously. This is also why Hegel says that we should think of the Absolute as a result. As a
reminder, Hegel had said: “Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only
in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual,
subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself.” 139 The retroactivity of the Absolute is such that we
cannot predict the genuine future in advance. Any future that we could possibly predict in
advance would be but a mere simulation or an artificial future: the genuine actuality of life places
us before an abyss of absolute difference – one in the face of which we have no choice but to be
brave. In this way, Hegel demonstrates how the genuine difference (of life itself) stands at the
basis of the constitution of the Absolute. Consciousness’s realization of its identity is
simultaneously its realization that such apparent completeness is in fact part of a larger
incompleteness – that of Spirit in its ongoing self-development.
I will use an example from the phenomenology of dissertation writing to illustrate the
point further. To use the writing of this dissertation as an example, the idea that I started with at
the beginning when I set out to write this dissertation was surely not the entirety of the work, and
in that sense it was not the whole dissertation. But surely, once the dissertation has been written,
one is able to look back on it (retroactively) and exclaim, “well, now that is the dissertation!”
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One is then more clearly able to see the relationship between the original thought and the
“finished product.” The initial idea is only genuinely understood in light of the finished product,
but Hegel’s point, paradoxically, is that in the case of Spirit, it is simultaneously true that the
“finished product” is itself always a work in progress at the same time. In this way, emptiness
returns itself to emptiness. Thus, the retroactive glance of the Absolute back on itself is never a
totalizing glance. Indeed, this is why retroactivity is so essential to our understanding of Hegel
and his philosophy itself as a philosophy of the vanishing mediator. What, then, is the
relationship between the Absolute Spirit and time? The genuine, living Absolute is the absolute
future and equally the absolute past. It affirms the unity of both absolute senses of time and the
difference of both from each other, while simultaneously affirming the first and second move
and then negating either the first or second move. The Absolute’s retroactive constitution in no
way implies a priority of the future over the past.
Hegel’s discussion of the Absolute as a result, is even more significant when we consider
this notion in connection with his Science of Logic. If the Phenomenology is primarily an
experiential work, detailing movements of consciousness and historical shapes of consciousness
in the process of their coming to Absolute Knowledge, then how does this work relate to the
project of the Logic? What sort of Logic does Hegel see himself enunciating? And how is the
task of the latter work intimately bound up with the Phenomenology? In some sense, the Logic
works alongside the Phenomenology in recognition of the fact that even the Phenomenology
itself is never a completed work. Indeed, as we have seen, one of the most fundamental insights
of the section on Absolute Knowing resides precisely in the realization that knowledge is never
complete due to the fact that Absolute Otherness plays a fundamental role in the constitution of
Spirit as self-consciousness.
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Interestingly, Hegel’s subsequent discussion in the preface of the Phenomenology is
about Science and system.140 The reason for this is that one of the conclusions that Hegel draws
from his previous discussion about the limitations of any principle to explicate the full, living
meaning of the Absolute is that only an understanding of the Absolute given in a system is
adequate to the task. However, here how we interpret what Hegel means by “system” is also of
paramount importance, since paradoxically, Hegel simultaneously argues that a genuine science
is neither founded on mere principles nor a system of principles. In connection to this, Hegel’s
thought that the Absolute is a result is of prime significance. If the Absolute is most properly
understood as a result, then what sort of system does Hegel have in mind?
I propose that in order to understand Hegel’s thoughts on system here, we really ought to
delve deeper into his dialectical method considered as a method beyond method. Hegel explains
how any principle has to be understood in light of the whole. He writes:
Among the various consequences that follow from what has just been said, this one in
particular can be stressed, that knowledge is only actual, and can only be expounded, as
Science or as system; and furthermore, that a so-called basic proposition or principle of
philosophy, if true, is also false, just because it is only a principle.141
Significantly, this understanding of system is also expounded by the Phenomenology when it is
considered as a work on the whole, and, as we will see, in relationship with the Logic as well.
The Phenomenology ends with a discussion of Absolute Knowing. But we can only begin to
understand what Absolute Knowing could possibly mean in light of the entire work. And with
the view of the entire work in mind, we see how Absolute Knowing in fact brings us back to
emptiness, since our task throughout the work is to be able to recognize the role of genuine,
absolute difference in the constitution of the Subject (as opposed to merely one-sided
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oppositional thinking, for instance.) In other words, the section on Absolute Knowing in fact
represents the importance of continuous repetition of otherness (as emptiness) and how this
functions for Hegel’s understanding of system. Thus, the purpose of the section on Absolute
Knowing is not to grant the reader any sort of totalizing knowledge of Absolute Identity that
settles in one form. Rather, it is precisely to display the living movement of the Absolute in
terms of a dialectical method (beyond method), one in which emptiness as such plays a
constitutive role. As we will see, this interpretation is also supported by the fact that Hegel
intended for the Phenomenology to be read together with the Logic.
If the Absolute ought to be conceived as a result, then Hegel is quite clever to end his
work with a section about Absolute Knowing as emptiness. The Absolute as result is both shaped
by the past (a past understood as past in light of the now that was once the future) and
simultaneously open to the difference of the future of the then now. One can genuinely hope that
love might reveal itself as that which rescues consciousness from the depths of the abyss of
freedom; and it is precisely the watching over of this actuality that could constitute a
phenomenology of spirit as system.
1.11) Spirit’s “Divestment” as the Source of Hegel’s Science
The recognition of Spirit in difference is thus the source of Hegel’s science. Hegel writes,
“pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this Aether as such, is the ground and soil of
Science or knowledge in general.”142 If Hegel thought that the recognition of the self in absolute
otherness was so crucial to knowledge as well as to the development of his science, then it is
very important to focus in on the term “absolute otherness” here. I consider this term to be the
key qualification in support of my reading and contra the “identity of identity and difference”
142
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readings. Hegel does not describe the otherness at work here as mere otherness but as absolute
otherness. The shortcoming of the identity of identity and difference reading is that it develops
the following notion of identity in its understanding of self-consciousness: self-conscious
identity is the mere identity of consciousness and its other (one in which identity as the
movement of the synthesis of opposition is presupposed). However, if Hegel really means to
suggest that the self comes to recognize itself in absolute otherness, then even the identity
reading must recognize that self-consciousness (in its constitution) is already subject to its own
difference from itself (even the identity of consciousness with its other must already be subject to
difference). Ultimately, we are left with the genuine aporia of life itself.143 In simple terms, the
development of Spirit out of absolute otherness implies that consciousness does not settle in
either identity or difference but rather its constitution implies the absolute affirmation of both,
thought together with the absolute negation of both.
This fact is why I take emptiness to be so important to the topic of absolute knowing.
When we understand what it means to think of Subject as Substance, then we come to see that
identity is simultaneously difference and that this relation goes all the way through. Thus,
Absolute Knowing implies emptiness both in its original constitution as well as in its
culmination. The constitution of self-consciousness entails that consciousness must always
already have passed through emptiness, not merely on the order of the for-itself (form) but also
on the order of the in-itself (content). But this fact simultaneously entails that it has eliminated
both form and content in the process. This is the paradox of the transcendence of Spirit.
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1.12) Conclusion
Some further questions remain to be addressed: if we understand the fundamental source
of Hegel’s science as the tension between absolute sameness and absolute otherness (as
represented by the Phenomenology) and to such an extreme degree that absolute Spirit dies to
itself in the process of its own constitution, one might wonder: what role remains for Hegel’s
Science in the exposition of Spirit’s coming to know itself? In other words, if form and content
are bound together primordially, how can a Science be developed in light of this? Why did Hegel
continue to place so much importance on the role of a systematic discipline, a science
(Wissenschaft), in order to aid us in our understanding of its development? In other words, how
did Hegel conceive of the nature and role of science in his overall project? I will hope to respond
to these questions by looking at the connection between the project of the Phenomenology and
the Logic and how the two works should be read together.
Along these lines, what was Hegel’s understanding of the role of internal reflection to
such a science, given his understanding of the vital importance of retroactivity to the entire
process? If the Absolute transcends itself, how does the Logic text as well as its relation to the
Phenomenology display Hegel’s insights into the dialectical structure, such as I have outlined it?
Hegel acknowledges that Spirit’s coming to know itself is an experiential process and
that, for this reason, there is a bilateral relation between Spirit’s experience and the Science. On
the one hand, the Science cannot get us there completely of its own accord. This is a process that
we must go through. On the other hand, perhaps we are justified in hoping that an actual science
will point us toward that part of ourselves that is beyond science:
Science on its part requires that self-consciousness should have raised itself into this
Aether in order to be able to live—and [actually] to live—with Science and in Science.
Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that Science should at least provide
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him with the ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within himself.144
In other words, if the Science in part depends on an experiential awareness of our unity of the
form of thought with its content considered together with an experience of difference, then
perhaps the most we can hope for from the science is to point us to this truth. Hegel uses the
ladder analogy and here we might be reminded of Buddhist metaphors for the canoe that helps
one to cross the stream to enlightenment and at which point the canoe is left behind. Similarly, if
the science is to function like the canoe, then one of the ways for it to achieve this goal is to point
us back to our own beginning in emptiness. So, likewise, the ultimate goal of the science would
then be to demonstrate how its task is ultimately the mere elaboration of a process that is internal
to us, and, in that sense, the science itself is overcome.
Hegel encourages us to read The Phenomenology of Spirit and The Logic together, since
they collectively constitute his reflections on the bilateral movement that consciousness itself
undergoes and is internal to it. The text of the Phenomenology on the whole plays the role of the
first part – that of self-consciousness in its existential recognition of its own nature as
fundamentally (in)complete. By the end of the Phenomenology, Spirit has come to recognize the
tension between absolute sameness and absolute otherness, such that its own existence is to live
from this “undecidable risk” 145 that Hegel terms the “aether.” The second part of the movement
is played by the Logic. This leaves open the question of the task of the Logic, which I will
address further in the next chapter. So, I will end with some important questions that remain to
be addressed: how are we to understand the role of the text of the Logic in this process? Why is it
so important to read the Phenomenology together with the Logic? Further, how are we to actually
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read these two works together? How does the reading of the two works together connect to the
theme of the relation between emptiness and absolute knowing?
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CHAPTER TWO
PURE EMPTINESS AND THE PROJECT OF HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC
2.1) Introduction
Chapter Two is largely focused on the topic of how the main insight learned at the end of
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit relates to Hegel’s project in the Science of Logic. I consider
this topic important to Hegel scholarship, since an understanding of the relationship between the
Phenomenology and the Logic may serve an informative role for interpreting the Logic. That
said, the relationship between the two works provokes a number of questions, especially when
considered from the standpoint of dialectics.
Some Hegel scholars seem to think that even Hegel himself did not have a clearly worked
out view of the relationship between the two works. Consider Andrew Bowie as one proponent
of this view. In his book, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, philosopher Andrew Bowie comments on
this interpretive importance of the Phenomenology to the Logic. He writes:
What causes the real trouble in interpreting claims of the Logic is the relationship
between the Phenomenology’s closely argued and historically based account of the
genesis of the essential modes of thinking through the working out of the contradictions
in the historical forms of thought in society, and the Logic’s use of a similar method
which does not refer to history as such and makes such claims as the one just cited. It is
not evident to me that Hegel himself was wholly clear about this relationship.146
Here, Bowie claims that the Logic does not make reference to history (perhaps he intends to say
that it is not explicitly historical, but I would argue that it is definitely bound up with history). He
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further argues that perhaps even Hegel himself was uncertain of the relationship of the two
works.
There are other Hegel scholars who seem to suggest otherwise. Consider Paul Redding,
for instance. As Redding notes, we know about Hegel’s professorship at Jena during this time
period, that he was working towards a systematic philosophy and that the Phenomenology was
intended to guide the reader along to the beginning of Hegel’s systematic philosophy.147
Redding’s position is that Hegel’s Phenomenology was meant as a starting point that could serve
to introduce the reader into a system of a fundamentally cyclical nature. As Redding states:
Hegel’s later years at Jena were also marked by the idea of a project, realized as his
Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807, that was meant to lead the reader into the system. The
consequences of this for the future of the system itself are complex and controversial. This
new distinctly phenomenological project seemed to have emerged from the earlier ‘logical’
projects starting the system…148
Redding explains how Hegel considered the Phenomenology as crucial to understanding his
entire system. Indeed, it was the Phenomenology itself which became the proper beginning of the
Logical system as such. Redding therefore agrees that the Phenomenology is important to
interpreting the Logic.
Even if Bowie is unsure of the relationship between the two works, he agrees with my
more general point that the relationship between the Phenomenology and the Logic remains
important when it comes to interpreting the Logic. Bowie’s more general point is also a good
one, since, as other scholars have noted, the works constitute a relationship of a very unique type.
Bowie’s point – that it is difficult to determine a relationship between the two works – also
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holds, especially if one limits oneself to thinking of a linear type. And there are certainly other
philosophers who would agree with Bowie that Hegel himself was not completely certain about
the relationship between the two works.
I agree with the notion that there is not one interpretation that could fully synthesize the
relationship between the two works once and for all: on the contrary, I agree with Žižek, Comay,
and Ruda that Hegel espoused an ontology of “disorientation.”149,150 If one were to synthesize
Hegel’s Phenomenology and the Logic into one higher-order system, such a reading would be
inconsistent with my understanding of Hegel’s dialectics. This is to say that even if Hegel’s
stated intention was for the Phenomenology to serve a sort of introductory role, the actual
relationship between the two works is a different story. Rather, in actual effect, it seems that the
Phenomenology always already (as we will see) leads the reader into the Science of Logic (I
agree with Žižek, Comay, and Ruda here).
Žižek may be helpful to illustrate the point. As he writes:
an absolute gap separates the two books: there is no common space between the two, no
general thought of Hegel applied to two domains, there is no way to bring them together
(in a big One book which would be simultaneously logical and historical)—if anything,
Hegel’s thought in general is defined by this crack between his two books, a crack which
is in itself impossible since one cannot ever draw a line of distinction that would give us
two clearly divided books.151
Here, Žižek’s most important point is that there is not a definitive way to demarcate between the
two books in the first place. First of all, Žižek’s interpretation of the relationship between the two
works here seems to fit with his overall interpretation of Hegel as a thinker of the “gap.” Žižek’s
point is that it is via the interplay between the two works that we arrive at a view of Hegel’s
system. In a sense, there is no Hegel other than the Hegel who is created by the “gap” between
149

Comay and Ruda, The Dash, 45.
See also Žižek, Sex and the Failed Absolute.
151
Žižek, Sex and the Failed Absolute, 99.
150

67

the two works. Second, my general point is not that the two works stand in a relation of
completeness, by means of which one arrives at a complete synthesis. Rather, my point is that an
insight gained at the end of the Phenomenology always already carries us over into the Logic. It
seems to me that Žižek would agree with this more general point.
Žižek, Ruda, and Comay all agree that Hegel’s ontology is “non-orientable”152 and in this
sense analogous to a Möbius strip in mathematics.153 As Žižek quotes from Ruda and Comay,
“Despite or because of the impossibility of crossing from one side to another, each side has
already passed over into the other side, as on a kind of Möbius strip.”154 Interestingly, Žižek once
again takes up the philosophical project of the development and investigation of the implications
of an ontology of “unorientable space” 155 in his latest book – Sex and the Failed Absolute.
In this chapter, I return once again to the question of how Spirit’s insight into its selfsacrificial nature relates to Hegel’s beginning of the Science of Logic. As I previously discussed
in Chapter One, Hegel ends the Phenomenology with a discussion of how Spirit has come to
learn of its sacrificial nature – that “absolute knowing” is a knowing on the order of a dwelling in
emptiness. And, following his introduction, Hegel begins the Science of Logic with a discussion
of “pure being” at the beginning of the Logic.
The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the fundamental insight that
consciousness learns at the end of the Phenomenology is also present at the beginning of the
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Science of Logic. In this precise sense, I aim to demonstrate how these two works can be read
together consistently. In order to accomplish this goal, I have two secondary aims. First of all, I
show how the lesson that consciousness learns at the end of the Phenomenology functions as the
motivating insight throughout the Science of Logic. I argue for this interpretation since, as
Comay and Ruda also note, a repetition of emptiness stands at the beginning of the Logic.156
Hegel intended the Logic to be “the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence
before the creation of nature and a finite mind.”157 However, (and this is one of my main
argumentative points) what Hegel in fact discovered is that, in the beginning, God is a repetition
of its own nothingness (a doubling on the order of the emptiness of matter).
We can make sense of the following two quotes from Hegel’s introduction to the work
when we read Hegel in this way. Hegel says in this same section, “pure science presupposes
liberation from the opposition of consciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as
much the object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure
thought.”158 In other words, the main insight regarding the self-sacrificial nature of
consciousness is present at the beginning of the Science of Logic. This is because consciousness
is the very movement that arises from a repetition of nothingness. In this particular sense, there is
“nothing” more than the movement of consciousness itself.
Shortly after, Hegel continues:
this objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it
being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true
cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ
the word matter, it is the veritable matter – but a matter which is not external to the form,
since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. 159
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Here, we find more evidence of the notion that matter is one with thought in the “pure science.”
This means that a repetition of the emptiness of matter is simultaneously the repetition of the
purity of thought (if thought and being are united, then a repetition of emptiness on the order of
being is also a repetition of emptiness on the order of thought). This is Hegel’s key insight: God
comes to know its transcendence by passing through an actual experience of emptiness.
God’s repetition (a “self-doubling”160 in, and as, empty matter) is that which will lead to
the constitution of God, as a living God. At the beginning, there is “nothing” other than this –
God is the movement which transcends itself from out of the emptiness of matter.
We find from the very start, then, that Hegel’s insight into the self-sacrificial nature of
the absolute permeates his entire Logic. For example, Hegel states that he cannot presuppose the
beginning of the Logic from the start, since it is the emptiness of emptiness as such which stands
at the beginning of the system. This is because according to Hegel’s view, it is only the selfrepetition of empty matter which will give rise to the genuine, living absolute. In this sense,
Hegel’s key insight into the heart of Christianity is at the core of his entire system of Logic.
Interestingly enough, this fundamental insight also affects how we are to interpret the
relationship between the two works. For example, it makes sense to think of the two works as
connected in their disconnection (such as Comay and Ruda suggest161), since both works take us
into a sacrifice that transcends the limitations of a finite thinker. In both the Phenomenology and
the Science of Logic, Hegel suggests that the only path to the genuine absolute is via a repetition
of emptiness. This is how I make sense of Žižek, Comay, and Ruda’s claim to an “ontology of
disorientation.”162
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As we will see in later chapters, Comay and Ruda’s suggestion that the relationship
between the two works is truly a “non-relation”163 will also connect to my discussion of
Schelling as a dialectical materialist as well, as evinced by the beginning of his Ages of the
World. There, Schelling writes of two co-eternal wills – the self-repetition of the will that wills
nothing results in a will that desires to become.164
As Comay and Ruda note, what we find at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic is
actually a repetition of emptiness: “Being Comma Pure Being Comma Dash… thought’s
insistence on being’s emptiness and meaninglessness forces it to state this emptiness twice.”165
The significance of this point to my overall argument is that, at the beginning of the Logic, we
find an openness to alterity – God that has already emptied itself out so fully as to be able to take
on being for the first time. It is perhaps something akin to Christ as he empties Himself out in the
beginning of time. In this sense, Hegel’s entire system is one founded in the self-sacrifice of the
absolute.
Next, I show how this fundamental insight influences the starting point of Hegel’s
Science of Logic and his threefold task in that work. An elaboration of the beginning will take us
into the tension between identity and otherness that I will further pursue in Chapter Three.
In order for me to explain how Hegel begins with the beginning as such, I must first lay
some of the initial groundwork for the relationship between the Phenomenology and the Logic in
the first place. In order to achieve this end, I will primarily look to the “Preface” and
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“Introduction” of the Logic to show some of Hegel’s comments on the relationship between the
two works.
2.2) On the Unity of Form and Content in the Logic
How might the emptiness of absolute knowing relate to pure being? First of all, it is
important to note that, on the Hegelian understanding, the form and content of cognition are not
considered as strictly distinct. In fact, the dialectical nature of the form and content of cognition
is one of Hegel’s primary demonstrations in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In that work, Hegel
discovers the form and content of consciousness to be intimately united and explores all of the
implications of such a dialectical interplay. Indeed, in the PhG, Hegel shows how, over time, and
through the examination of a variety of possible relationships, consciousness comes to
understand itself as one with the content that it initially considers as external to itself. Thus, the
fact that Hegel states in the Science of Logic that he will not presuppose anything about the
content of the science directly connects his latter work to his former work. In fact, Hegel himself
tells us that this is the case.
The Phenomenology of Spirit is a demonstration of the harmonious interplay of the form
and content of consciousness. However, Hegel also states that it is also a demonstration of a
method in application to an object (in this case, consciousness). Here, significantly, however, it
could be said only that the method is applied to an object insofar as the method itself is in fact
internal to the very object under consideration in that particular science (the science of
consciousness). In other words, if the PhG is a demonstration of a method at all, it is only insofar
as that method in fact unfolds from out of the unity of consciousness with itself. As we will see,
this very insight (into a method that unfolds from out of itself) stands at the beginning of Hegel’s
Science of Logic.
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At the beginning of the Phenomenology, consciousness starts from the standpoint that the
objects of its knowledge stand opposed to it. As Hegel states:
In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have exhibited consciousness in its movement onwards
from the first immediate opposition of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The path
of this movement goes through every form of the relation of consciousness to the object
and has the Notion of science for its result. This Notion therefore (apart from the fact that
it emerges within logic itself) needs no justification here because it has received it in that
work… 166
As the work progresses, however, consciousness eventually comes to the standpoint of absolute
knowing – the standpoint of the unity of thought and being. Hegel also comments in the passage
quoted above on the general relationship between the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of
Logic. Hegel explains how the unfolding of the Notion itself occurs in the former work in a
historical fashion and it will continue to unfold throughout the course of the Logic as well. Hegel
explains, therefore, that he need not provide a complete justification for how the Notion is true
(as the unity of form and content) since he has already shown this to be the case in the PhG.
Rather, the Logic will be a return to the same movement in a new way; that is, the Logic, too,
will demonstrate the self-unfolding of the Notion. But, if this is true, then the result of the PhG is
intimately bound up with the entire work of the Logic. Indeed, I argue that the two works are
intimately bound together (in a way that reminds me of the German term for two things being
bound together, “zusammengebunden”).
2.3) On the Relation Between Absolute Knowing and Pure Being
I argue that the entire work of the SL is inherently infused with a crucial awareness
learned during the course of the PhG. The culminating insight of the PhG – that absolute
knowing is emptiness as the unity of thought and being – is what Hegel considers decisive to the
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development of a genuine science of Logic. One way to understand this relationship is that the
SL starts from the standpoint of absolute knowing – in recognition of the unity of thought and
being in the Notion – a Notion, however, which ultimately begins in emptiness as such. As we
will see, the result of the PhG (as demonstrated by the section on “Absolute Knowing” in which
consciousness discovers itself as Spirit in and via its own emptiness) is actually precisely where
Hegel begins the Science of Logic.
Hegel demonstrates how his science must begin with “pure being.” In the section, “With
What Must the Science Begin?”, he explains:
the beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract beginning;
and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything nor have a
ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science… The beginning therefore
is pure being.167
This entails that, for Hegel’s system to be a true system of philosophy (as a science of logic), the
only genuine beginning for philosophy is “pure being” as such. Hegel calls the being of pure
being an “indeterminate immediacy” which “is equal only to itself.”168 In fact, he explicitly
equates it with “pure indeterminateness” and “emptiness” as well, since there is nothing
determinate about it.169 In other words, even here, the language that Hegel uses helps to set the
stage for his thinking of Being and Nothingness in both their identity as well as in their
difference. Hegel shows here, how Being, in its emptiness, in fact reveals itself as the same as
Nothing. When consciousness empties itself out, what does it discover? The answer that will
unveil itself: both itself and nothingness at the same time.
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2.4) The Beginning of the Logic as Pure Being
Here, it will aid us to return once more to the original language of Hegel himself on the
beginning. Hegel begins chapter 1, “Being,” of “Book One: The Doctrine of Being” of the SL as
follows:
Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is
equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within
itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it
contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it
could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is
nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure
intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty
thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less
than nothing.170
The beginning is with the immediacy of emptiness – it could be said to be akin to the Absolute in
its own “vanishing.”171 Furthermore, there is nothing determinate about it. Hegel ends this
passage by stating that this beginning is “in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.”
So, as one might expect, this passage is followed by a section on “Nothing”. Hegel continues:
Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all
determination and content — undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as intuiting or
thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or nothing is
intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are
distinguished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty
intuition and thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure
being. Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination,
and thus altogether the same as, pure being. 172
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The original pure being could equally be said to be nothing, since it is undifferentiated and lacks
determinate content. Hegel’s point here, as we will see by commentators in later chapters (such
as Angelica Nuzzo in Chapter Three), is that thinking of this original nothing is the same as the
nothing’s self-movement. In other words, it is the self-movement of the original pure beingnothing. So, when Hegel states that the SL begins with Being, it is equally true that it begins in
Nothing. As I have argued, this point is crucial to understanding the connection between the end
of the PhG and the beginning of the SL, since this insight brings us back to the insight learned in
the section on Absolute Knowing from the PhG. What greater lesson could consciousness have
learned during the course of the PhG than that its emptiness is simultaneously absolute knowing
in terms of its own death being the condition for the possibility of its experiential awareness of
its unity with the whole of existence? In other words, the experiential awareness that
consciousness begins to unearth at the culmination of the PhG becomes the awareness that sets
the stage for the birth of the work of the Logic.
Furthermore, one would do well to note how Hegel himself uses the language of
emptiness to describe both pure being as well as nothingness, which further aids to highlight
their connection. I will examine the dialectic between being and nothing in more detail in
Chapter Three. But, for our current purposes, it is important to note what this reveals about the
connection between the PhG and the SL.
Along these lines, a phenomenological investigation is infused into the Logic at its core. I
argue that the education that consciousness has undergone in the PhG is centrally infused into the
development of the Logic itself insofar as consciousness has been educated from a historical
standpoint. The self-awareness of consciousness (with regard to its own dialectical nature) will
be the awareness that Hegel deems necessary to bring to an investigation of pure reason as such
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in the SL. If this is the case, then one might wonder: what might this imply about the work of the
Logic as a whole?
Hegel states in the introduction to the SL that the Logic will be about a “content” that the
PhG already in some sense supplies from the start. At first, this might seem contradictory, since
elsewhere, he also states that the Logic will presuppose nothing. However, on further
consideration, Hegel’s thought here is actually consistent. This is because the “content” that is
required from the result of the PhG is actually the content of nothingness itself (as we will see in
Chapter Three), since it is in fact in emptiness that consciousness recognizes its unity with itself
as substance. Substance as Subject is simultaneously both and neither, etc. (as Žižek explains).
To put it another way, the content of the Logic is born from out of the emptiness of the
Phenomenology; what we find at the culmination of the Phenomenology internally unfolds itself
to reveal the Logic as already there (or as Heidegger would have it, “always already” there). If
the “content” provided is emptiness as such, then the method of the Logic begins in emptiness as
well. As we will see, according to Hegel, the true infinite generates the content and the method
from out of its internal absolute negativity.
Along these lines, an additional explanation for what I take to be Hegel’s consistency
here is the fact that, on Hegel’s account, the form and content of consciousness are not strictly
separated, and therefore, Logic should be developed in recognition of this insight. Indeed,
Hegel’s critique of his predecessors is based on their separation of the form and content of Logic
from each other in their development of systems of logic. As Hegel writes, “it is quite inept to
say that logic abstracts from all content, that it teaches only the rules of thinking without any
reference to what is thought or without being able to consider its nature. For as thinking and the
rules of thinking are supposed to be the subject matter of logic, these directly constitute its
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peculiar content…”173 And Hegel’s keen insight into the unity of form and content is what he has
already shown to be the case in the PhG when it comes to consciousness.
Thus, Hegel’s insight at the end of the PhG is the same insight that carries over to the
“beginning” of his Science of Logic. As Hegel writes:
The Notion of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work
in so far as the Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it.
Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of
the Phenomenology showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the
object from the certainty of itself is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with
certainty and this certainty with truth. Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the
opposition of consciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object
in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought. 174
First of all, Hegel has already deduced the “Notion” in some sense in the Phenomenology, since
he showed in that work that the dialectical nature of the Notion is that it is both Substance and
Subject, but also neither merely one nor the other as I addressed in the first chapter. Second, the
insight of Absolute Knowing runs throughout the work, since consciousness learns that it is
ultimately, and intimately, bound up with the forms that it investigates. Third, the form and the
content of thought were already shown to be one in the PhG. However, here it is also important
to note that Hegel does not claim that since the PhG has done the heavy lifting of the
phenomenological science that he can now elaborate a science of logic that will merely explore
fixed forms of thought. Rather, Hegel’s point here is, more importantly, that the same insight
binds the two works together. If the end of the Phenomenology is the truth of absolute knowing
as emptiness, then, as we will see, this is precisely where the SL begins. In other words, the SL
does not merely operate externally on a content that the PhG supplies. Rather, it would be more
apt to say that both works are imbued by the same fundamental insight – that the unity of form
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and content ultimately implies that a pure science ought to be grounded in subjectivity’s selfdivestment and subsequent reconciliation with itself (although not in the sense of completeness).
In other words, if, at the end of the PhG, consciousness realizes that what it has been examining
has actually been the internal structure of itself all along, then the Logic will now begin from this
key insight to once again examine the absolute truth of the unity of form and content.
Here, a return to the end of the PhG will help to draw out the connection. At the end of
his PhG, in the section on “Absolute Knowing,” Hegel writes of a two-way movement involving
the self-divestment of Spirit:
Spirit, however, has shown itself to us to be neither merely the withdrawal of selfconsciousness into its pure inwardness, nor the mere submergence of self-consciousness
into substance, and the non-being of its [moment of] difference; but Spirit is this
movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its substance, and
also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an
object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and
content. 175,176
Original German text:
Der Geist aber hat sich uns gezeigt, weder nur das Zurückziehen des Selbstbewußtseins
in seine reine Innerlichkeit zu sein, noch die bloße Versenkung desselben in die Substanz
und das Nichtsein seines Unterschiedes, sondern diese Bewegung des Selbsts, das sich
seiner selbst entäußert und sich in seine Substanz versenkt, und ebenso als Subjekt aus ihr
in sich gegangen ist, und sie zum Gegenstande und Inhalte macht, als es diesen
Unterschied der Gegenständlichkeit und des Inhalts aufhebt.177
In this passage, Hegel comments on what it means for there to be a unity of Subject and
Substance as Spirit (Der Geist). Hegel explains how Spirit as Subject empties or divests
(entäußert)178 itself into Substance. Yet even this self-divestment does not constitute the whole
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explanation of its unity with otherness, since it is equally true that the difference between Subject
and Substance is “sublated” in the movement. In other words, Spirit ultimately overcomes its
self-differencing in some sense – it is, arguably, the very movement of its own self-differencing
and subsequent overcoming. Hegel even uses the word “aufhebt” (“sublates”) in the German to
describe how the difference between Objectivity (die Gegenständlichkeit) and Content (der
Inhalt) is sublated. For our purposes, what is important here is that the unity between form and
content is simultaneously the positing of difference from out of itself and its subsequent
overcoming (although not in a sense that would imply self-reflexive totality). Hegel’s comments
here relate to my argument regarding the incompleteness of Hegel’s system, since it implies that
Spirit is inherently irreducible. Spirit is an ascension (as a movement out of nothingness) that
holds open the difference between objectivity and content while simultaneously moving beyond
it.
2.5) Before God Becomes God
Transitioning back to the “Introduction” of the SL, Hegel reflects there on how this
insight from the PhG relates to the Logic. In doing so, he comes to a momentous realization: that
the beginning of the Logic is with God’s emptiness (of Spirit) before God becomes God: “It can
therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before
the creation of nature and a finite mind.”179 Indeed, one could argue that Hegel’s entire project is
the elaboration of the course of God’s emptiness before creation. This is to say that, on Hegel’s
account, at the beginning of everything God divests itself – empties itself out as pure negativity.
On Hegel’s account, Christ is the symbol of God’s “self-alienation” in the absolute knowing of
Spirit. Thus, as we will see in the next chapter, Hegel begins the project of the Logic from the
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pure negativity of emptiness as such. Important to my argument, Hegel nowhere posits a
substantive entity at the beginning. Rather, it is the immediacy of emptiness itself at the
beginning of the movement.
Hegel continues the thread about the connection between the two works in the section,
“With What Must the Science Begin?,” from the “Doctrine of Being” in the Science of Logic.
There he writes:
In the ‘Introduction’ it was remarked that the phenomenology of spirit is the science of
consciousness, the exposition of it, and that consciousness has for result the Notion of
science, i.e. pure knowing. Logic, then, has for its presupposition the science of
manifested spirit, which contains and demonstrates the necessity, and so the truth, of the
standpoint occupied by pure knowing and of its mediation. In this science of manifested
spirit the beginning is made from empirical, sensuous consciousness and this is
immediate knowledge in the strict sense of the word…in the work just mentioned [The
Phenomenology of Spirit] immediate consciousness is also the first and that which has
proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration – the Idea as pure
knowledge. Logic is pure science, that is pure knowledge, in its entire range of its
development. But in the said result, this Idea has determined itself to be the certainty
which has become truth, the certainty which, on the one hand, no longer has the object
over against it but has internalized it, knows it as its own self – and, on the other hand,
has given up the knowledge of itself as of something confronting the object of which it is
only the annihilation, has divested itself of this subjectivity and is at one with its selfalienation.
Now starting from this determination of pure knowledge, all that is needed to ensure that
the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to consider, or rather,
ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions whatever, simply to take up, what is
there before us. 180
In terms of what is most significant to our current purposes, here Hegel states that the
culmination of the phenomenology is “pure knowing.” Hegel also states here that the Logic
presupposes the PhG insofar as it shows the truth of the perspective of pure knowing. However,
elsewhere Hegel has already stated that the Logic must begin without any presuppositions. So,
one might wonder again if Hegel is inconsistent here – how can the Logic take the
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Phenomenology as its presupposition if the Logic is not to have any presuppositions at all? I
argue again that Hegel is consistent, since the sense in which the PhG could be a
“presupposition” at all is precisely insofar as it allows one to realize the unity of thought and
being, and therefore it is actually a presupposition-less presupposition. It is of further note that
Hegel again uses the language of “divestment” in this passage from the SL, which we just saw
him use earlier in the passage from the “Absolute Knowing” section of the PhG as well. Hegel
often uses the language of “divestment” (Entäußerung) (which is sometimes also translated as
“emptying,” in the sense of kenosis) when he discusses the subject’s alienation or externalization
from itself. As we will see, there are biblical undertones to Hegel’s understanding of Absolute
Knowing and this understanding ties in to his starting point for the Logic overall: for God to
become God, God must originally be as an absolute emptiness. As Hegel states soon thereafter,
and I will explain more in the next chapter: “The beginning therefore is pure being.”181 Spirit
finds itself as the movement of its own divestment: Logic must begin as absolute emptiness. In
the next chapter, I will explore the notion that pure knowing is simultaneously pure being and
what this will entail.
Thus, for Hegel to claim that the deduction of the Logic was already provided in the PhG
is essentially just a reaffirmation that, in that work, consciousness came to the realization of its
unity with itself in its otherness. Consciousness became aware of itself as substance. On Hegel’s
understanding, the form and content of consciousness are not strictly separated.
Indeed, we find Hegel’s thought process here reiterated when we review his commentary
on the thoughts of the ancient metaphysicians and what he praises about them. He writes:
this metaphysics [the metaphysics of the ancients] believed that thinking (and its
determinations) is not anything alien to the object, but rather is its essential nature, or that
things and the thinking of them – our language too expresses their kinship – are explicitly
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in full agreement, thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things
forming one and the same content.182
Here, Hegel praises the ancient metaphysicians for the fact that they did not strictly separate
thinking from the object of thought. Instead, the ancient metaphysicians whom he praises
perceived a unity between thought and being.
Hegel goes on to connect what he praises about the ancient metaphysicians to his
understanding of the unity of the form and content of Logic and also his explication of what this
implies about the science of logic. He states, “However, the exposition of what alone can be the
true method of philosophical science falls within the treatment of logic itself; for the method is
the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.”183 The last
sentence here is of crucial importance. To put it in other words, what Hegel says here is that the
form of the science must be provided from out of the dynamic process and movement of the
content itself: in many ways, it is the awareness of the dynamism of the content itself. Thus,
there is no strict separation between the two – Spirit is simultaneously Subject as Substance as
well as Substance without Subject, as Žižek would have it.184
2.6) Absolute Knowing in the Science of Logic
Here, it is also helpful to reflect further on what Hegel says about the PhG as a
demonstration of the method and what he hopes to explain by understanding his former work in
that way. As Hegel writes, “In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have expounded an example of this
method to a more concrete object, namely to consciousness…”185 On first glance, it may appear
that what Hegel intends to say here is that the PhG is an example of a method in its application to
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an object, namely, consciousness. However, given what has already been discussed above, the
important point here is rather that the PhG is a demonstration of the truth of absolute knowing
insofar as, in the case of empirical consciousness, Spirit comes to know itself in its otherness and
as its subsequent reconciliation (although not a complete one). In other words, it is a
demonstration of the unity of thought and being – and therefore, a demonstration of a methodless method.
Thus, despite all appearances to the contrary, I argue that the two works are in fact more
closely tied together than the latter (the Logic) merely representing the application of a method
that is developed once and for all in the former. As previously mentioned, I agree with Žižek,
Comay, and Ruda that the reading of one work always already takes one into the other, in a way
that is analogous to the non-orientable surface of a Möbius strip in mathematics.186 In his later
work, Hegel is inspired by the former work to return once more to a beginning that is the
culmination of the former work (in the sense of an experiential insight). Even so, if the
relationship between the two works is most akin to a circle, it is not a circle that returns to the
same beginning. Also, although there are admittedly times in which Hegel speaks about the
relationship between the two works as if the PhG is an example of an application of a method to
an object (consciousness), I argue that Hegel’s explanation is even subtler than that, since
ultimately consciousness is not an object that merely stands against itself in any strict sense.
In some ways, we might want to say that for Hegel, consciousness is an empirical
representation of a structure that he holds to be true about reality as such. Yet here is where
Hegel also finds the limits of the analogy – since a true science of logic must itself “move

186

Žižek, Sex and the Failed Absolute, 99. Comay and Ruda, The Dash, 45.

84

through”187 the very movement that it proposes to describe. In other words, the PhG does not
borrow its method from anywhere external and neither does the Logic merely apply a method
that is extracted from the development witnessed in the course of the PhG. Rather, in both works,
the method must develop from out of itself internally. In the case of the PhG, we see this as
consciousness develops from out of its own self-othering. In the case of the Logic, we see this as
God becomes God from out of its own absolute nothingness. This implies that the Logic and the
PhG are both results of the development of the Notion from out of itself and also that the two
works are always to be read as intimately bound together.
The fact that the two works exhibit this close relationship also implies that what was
learned from the course of the phenomenology was essentially an awareness – that the
perspective of absolute knowledge entails the insight that a true beginning must begin in
emptiness. The subject knows itself simultaneously as subject and object in a movement of
Spirit, which ultimately overcomes or “sublates” the difference between subject and object.
A number of questions remain, however. For one, if the true beginning of pure knowing
implies that one must begin in emptiness, then one might wonder: to what extent can Hegel
explicate the Logic at all? In other words, if the Logic is a movement of thought that is a
dynamic process in which form and content are understood as inherently bound together, and the
only possible beginning for philosophy is ultimately the immediacy of emptiness, then is the
Logic itself also a Phenomenology? Must not the Logic be experienced as well? If so, is the
Logic more properly understood as a phenomenological science as opposed to a speculative
metaphysics in the traditional sense?
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As we will see in the next chapter, Hegel acknowledges that, at the beginning of the
Logic, absolute knowing must return to the perspective of what consciousness has learned at the
culmination of the PhG – that absolute knowing is the knowing of emptiness, lacking any
presuppositions of thought at all. So, in connection with the questions that I raised above, Hegel
needs to address the nature of his work overall. This is to say that if absolute knowing returns
itself to the beginning of being as such (without any presuppositions), then to what extent can
Hegel elaborate a system at all? How does the system maintain the tension – (what Dieter
Henrich essentially refers to as the relative stability and instability) between identity and
difference?188 Is this truly possible? In fact, Hegel himself explains that the Logic is of a
historical nature and that it is to be read as such. In other words, his investigation ought to be
read as a provisional exploration based on a historical process of consciousness – an elaboration
of a process that is of a truly continuous and ongoing nature. He writes:
I could not pretend that the method which I follow in this system of logic—or rather
which this system in its own self follows – is not capable of greater completeness, of
much elaboration in detail; but at the same time I know that it is the only true method.
This is self-evident simply from the fact that it is not something distinct from its object
and content; for it is the inwardness of the content, the dialectic which it possesses within
itself, which is the mainspring of its advance. It is clear that no expositions can be
accepted as scientifically valid which do not pursue the course of this method and do not
conform to its simple rhythm, for this is the course of the subject matter itself.
In conformity with this method, I would point out that the divisions and headings of the
books, sections, and chapters given in this work as well as the explanations associated
with them, are made to facilitate a preliminary survey and strictly are only of historical
value. They do not belong to the content and body of the science but are compilations of
an external reflection which has already run through the whole of the exposition and
consequently knows and indicates in advance the sequence of its moments before these
are brought forward by the subject matter itself.189
There are a number of significant points here to address. First of all, Hegel acknowledges the fact
that his method is not fully complete. In fact, I would argue that its very nature is to hold open
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the tension between completeness and (in)completeness and this is also why it must be based in
the actuality of history. Even so, Hegel states that it is certainly possible that his Logic could be
explained and developed to an even greater degree than he was able to achieve. This makes
sense, since the method that Hegel refers to here is the method of dialectic itself – a method that
develops from out of the Notion and is not stated in its full completeness. This is also what Hegel
considers as what grants the method its genuineness – the fact that the content of the science is
understood as one with the method that spontaneously and organically develops from out of
itself. For this reason, Hegel also comments on how the section titles of each part of the work are
only of a provisional or “preliminary” nature, since he can only provide them from a historical
standpoint. In other words, the section titles are provided after an “external reflection” – after
consciousness has already gone the course.
Furthermore, this is also why Hegel clarifies what dialectic means to his science and how
his position differs from that of his predecessors: on Hegel’s account, dialectic is internal to the
science itself – it is not a method applied from the outside. As Hegel writes, “Dialectic in this
way acquires an entirely different significance from what it had when it was considered as a
separate part of logic and when its aim and standpoint were, one may say, completely
misunderstood…it is in this dialectic as it is here understood, that is, in the grasping of opposites
in their unity or of the positive in the negative, that speculative thought consists.”190 As we will
see, according to Hegel, the Notion posits its difference from out of itself – from out of its own
negativity and then sublates this self-difference (also known as the negation of the negation) to
realize its unity with itself. Simply put, something positive comes from out of the internal
negativity.
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Thus, Hegel’s critique of previous conceptions of the relationship between dialectic and
logic is that these prior accounts failed to properly conceive of the internal connection between
the two. On Hegel’s account, dialectic is internal to the science of logic as such. When
commenting on what has been learned from the PhG, Hegel states:
All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress – and it is essential to strive to gain
this quite simple insight – is the recognition of the logical principle that the negative is
just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a
nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular
content, in other words, that such a negation is not all and every negation but the negation
of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently is a specific negation,
and therefore the result essentially contains that from which it results….191
So, if dialectic is internal to the Logic, and something positive comes from something negative,
then the question becomes to what extent this is true of the Logic considered on the whole, and
also, if so, then what would this imply? In other words, what will the resolution of a selfcontradiction produce when it comes to the Logic considered on the whole?
2.7) Hegel on Kantian Dialectic
While postponing these questions until later chapters, I will now look more closely at the
related topic of what Hegel praises about Kant’s understanding of dialectic. Hegel praises Kant
because Kant understands the “necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of
thought determinations.”192 Hegel found evidence of this in Kant’s antinomies of pure reason.
Kant makes an advance in the right direction in comparison to previous metaphysicians, since
Kant advanced toward an understanding of the necessity of contradiction as an integral part of
reason. However, on Hegel’s account, Kant does not fully appreciate the positive aspect of
dialectic. Hegel writes: “But if no advance is made beyond the abstract negative aspect of
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dialectic, the result is only the familiar one that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite; a
strange result for—since the infinite is Reasonable—it asserts that reason is incapable of
knowing the Reasonable.”193 Hegel’s critique here is a familiar one, as it is the same account he
provides as a critique of the Kantian and Fichtean systems of philosophy in his Differenzschrift
(first published 1801)194, and ultimately what he praises about Schelling’s philosophy in contrast
to those of Kant and Fichte. Along these lines, Kant does not raise the insight of dialectic to a
higher perspective; he fails to fully appreciate the more relevant insight of his discovery – that
dialectic is in fact the internal truth of reason as such. For this reason, Kant posits a strict
difference between the transcendental categories (form) and their related content. Hegel’s
solution is to see how this difference is in fact grounded in a self-othering – how could we come
to know the difference otherwise?
Thus, the Hegelian insight here is that from a higher perspective, the dialectical negations
that Kant observes (that which lead to necessary contradictions in the antinomies of pure reason)
are internal to reason as such, such that the negative ultimately leads to positive content in the
subject’s reconciliation with its otherness (though not in a sense that would imply totality). If one
does not recognize this insight, then one is ultimately left in a standpoint in which the infinite
cannot be known by reason at all – a failure that Hegel does not wish to accept.195 Indeed, Kant
himself was aware that his position leads to this conclusion. In fact, he is famously quoted in his
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Critique as stating that he had to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.” (Bxxx)196
Hegel’s point, on the other hand, is that reason can experientially come to know itself as united
with the absolute (as that which transcends itself) via its own self-negation – dialectic is internal
to reason itself.
This understanding – of the fact that dialectic is internal to reason – enables one to
conduct a science of logic with the realization that thought and being are ultimately one, but we
may also consider them as distinct forms for the purposes of our investigation. In other words,
they may be investigated as forms but only to the extent that one recognizes that form and
content are so intimately united in reason that they are in fact both form and content but neither
merely form nor content. This is why Hegel states, “Consequently the earlier determinations
(those used on the pathway to truth) such as subjectivity and objectivity, or even thought and
being, or Notion and reality, no matter from what standpoint they were determined, have lost
their independent and purely affirmative character and are now in their truth, that is, in their
unity, reduced to forms.”197 In other words, the preliminary forms are ultimately to be understood
as unified in living Spirit; thus, when considered as forms, they are merely considered in their
inert dimension to see what will result from the consideration of said forms as what ultimately
constitutes a living system.
Since these forms are internal to the Notion, Hegel thinks that it is very important to the
development of a speculative metaphysics to pass beyond an understanding of dialectic as an
external method that is merely applied to an abstract content. Indeed, Hegel comments on this
fact when he reflects on the subject-object relation as it is found in Kant’s philosophy. The
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meaning of Kant’s transcendental categories is ultimately a meaning that is “mediated” insofar as
the categories stand in relation to a subjective ego.198 One problem with this viewpoint is that the
categories are empty and meaningless if they are not related to the subjective ego – Kant’s
starting point is not immediacy, but mediation. Perhaps this would not be so problematic if Kant
were aware of this, but Hegel thinks that this is true of Kant’s system in a way that Kant is not,
properly speaking, aware of in terms of all of its implications. On Hegel’s account, what is
needed as a remedy to this starting point for genuine knowledge is a more elevated and abstract
reflection on the relationship between subject and object in the first place. How is the subjective
ego related to the categories in the first place? What defines such a relationship? By undergoing
such a reflection, we find that dialectic is internal to reason as such – the infinite form of the
Notion (which is, simultaneously, a content). In other words, the antinomies of reason do not
merely result in a negative implication (such as one’s ability to state the limits of pure reason).
Rather, the antinomies simultaneously provide a positive content insofar as contradictions are
generated and sublated by the negativity of reason itself.
Hegel’s point here is that Kant’s consideration of the antinomies operates within the
supposition that the transcendental categories of the subject stand at a remove from the content to
which they are applied. What is lacking from Kant’s account is sufficient higher-order reflection
on the relationship between subjective knowledge and the content of said knowledge in the first
place. In other words, how is it possible that the transcendental categories yield us knowledge at
all? As Hegel comments on Kant:
But if philosophy was to make any real progress, it was necessary that the interest of
thought should be drawn to a consideration of the formal side, to a consideration of the
ego, of consciousness as such, i.e. of the abstract relation of a subjective knowing to an
object, so that in this way the cognition of the infinite form, that is, of the Notion, would
be introduced. But in order that this cognition may be reached, that form has still to be
198
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relieved of the finite determinateness in which it is ego, or consciousness. The form when
thus thought out into its purity, will have within itself the capacity to determine itself, that
is, to give itself a content, and that a necessarily explicated content – in the form of a
system of determinations of thought.199
This is a crucial part of Hegel’s explanation of his critique of Kant and also the project of the
Logic as a whole. Hegel’s point here is that when we progress past an understanding of dialectic
as an abstract negative form that is applied to an external content, we come to an understanding
of how dialectic is internal to reason as such – that a content can be generated through the form
of its own negativity. This leads us to the question of how the forms of the Logic could possibly
determine themselves out of nothingness (which I will examine more in the next chapter).
Interestingly enough, however, it is this precise reflection, which leads Hegel into his
section on “The Doctrine of Being” (the first part of the “Objective Logic”) and his explanation
of the fact that philosophy must begin in emptiness. Hegel’s point here is essentially that Logic
must not depend on a method from another science – philosophy must internally produce its
science from out of itself. Hegel’s point is that the only possible genuine starting point for
philosophy is nothingness, since any other possible candidate would already presuppose a
relation and a relation itself must already be mediated (and this is not a genuine starting point if it
is merely a presupposed mediation).
Hegel’s understanding of the developmental nature of dialectic also allows him to be able
to explain the tripartite structure of the work. If former philosophers, such as Kant, had dealt
with logic on the order of “thought alone” (Hegel’s own example here is Kant’s “transcendental
philosophy”), then Hegel will be conscious of the fact that pure reason is nothing if Ideas do not
take on a substantial nature. Dieter Henrich comments on the purpose of the third section of the
Logic as the completion of the system, stating:
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The secret intention of the Logic of the Notion is to relate self-reference (as one
structure) to otherness (as another structure) so that we may assert their mutual
dependence, while simultaneously preserving their distinctive features.200
Here, the irony is that to assert the “completion” of the system is simultaneously to acknowledge
its incomplete nature. Although I agree with Henrich’s interpretation of the general overall
movement, I would emphasize a different conclusion. Since a distance of nothingness from itself
is that which reveals itself as simultaneously identical and different (since the self-negation of
emptiness as its erasure is simultaneously to affirm negation) we are to conclude that the basis of
Spirit is itself a transcendent-immanent movement without a determinate ground. On my reading,
then, Hegel’s “completion” of the system is not to posit a meta-structure on the order of identity.
Rather, it is to unveil the movement of Spirit as that which relates the two structures, allows for
their simultaneous unison and difference, and subsequently cancels out the difference between
the two structures as it eliminates itself and allows for new categories to emerge from out of
itself.
Furthermore, since the original Ur-structure is not a structure at all but rather a movement
of nothingness itself (as we will see in the next chapter), Hegel does not posit closure to the
system. To put it simply, even if Hegel’s intention is to achieve a structural stability, the only
way that he is able to achieve his aim is to simultaneously acknowledge that what makes identity
on the order of relationality possible is a prior movement in which even relationality as such
could not properly be said to exist.201
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2.8) Conclusion
If the Logic is to remain truly presuppositionless, then Hegel must not anticipate the
structure of the overall work from the start. If philosophy begins in emptiness, then the structure
of the work must reveal itself. Indeed, Hegel even states that, “what logic is cannot be stated
beforehand.”202 The Logic must arise from the self-unfolding of the beginning.
Furthermore, to what extent is such a structure a necessary structure? Do philosophers
themselves participate in the movement insofar as we participate in the “thinking” of emptiness?
In other words, do we pass through emptiness in thinking it? What would it mean for the
necessity of the movement if the movement itself is revealed as the necessity of contingency and
the contingency of necessity?
One thing is certain: if Hegel thinks “that this content is the exposition of God as he is in
his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind,”203 then we would do well to
humble ourselves in an experiential sense (to practice a humility of spirit). Indeed, it is the
culminating insight of the PhG that brings us to divest ourselves once more: to return back into
the depths of the unknown – the first premise of all subsequent premises must itself be without
premise. And as we will see, even this statement does not encapsulate the full thought of
emptiness that Hegel has in mind.
So, the revelation of the Logic, interestingly enough, always brings us back to the
culmination of the Phenomenology – that the reality of lived experience is actually the unfolding
of the very tension between (1) self-reflexivity and (2) otherness: the Logic unfolds the identity
(of the Idea) that results from the difference (emptiness) that we are left with at the end of the
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PhG. And this difference itself (in the way that the Logic is different from the PhG) will be
shown to be an irrecoverable one: in some sense this is a symbol for the retroactive paradox of
the Logic itself: the fact that the entire structure reveals something that must have already been
the case from the start. Yet, this simultaneously seems to only make itself possible after the fact,
since what sets the whole movement in motion in the first place is emptiness as such – nothing
has been presupposed. Nothing at all.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE NATURE OF THE BEGINNING
3.1) Introduction
In this chapter, my first task is to delve deeper into the nature of Hegel’s beginning as he
presents it in the Science of Logic in relation to his overall system of philosophy. According to
Hegel, the genuine beginning of philosophy is beyond even the principle or idea of a
beginning.204 Where else could philosophy begin, then, other than in the emptiness of emptiness
(which reveals itself as simultaneously both being and nothingness but also neither merely one
nor the other considered alone)? For this reason, I show how the true beginning leads into a
dialectical, and dynamic, movement between being and nothingness that will eventually unveil
the Notion.
My second task in this chapter is to reflect on Hegel’s beginning as either dialectical or
undialectical. I argue (in partial agreement with Angelica Nuzzo) that Hegel’s beginning is “undialectical.”205,206 However, I use the term in a modified sense and I draw a slightly different
conclusion from this than Nuzzo. On my understanding, the beginning of dialectics is
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“(un)dialectical,” since it is both dialectical and undialectical and neither one nor the other. In
other words, the beginning is a genuine emptiness. Hegel’s beginning is in fact the emptiness of
emptiness – the “nothing” beyond nothing. Nuzzo does, however, agree that even the
undialectical beginning must, of course, be related to dialectics.207
Next, I then show why this understanding of Hegel’s beginning fits with my understanding of
Hegel as a philosopher who thinks at the interstices of identity and difference. My reading of the
beginning as (un)dialectical supports my understanding of Hegel as a philosopher who thinks at
the interstices of identity and difference, since the beginning is neither a static nor even
comprehensible beginning. In agreement with Comay and Ruda, Hegel’s beginning, as we saw in
absolute knowing, is with an “experience of the impossibility of experience:”208 the selftranscendence of consciousness as the movement of absolute Spirit.
3.2) Hegel’s Overall Task in the Science of Logic
Hegel’s overall task in the Logic is essentially his attempt to create a system in which he can
think both system and freedom together. Hegel wrote his major works during a (relatively short)
period of German history which resulted in some of the most philosophical productivity in the
entire history of Western philosophy. As Adrian Johnston notes:
An extremely brief period between the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the
nineteenth centuries sees an incredible explosion of intense philosophical activity in the
German-speaking world, perhaps rivaled solely by the birth of Western philosophy itself
in ancient Greece (although Alain Badiou passionately maintains that postwar France is
philosophically comparable to these other two momentously important times and
places)…209
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With the development of his system of philosophy, Hegel responds to many of his
contemporaries, such as F.H. Jacobi.
As Adrian Johnston further writes, as early as the 1780s, F.H. Jacobi had already posed the
problem as one of “system” or “freedom.”210 The main problem that motivated the development
of Hegel’s system was how to think a monism on the order of substance in a way that would be
consistent with autonomy and “transcendental subjectivity.” As Johnston states:
In a word, the problem was how to think of substance while retaining transcendental
subjectivity as immanent – the problem of “grasping and expressing the True, not only as
Substance, but equally as Subject.” (Hegel, PhG) This was the problem of unifying the
thought of Spinoza (on Substance) with that of a Kant or Fichte (on transcendental
subjectivity).211
My main argument, as we will see (in agreement with Žižek, Comay, Ruda, and Johnston) is that
Hegel’s solution to this question is actually to begin the system with a genuine beginning – a
repetition of emptiness that secures a beginning beyond Kant’s categories of a rational subject.
In the “Introduction” to his Science of Logic, Hegel clarifies the overall task of his work. We
know that subsequent to the influence of relatively proximate historical thinkers such as Spinoza
as well as his contemporaries (including Fichte, F.H. Jacobi, Kant and Hölderlin) Hegel develops
his own system of philosophy to address what he perceives as inadequacies of the metaphysical
systems of his predecessors. As is customary of Hegel, he hopes to retrieve their essential
insights but to think them anew and from a more developed perspective “als Aufhebung.”212,213
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Following the influence of Spinoza (as a thinker of monistic substance), 214 Fichte (as a thinker
of the transcendental subject), and Hölderlin (among others),215 Hegel begins his project to
develop a system of the genuine Absolute. As became the goal in post-Kantian German Idealism,
Hegel’s aim is to think both substance (qua system) and subject (qua freedom) at the same
time.216 Hegel aims to achieve this goal by developing a system of a three-pronged nature:
(1) An elaboration of the beginning of metaphysics in otherness (or emptiness as such).
(2) To demonstrate this beginning as self-referential.
(3) To show how otherness and self-reference are internally united, while retaining respect
for the relative stability and instability of each of the moments of the system.217
Accordingly, for Hegel’s project to even get off of the ground, Hegel first must address the topic
of the beginning.
3.3) A Presuppositionless Beginning
Interestingly enough, Hegel begins the “Introduction” to his SL by adamantly stating that
any genuine philosophy (and, in this particular case, any science of logic) must begin without
any presuppositions. He states, “In no science is the need to begin with the subject matter itself,
without preliminary reflections, felt more strongly than in the science of logic.”218 One reason
why Hegel commits himself to begin the Logic without any presuppositions is that, according to
Hegel, philosophy seeks to express the unconditional truth.219 Surely, if philosophy makes any
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presupposition at the beginning, then, problematically, it could be demonstrated as a conditional
premise. Therefore, it would not suffice as the genuine beginning of a science of an
unconditional nature.
Along these lines, there are two unique facts when it comes to a speculative metaphysics
(in Hegel’s case, which begins with the science of logic) in comparison to other sciences or
disciplines (die Wissenschaften). The first unique fact about logic is that (unlike in the other
sciences) there is not a method of the science that is distinct from the object(s) that the science
investigates. For example, in a science such as biology, there is often a method of the science and
a corresponding content of the science that the science investigates (in the case of biology, it is
the study of bios, for example). However, when it comes to the science of logic, there is neither
an external nor, strictly speaking, distinct method that is applied to a foreign content under
investigation. This is because, in logic, the form and content are co-constitutive. The second
unique aspect of logic (which follows as a result of the first) is that the fully developed subject
matter that is under investigation is also inherently bound up with the nature of the scientific
investigation itself insofar as the investigation is of a developmental nature. In other words, what
is under investigation in the science unfolds from out of the science itself. As Hegel writes, “But
not only the account of scientific method, but even the Notion itself of the science as such
belongs to its content, and in fact constitutes its final result.”220 This is to say that, on Hegel’s
account, it is of the utmost importance that the science supplies the content and the method from
out of itself internally.
Indeed, in the “Preface” to the First edition, Hegel states again that philosophy ought not
to seek its method from another discipline. He writes:
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Philosophy, if it would be science, cannot, as I have remarked elsewhere, borrow its
method from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than it can remain
satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, or employ arguments based on
grounds adduced by external reflection. On the contrary, it can be only the nature of the
content itself which spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing,
since it is at the same time the reflection of the content itself which first posits and
generates its determinate character.221
In other words, when it comes to philosophy, Hegel contends that the content develops a method
from out of itself – the content and the method ought to spontaneously and simultaneously
develop in a harmonious interplay.
The notion that both the method and the content of the logic develop internally from out
of the logic itself is directly bound up with Hegel’s explanation that there ought not to be any
presuppositions when it comes to the beginning of the Logic. As Hegel writes, “what logic is
cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final
outcome and consummation of the whole exposition.”222 This is to say that one does not come to
the study of a genuine science of logic with a method in hand and a presupposed idea of what
object(s) will be taken for consideration, for to do so would be to preclude the possibility of a
genuine science of logic developing from out of pure reason itself. For this reason, Hegel
expands on this discussion, explaining how, “the Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of
the exposition.”223 In other words, what will constitute the content of the Logic is ultimately not
known until the process has taken its course. This realization – regarding the developmental
nature of the logic – raises the question: wherefrom could the science possibly even start at all?
(As we will see, this leads Hegel into the first section of the “Doctrine of Being,” entitled “With
What Must the Science Begin?” which I will discuss in more detail later on in this chapter).
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Hegel’s rejection of the notion that there could possibly be any adequate presuppositions when it
comes to the development of a science of logic also connects to what distinguishes his position
from that of his predecessors – his rejection of a strict distinction between form and content.
Indeed, following his statement that the Logic ought not presuppose anything, Hegel goes
on to explain that the predecessors to his Logic have problematically presupposed a strict
separation between form and content. As Hegel explains, “Hitherto, the Notion of logic has
rested on the separation, presupposed once and for all in the ordinary consciousness, of the
content of cognition and its form, or of truth and certainty.”224 Here, significantly, the object
under consideration is cognition as such. In other words, previous thinkers often tend to
presuppose a strict division between the form and content of cognition; Hegel, on the other hand,
denies such a strict division.
In the section, “With What Must the Science Begin?” from the Logic, Hegel reflects once
again on what constitutes the genuine beginning of philosophy – what is its “absolute ground”?
Hegel had shown at the culmination of the PhG that consciousness is self-referential but,
importantly, it is also true that in this self-reference, consciousness is simultaneously different
from itself (and, therefore, it is never self-referential in a complete sense). It is with this insight
into “pure knowing,” that Hegel begins his reflections on how philosophy as such begins in the
SL.
Here, once again, Hegel is keen on the fact that one does not arrive at philosophical
reflection externally, especially when it comes to the beginning of philosophical reflection as
such. On the contrary, Hegel shows how, more properly speaking, philosophy (as the love of
wisdom) in fact reveals itself as always already there from the start. If this is the case, however,
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then it follows that the beginning of philosophy must reveal itself as always already there in
some sense (although we will see that a paradox remains when it comes to revealing exactly how
this is the case). And this is in fact precisely what Hegel concludes. He writes:
Now starting from this determination of pure knowledge, all that is needed to ensure that
the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to consider, or rather,
ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions whatever, simply to take up what is
there before us.
Pure knowing as concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and
mediation; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be
knowledge; what is present is only simple immediacy.225
Hegel indicates here that the beginning of philosophy must be made with what he refers to as the
“indeterminate” and “simple immediacy” of pure being. However, in his reflections on this fact,
Hegel later comes to realize that this simple immediacy reveals itself as already bound up with
mediation as well. For this reason, at this point, Hegel notes how he will consider the beginning
(at the initial stage of his reflection) as the emptiness of “simple immediacy.” Hegel hopes to
show how philosophy begins with what is already there. It must begin without any
presuppositions at all; the beginning must be already here – it is not something that we arrive at
externally (in the sense that it must not be based on other considerations). As we will see,
however, this consideration of the pure immediacy of Being is later revealed as a merely
preliminary one, since Hegel later demonstrates how immediacy is necessarily bound up with
mediation. I will examine Hegel’s explanation for this connection in more detail later on in this
chapter.
In any event, the context of Hegel’s discussion prior to this passage had been how it is
relatively simple to show how philosophy cannot begin either with mere mediation nor mere
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immediacy alone.226 For example, if one were to begin in mere mediation (any possible
relationship or even the nature of relationship as such), then one could show that the mediation
of two things has already been presupposed from the start, which means that it could not truly be
the first. In other words, the problem with this approach is that it seems to presuppose a
relationship of two different possible relata or mere relation as such. Problematically, however,
such a presupposition is of a conditional nature, and therefore, could not lead to the discovery of
the unconditional truth. On the contrary, if one begins with a mere axiom (of a particular posited
principle, for example), then that principle has to be presupposed from the start, and then it
seems impossible to explain why we should begin with that principle as opposed to any other – it
becomes arbitrary to choose any particular principle and one seems equally justified in arguing
for any particular principle as opposed to any other.
3.4) How to Return to the Beginning as Such?
Hegel’s question, then, becomes how might he return philosophy to the genuine
beginning?227 This is to say, how might philosophy arrive at the beginning as such (even without
presupposing an idea of what constitutes a beginning from the start)? And I argue (in agreement
with Dieter Henrich on this point, as we will see) that understanding Hegel’s proposed solution
to this dilemma is actually crucial to understanding the whole system.228 A large part of Hegel’s
response to this dilemma is also bound up with a profound insight: his understanding that the
emptiness of the genuine beginning passes before the positing of any particular principle, and
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that for this reason, the genuine ontological beginning actually reveals itself as the true
beginning.
Indeed, Hegel continues through this discussion by stating that “it lies in the very nature
of a beginning that it must be being and nothing else. To enter into philosophy, therefore, calls
for no other preparations, no further reflections or points of connection.”229 Since, for Hegel, the
form and the content of philosophy are unified (as I discussed previously), he argues therefore
that, “the first for thought ought also to be the first in the process of thinking.”230 In many ways,
this means that the beginning is not something that we come to secondarily, since it is, on the
contrary, already there (although not in the form of a complete or completed notion), and that is
why the connection to the PhG is also significant here as well.
Hegel’s solution to the dilemma, then, is that the beginning of philosophy must also be
the beginning of thought as such – that which starts thought on its way – the unity of pure
knowing (subject) and pure being (substance) in emptiness. In other words, Hegel will attempt to
retrieve the beginning of thought itself (in an absolute sense) as that which will ground his entire
system of philosophy. As he states:
thus the beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract
beginning; and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything nor
have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science. Consequently, it
must be purely and simply an immediacy, or rather merely immediacy itself…the
beginning therefore is pure being.231
Here, Hegel’s solution, then, to the question of the beginning of philosophy is to be found in the
immediacy of pure being. It is only here, in such an absolute beginning, that philosophy could
truly begin and repeatedly return. However, Hegel’s thinking on the beginning, both in and as
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the immediacy of pure being will actually take him on a path that extends across the entire work,
since “pure immediacy” is not static on Hegel’s account. Rather, the beginning as immediacy
will aid Hegel in his demonstration that a structural tension between immediacy and mediation is
actually definitive of life as such, and consequently, of his philosophical and ontological system
as well.
Along these lines, due to what will eventually unveil itself as the circular nature of the
Logic, what is shown to be true at the beginning will also be revealed to be true throughout the
course of the entire science as well. In other words, the circular nature of the Logic entails that
the beginning will not merely be present at the beginning and then no longer. Rather, the
beginning maintains its truth throughout the entire process: Spirit’s “dying” to itself into the
actuality of Substance in fact entails that genuine sacrifice highlights the nature of existence.
3.5) The Beginning as Both Immediacy and Mediation
For this reason, Hegel’s further reflections on the beginning reveal an irony: although the
beginning must be neither mere immediacy nor mediation considered alone, it is also true that
the beginning must in some sense be both immediacy and mediation at the same time. He writes:
pure being is the unity into which pure knowing withdraws…It is when taken in this way
that this pure being, this absolute immediacy has equally the character of something
absolutely mediated. But it is equally essential that it be taken only in the one-sided
character in which it is pure immediacy, precisely because here it is the beginning.232
What Hegel discovers is the following: if pure being is taken as absolute immediacy, then it is
also true that it must be pure mediation also, since it is equally true that pure being is then in
relation to pure knowing (and therefore, absolute immediacy is equally the mediation of pure
being and pure knowing). Hegel seems to be saying here that what makes it possible for pure

232

Ibid., 72.

106

being to exist is that it exists as the sublation of mediation itself. In other words, for pure
immediacy to exist at all, pure immediacy must sublate the purity of pure mediation. Thus, the
pure immediacy of pure being is simultaneously both immediate and mediated: the beginning
reveals a dialectical tension between identity and difference. That said, the last part of the quote
above is also essential. Hegel comments that, at this stage of the Logic, he is only considering
pure being insofar as its relationship to pure knowing has been sublated, and therefore, he
considers it from the viewpoint of its immediacy. Here, Hegel attempts to pause and retrieve a
genuine beginning on the order of pure being.
My reflections on the double meaning of the beginning (as both mediated and immediate
while also neither mere mediation nor immediacy) lead to the notion of a tetralemma. The
majority of my thought in this chapter will be occupied by an attempt to display how this reveals
itself. Now that we have the more general idea of the movement at hand, I will begin with my
attempt to demonstrate this movement in a more detailed fashion. Later on in this chapter, I will
bring in some reflections by contemporary philosophers in an attempt to aid my illustration of
the movement in a variety of ways.
3.6) My Reconstruction of Hegel’s Beginning
To reiterate, in the section “With What Must the Science Begin?” from the “Doctrine of
Being,” Hegel explains that a genuine Science of Logic ought not to presuppose anything. For
this reason, the Logic begins in what he calls “indeterminate immediacy” or “pure being.” He
writes:
Now starting from this determination of pure knowledge, all that is needed to ensure that
the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to consider, or rather,
ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions whatever, simply to take up, what is
there before us.
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Pure knowing as concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and to
mediation; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be
knowledge; what is present is only simple immediacy.
Simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection and contains a reference to its
distinction from what is mediated. This simple immediacy, therefore, in its true
expression is pure being. Just as pure knowing is to mean knowing as such, quite
abstractly, so too pure being is to mean nothing but being in general: being, and nothing
else, without any further specification and filling.
Here the beginning is made with being which is represented as having come to be
through mediation, a mediation which is also a sublating of itself; and there is
presupposed pure knowing as the outcome of finite knowing, of consciousness. But if no
presupposition is to be made and the beginning itself is taken immediately, then its only
determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is
present is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose to
consider thought as such. Thus the beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous
here, an abstract beginning; and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated
by anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science.
Consequently, it must be purely and simply an immediacy, or rather merely immediacy
itself. Just as it cannot possess any determination relatively to anything else, so too it
cannot contain within itself any determination, any content; for any such would be a
distinguishing and an interrelationship of distinct moments, and consequently a
mediation. The beginning therefore is pure being.233
According to Hegel’s reflections here, the science of logic must begin with “being” considered
by itself. Furthermore, he indicates that said being must be empty, since if it were not, then being
would be mediated, in the same sense that there would be a specific relationship between a
content and a form, for example. Yet, he will eventually find that this apparent absolute
immediacy is in fact only possible in the first place since mediation has been sublated.
Furthermore, it is particularly interesting to me that here Hegel aims to begin his system of
philosophy with the beginning of thought as such – the beginning even beyond the idea of a
beginning. In order to do so, Hegel explains that the only genuine beginning is to begin with the
purity of immediacy itself – in other words, a state of awareness that is not focused on any
particular determinate content. I would liken this state to a divine, meditative state, which
233
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observes all thoughts but is not restricted to any particular thought. In other words, Hegel
discovers that, if his system is to begin with a genuine beginning, then Spirit must enter into the
beginning of all beginnings: the emptiness of emptiness.
Hegel arrives at a number of important discoveries in this passage quoted above. First of
all, pure knowing (insofar as it is immediate) exists as immediate only insofar as it exists as the
sublation of mediation. In other words, it can be considered in its immediacy but at the same
time in a different sense it is only immediate insofar as mediation has been both negated and
preserved. In other words, while the positive side of negation is apparent immediacy, the
negative side is the lack of the appearance of mediation (even abstract immediacy stands in some
relation to mediation upon further consideration). The second interesting discovery, then, follows
from the first: that insofar as we may call “simple immediacy” immediate at all, it is equally true
that it is mediated: this is why Hegel uses the language here of “an expression of reflection.” For
instance, in the part where Hegel writes how, “Simple immediacy is itself an expression of
reflection and contains a reference to its distinction from what is mediated,”234 he provides
evidence of how immediacy is only immediate insofar as it is distinct from, but also in relation
to, the notion of mediation. In other words, there is already a relation to what it is not insofar as
the apparent lack of any mediation is what defines it as immediacy. But, when immediacy pushes
the extreme of pure and abstract immediacy, one discovers that it is already related to that from
which it is distinguished – mediation. Next, the part of the quote where Hegel comments on
“pure being and nothing else” also reveals the dialectical tension between being and nothing. For
Hegel to even comment here on “being and nothing else” already reveals a dialectical interplay
between being and nothing. Lastly, it is important to reflect further here on what makes possible
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the “abstract beginning” that Hegel is searching for here in the first place. As we will see, in the
truly abstract beginning (the only genuine beginning), spirit must negate itself – and wager the
genuine possibility of its own non-existence. Or, to put it in another way, identity must sublate
itself in otherness – this is the genuine beginning that Hegel desires for philosophy. In some
ways, it seems that Hegel is saying here that when God dies to itself God discovers that it has
already overcome death: Spirit has always already been resurrected from the dead. This does not
imply completeness, however, since the life of God (via the resurrection and overcoming of
death) is constituted by the very movement of Spirit out of the emptiness of emptiness and its
continuous return to nothing (it is simultaneous with God placing itself before the possibility of
its own genuine death repeatedly).
During Hegel’s entrance into the emptiness of pure being, a number of further insights
are unveiled. First of all, pure being, although initially considered in its apparent “immediacy,”
actually reveals itself as possible only to the extent that any possible relationship has first been
overcome. I will use an example here to illustrate the point.
I believe that Hegel has something like the following in mind (admittedly, in my analogy,
I am thinking on the order of a finite thinker, whereas Hegel ultimately demonstrates how this
process is shown to be retroactively inscribed within the absolute as such (as we will see Žižek
explain later on)). Thus, Hegel thinks that the two domains are fundamentally united – insofar as
they are integral correlates of each other235 – so my analogy serves a useful purpose. To return to
the true beginning, one ought not to think any particular thought. This means that one would
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return to a state of awareness that is beyond any particular thought, yet simultaneously capable of
being all possible thoughts. This means that the thinker opens himself up to the possibility of
empty observance. In this state, there is an appearance of immediacy or what Hegel would call
“pure being.” However, upon deeper observance, one further notices that what actually opens up
the possibility for one to exist in this state of immediacy in the first place is the overcoming of
thinking any determinate, particular, or otherwise finite thoughts. This is what Hegel calls the
“sublation of mediation.” However, the mediation that is sublated here is not merely thoughts
insofar as they are related to other thoughts, but rather the relationship between immediacy and
mediation as such. In other words, it is the very relationship between difference and identity as
such that is sublated – and this opens up the possibility for a deeper nothingness. For this reason,
the sublation of the relationship between identity and difference actually entails a fourfold
structure, since it is such a sublation that actually allows for the affirmation of identity but also
the simultaneous possibility of its negation. In other words, Being is free at bottom. In this way,
Hegel shows that it is actually the sublation of mediation that unveils the possibility for the
immediacy of pure being in the first place.
Thus, I argue that Hegel’s thinking of the beginning as the pure immediacy of being in
fact displays a tetralemma structure. When thinking empties itself out into the empty content (of
being) via negation and is considered as abstract immediacy what we find there is that this
immediacy is actually enabled by the sublation of mediation (the sublation of the relation
between substance and subject allows for the apparent immediacy of substance). For this reason,
apparent immediacy in fact displays itself as inherently bound up with its own self-negation
(explicated as the negation of negation) and unveils a higher-order identity. In other words,
immediacy’s self-negation (the negation of difference) is actually united by a higher-order unity
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with the affirmation of identity and for this reason, the proper structure is a fourfold one in which
there is an indifference of a higher order when it comes to identity and difference. I argue that
this is the proper reading of what Hegel means when he begins the system of Logic in pure
immediacy and also why he says that the Being at the beginning is also bound up with
Nothingness.
On my reading, then, Being and Nothingness, therefore, stand in a dialectical relationship
of a (at minimum) fourfold nature. Immediacy stands at the beginning as the sublation of
mediation, since what makes said immediacy possible is actually a constitutive self-repetition
that reveals a higher-order indifference between identity and difference (a simultaneous identity
and difference).236 If this is the case, then the actuality of mediation is actually latent within pure
immediacy itself. And therefore, pure immediacy is both identity (the identity of immediacy with
itself), difference (the difference of immediacy from mediation), and also neither merely
immediacy nor mediation. In other words, the beginning as “pure immediacy” is both identity
and difference but also the indifference of both. As a consequence, if Hegel thinks that
philosophy’s task is bound up with the revelation of absolute truth, then it is very significant here
to consider what this would imply, since the only prior truth that could be said to be presupposed
when it comes to philosophy (if there could be said to be any presupposition at all) is, in fact,
nothing – the actuality of nothingness and the subsequent revelation of the indifference of pure
being and nothingness which lies at the bottom of life considered as a continuous, dynamical
process.237
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In a passage following shortly after the one quoted above, Hegel discusses this notion of
spirit’s self-sublation and its importance to understanding the beginning. He writes there:
It must be admitted that it is an important consideration—one which will be found in
more detail in the logic itself – that the advance is a retreat into the ground, to what is
primary and true, on which depends and, in fact, from which originates, that with which
the beginning is made. Thus consciousness on its onward path from the immediacy with
which it began is led back to absolute knowledge as its innermost truth. This last, the
ground, is then also that from which the first proceeds, that which at first appeared as an
immediacy. This is true in still greater measure of absolute spirit which reveals itself as
the concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the end of the development
is known as freely externalizing itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate
being – opening or unfolding itself [sich entschliessend] into the creation of a world
which contains all that fell into the development which preceded that result and which
through this reversal of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed into
something dependent on the result as principle. The essential requirement for the science
of logic is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole
of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also
the first.238
In this passage, Hegel clarifies the fact that “the beginning” of his system is a beginning in a
tenuous sense. It is certainly not a beginning in the sense of a pure principle taken by itself. At
first, Hegel thinks about the beginning as a beginning that could be considered as a pure
immediacy. But when he considers this pure immediacy taken alone, what he comes to find is
that the condition for the possibility of this immediacy is in fact the sublation of mediation. This
further points to the dialectical movement between immediacy and mediation. The qualification
that Hegel makes at the end of this passage is crucial, then, since it is here where Hegel explains
that the beginning is actually part of a circular process. Here again, it is absolute spirit’s own
self-emptying which makes possible the “shape of an immediate being” at all. To put it in my
own words, when absolute spirit empties itself out into nothingness, what it discovers there is
actually simultaneously its self-affirmation. This passage is also part of Hegel’s “retroactive”
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logic. When Spirit empties itself out in the final stage, what at first appeared to be simple
immediacy is no longer simple immediacy. Rather, Spirit discovers there what had to have been
the case via the eyes of emptiness, such that the effect reaches back in time and fundamentally
transforms what it sees. As Žižek and Henrich will explain, the negation of negation is
simultaneously both an affirmation and a negation. As we will see, Hegel’s reflections here point
us to his three-part movement that leads from the Doctrine of Being to the Doctrine of Essence to
the Doctrine of the Notion.
In Hegel’s view of the circular nature of the beginning, then, the beginning is not merely
present in the beginning and then no longer. Rather, he notes how in his system, the beginning
retains its presence throughout the development of further philosophical reflection. As he writes,
“thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout
the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further
determinations.” 239 In the way that I interpret this quote, I understand it to mean that Absolute
Spirit’s self-emptying is both the culmination as well as the beginning of the process. When
absolute spirit empties itself out, it in fact finds itself in emptiness, and yet it also discovers itself
anew. This process is simultaneously a resurrection and a rebirth, although according to Hegel,
the process is not predicated upon a completely totalizing resurrection. On the contrary, there is
always something old, simultaneous with something new.
The key part from the quote above for our current purposes is when Hegel notes how
Spirit demonstrates absolute knowledge when it is divested as the immediacy of pure being. To
reiterate, he states there:
This is true in still greater measure of absolute spirit which reveals itself as the concrete
and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the end of the development is known as
freely externalizing itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate being – opening
239

Hegel, Science of Logic, 71.

114

or unfolding itself [sich entschliessend] into the creation of a world which contains all
that fell into the development which preceded that result and which through this reversal
of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed into something dependent on the
result as principle… 240
Hegel suggests here that when Spirit is divested, it is as something positive – Substance! This
developmental structure is not presupposed from the start. However, there is a sort of
reconciliation of Spirit that ultimately reveals itself to be true, and indeed, continuously so. Even
so, this reconciliation is not a complete one – Spirit need not completely recover itself from out
of the abyss in order for Hegel to be consistent here. This is because Hegel is making a different
claim altogether. He is instead asserting that it is the very tension between the possibility of
Spirit’s annihilation and affirmation that defines its identity.241 In other words, the tension
between identity and difference is internal and constitutive of Spirit such that in the process of its
own self-reconciliation a tension is revealed between identity and difference: Spirit unveils itself
as beyond a complete reconciliation merely on the order of a static identity. This is why Hegel
uses the analogy of a circle here – no matter where on the circle one takes as the beginning,
Spirit’s self-emptying ultimately reveals the circular structure insofar as it implies a continuous
reversal back to an empty beginning and a subsequent development from there. In other words,
the reason that the circular nature is so important to Hegel (even more important than the pure
immediacy) is that through the course of Spirit’s self-emptying it reveals an internal tension
between identity and difference.
Along these lines, Hegel continues on to describe why the Logic begins with the
immediacy of pure being and how this beginning makes itself known throughout the course of
the Logic. He writes:
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Through this progress, then, the beginning loses the one-sidedness which attaches to it as
something simply immediate and abstract; it becomes something mediated, and hence the
line of the scientific advance becomes a circle. It also follows that because that which
forms the beginning is still undeveloped, devoid of content, it is not truly known in the
beginning; it is the science of logic in its whole compass which first constitutes the
completed knowledge of it with its developed content and first truly grounds that
knowledge.242
Of primary interest to me here is the way in which Hegel discusses the beginning as not known
in the beginning as what it is, since, in the beginning, it is only considered as the immediacy of
pure being. Yet, throughout the course of the logic, the beginning reveals itself as a necessary
beginning, since there would be no better place for philosophy to begin other than in the
immediacy of pure being without any presuppositions. In other words, Hegel does not
presuppose pure being as a principle. Rather, Spirit continuously sacrifices itself, emptying itself
out into a profound nothingness, and in doing so, genuine Spirit is revealed: this is the truth that
the Logic unveils.
Hegel contends that as Spirit undergoes this journey, what is revealed is that pure Being is, in
fact, always already mediated. Thus, to consider anything from the standpoint of pure immediacy
is also to consider it as mediated. As Hegel explains, “It is when taken in this way that this pure
being, this absolute immediacy has equally the character of something absolutely mediated.”243
As we will see later on, Žižek also discusses this when he notes how the “immediacy of
mediation” is simultaneously the “mediated nature of... immediacy.”244
Hegel does not merely presuppose “pure being” in the sense that anything could be
presupposed as a beginning. This is to say that the beginning of the Logic as pure being is not an
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external presupposition. On the contrary, it is a beginning that becomes more and more apparent
as “always already” there during the course of the overall movement. This is why Hegel writes:
It also follows that because that which forms the beginning is still undeveloped, devoid of
content, it is not truly known in the beginning; it is the science of logic in its whole compass
which first constitutes the completed knowledge of it with its developed content and first
truly grounds that knowledge…245
Interestingly enough, during this process, the beginning that necessarily must have been there at
the start as “immediate” simultaneously reveals itself as mediated (since it is the sublation of
mediation which makes said immediacy possible). In the way that I understand it, then, Hegel
seems to indicate that the emptiness of emptiness is the form of all forms – in the sense that it is
both emptiness (without form), and yet, simultaneously all possible forms. Naturally, here the
question arises – to what extent could Spirit know pure emptiness? Indeed, to what extent is it
possible to know pure emptiness at all? Hegel’s point here is that knowledge of pure emptiness is
internal to, and constitutive of experience as such. As Hegel puts it, “pure being is the unity into
which pure knowing withdraws, or, if this itself is still to be distinguished as form from its unity,
then being is also the content of pure knowing.”246 In other words, in emptiness, pure being and
pure knowing are united (there is a coincidence of substance and subject). In Spirit’s surrender of
itself, there is a unity of pure being and knowing, since consciousness dissolves itself into the
emptiness of pure being. Yet in order for this to be possible, pure knowing must sacrifice itself.
In the beginning of philosophy, pure knowing sacrifices itself to the emptiness of pure being, and
in this emptiness there is an affirmation of its identity with being.
The structure of Hegel’s text (in rough outline) is the movement from the Doctrine of
Being to the Doctrine of Essence and finally, to the Doctrine of the Notion. However, if what we
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have stated beforehand (about the fact that mediation must be sublated in order to allow for
apparent immediacy) is true, then it is also the case that, in many ways, what apparently comes
later must actually precede the apparent first.247 I will attempt my reconstruction of the overall
structural movement in rough outline with some help from Dieter Henrich’s chapter, “The Logic
of Negation.”248
Let us say for starters that the Logic begins at first with the Doctrine of Being (Negation
understood as pure immediacy). Then what reveals itself next in the process is that this pure
immediacy of Being (which is negation understood as the lack of all properties and
simultaneously the possibility of all properties) must also be self-identity, since the only thing
that negation could possibly negate here is negation itself. Yet, what appears to be a subsequent
negation here in this process must have actually been there already (since it is the self-sublation
of mediation which made apparent immediacy possible in the first place). As Dieter Henrich puts
it: “we are led unavoidably to the conclusion that the state that is opposed to negation is with the
state to which it is opposed in the relationship of self-reference.”249 Finally, chronologically
speaking, the Doctrine of the Notion comes next. However, it, too, reveals itself as ontologically
prior to the Doctrine of the Essence. In the Doctrine of the Notion, Hegel presents a more
developed understanding of the relation between the two prior moments of the movement in their
instability and stability, respectively.250
Following that brief structural outline, let us return once more to our reflections on the
beginning according to Hegel. Hegel notes how the beginning is not anything tangible or
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concrete in the sense that one could state it as an external presupposition that would allow for our
reflections to subsequently begin. Indeed, throughout Hegel’s various texts he often refers to the
beginning in terms of a “divestment” (Entäußerung) (as I explained in Ch. 2 of this dissertation)
or “emptiness.” In recent Hegel scholarship, contemporary philosophers have written on the
topic of connecting this notion of beginning to the notion of kenotic sacrifice and emptying
oneself.251 So, when Hegel argues that the beginning is not anything concrete in terms of an
external presupposition, I would similarly argue that understanding the etymological connection
of the word Hegel uses to the notion of sacrifice is also crucial to understanding what Hegel
means to say about the beginning of the Logic in the emptiness of Being.
3.7) The Sacrifice of the Absolute
The notion of sacrifice is crucial to understanding the beginning, since, as we will see, to
give oneself away is simultaneously to find oneself.252 In the spirit of the 13th century German
mystic Meister Eckhart, and just as Molly Farneth points out in her essay, “The Power to Empty
Oneself,” many Christians often espouse the view that one ought to be a humble servant in faith,
allowing “the same mind to be in you that was in Christ Jesus.”253 Yet to allow the Christ mind
to live in you is to empty oneself of one’s particular, or otherwise finite, determinate identity.
Could it be that what Hegel had in mind for the beginning of the Logic was a sacrifice akin to
this (albeit on the order of the absolute)? What arises here in emptiness (I will also argue this
point in connection with Schelling in the next chapter) is actually the holiness of God – the
sacrifice of God from out of its own emptiness that is simultaneous with divine Love. Moreover,
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the sacrifice that stands at the beginning of philosophy must be given as an absolute one – it must
be the sacrifice that God makes from out of itself at the very beginning. In this sacrifice, the
infinite discovers itself in its own difference: as the “subject” dies to itself, an irrevocable tension
is revealed that is constitutive of philosophy as such – the tension between existence and nonexistence.
In his essay, “Hegel and the Gift of Sacrifice,” Joseph Cohen comments on the
importance of sacrifice to Hegel’s Logic and the PhG. He writes there:
This is why Hegel warns, in our opening quote, that the force of Spirit is not to ‘close its
eyes to the negative,’ but only by the long and sustained gaze in the face of nothingness
transform, transpose, alter and transfer it, ultimately negate it and thus relieve it into its
own end which is its own truth, testifying thus that the ‘negative’ reflects that it was
already and always a name, amongst others, of the ‘infinite life’ of Spirit. This point
needs here to be marked as it clearly demonstrates the inherent necessity in Hegel’s
speculative dialectic to think the essential movement of a negation which retains and reappropriates the truth of that which it negates. And such is the speculative definition of
sacrifice: to retain whilst negating, to keep the actuality of that which is abandoned, to
preserve the essence of that which is annihilated. The question, for Hegel, is what is
being retained here whilst at the same time being dispensed? 254
In the spirit of Cohen’s reflections here, what might this imply when it comes to the beginning of
philosophy for Hegel? The connection that I would like to make here is to the beginning of the
Logic in the pure immediacy of Being. In Spirit’s self-sacrifice, one discovers that, for Hegel, the
apparent pure immediacy of Being actually reveals that what makes apparent immediacy
possible is in fact the suspension of mediation (likewise, the subject’s development out of
substance demonstrates that substance was always already subject in some sense).255 In other
words, Hegel’s attempt to think Nothingness actually reveals a phenomenological and structural
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tension between identity and difference that is constitutive of the Logic as such and therefore, of
ontology in a more general sense. Indeed, such a tension informs the structure of the work on the
whole and the transition from the Doctrine of Being to the Doctrine of Essence and the Doctrine
of the Notion.
Significantly, Cohen and Henrich both note how there is a double meaning of the
negation of Spirit here. If Spirit negates itself in the beginning, it is equally true that this is what
defines Spirit as genuinely alive – this self-negating aspect is never completely total, but rather
propels Spirit forward and produces its living nature. In other words, the courage of Spirit in the
face of its own non-existence and the possibility of its negation are actually what constitute life.
As Cohen states:
what must retain attention however, as we have just noted, is the sovereignty of the autoprotection of meaning deployed through Spirit’s incessant sacrifice. As if Spirit’s
incessant sacrifice always sought to protect Spirit from its own negation. As if what
protects Spirit from itself is always the sacrificial process of its negation.256
Interestingly enough, the point here is that there is a paradox when it comes to the beginning of
philosophy in and as negation: by subjecting itself to absolute negation, Spirit simultaneously
preserves itself. Hegel’s point is that in Spirit’s movement of development from out of substance,
spirit simultaneously preserves itself as subject.
For this reason, on Cohen’s account, the purpose of Hegel’s move at the beginning of the
Logic is actually also to demonstrate the tension between a one-sided negation (on the order of
self-elimination and one-sided infinitude) versus a self-determining negation (affirmation and
finite determination). Due to this aporetic tension, there is also a dimension of holiness present
here as well (a holiness that Schelling even more explicitly comments on, as we will see in the
next chapter).
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Hegel’s point (in agreement with Schelling) is that the genuine absolute does not stand at
a distance from the world of experience.257 Rather, it is God’s self-vanishing movement that
displays the sacredness of the genuine Absolute – the transcendent is, paradoxically,
simultaneously both in being and beyond being. God’s self-movement in Nothingness – the
passage across the possibility of its own non-existence – is actually what continually establishes
the genuine actuality of the Absolute from out of the abyss of freedom.258 As Angelica Nuzzo
writes, “It is only once the radical ‘sacrifice’ of thinking is performed that dialectic can
begin.”259 As God sacrifices itself absolutely, in pure emptiness it discovers that its own selfmovement is the very moment that constitutes itself as God (the expression of Spirit as the
Absolute Idea). Here, Hegel thinks both elimination and affirmation simultaneously. Indeed, the
whole movement is an aporetic one, as Joseph Cohen points out. As Cohen writes:
Such is the risk opened by Hegel: that of a ‘double blind’ so powerfully aporetic that it
risks of projecting speculative dialectic towards an impossible decision between
sacrificing itself or recognizing itself as sacrifice. But such is perhaps also its gift: that of
an undecidable risk, a radical indecision between a sacrifice without sacrifice, a sacrifice
that would consume itself by voiding, incinerating, destroying Spirit itself, its sacrifice its
violence AND a sacrifice which operates always in the name of Spirit, which assumes,
recognizes, acquiesces itself as a sacrifice.260
Cohen views this tension (between an absolute sacrifice that would void oneself and a selfaffirming sacrifice) as constitutive of Spirit. To put it briefly, it is precisely the experience of its
self-sacrificial nature that constitutes its identity. For this reason, the aporetic tension is
preserved during the process of the Absolute coming to know itself. Furthermore, since Hegel
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does not posit a strict divide between form and content when it comes to the Absolute, the
Absolute’s subjection to negativity is actually one with its experiential passage through nonexistence. Indeed, the passage through non-existence is actually what constitutes experience. For
this reason, it is this passage that opens up the genuine beginning of philosophy.
Therefore, the notion of sacrifice is crucial to understanding Hegel’s Logic at its core,
since it stands at the beginning of the entire movement. Hegel does not merely presuppose an
internal relation at the start – on the contrary, the Absolute subjects itself to the internal
possibility of its own non-existence. In other words, something akin to God’s contemplation of
its own impossibility or possibility (taken together) is what grounds the possibility of the Logic
in the first place. Absolute Spirit must die to itself in order that form and content can reveal
themselves as internally united (Substance without Subject is simultaneously Substance as
Subject, as Žižek would have it).261
This movement is precisely why Hegel explains that the Logic must begin in the
emptiness of pure being. Indeed, if Hegel conceived of his project as the revelation of
unconditional truth,262 it is a truth that must become through a process of its own selfdifferentiation out of an original emptiness (an emptiness prior to the logical space that makes
possible a determinate nothing – nothing conceived as a lack of something). This is to say that
philosophy arises from out of its internal Ungrund (a groundless ground) akin to its own
unconscious.263 As Hegel writes,
The foregoing shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot be made with
anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes an
261
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internal process of mediation and transition of which the concrete, now become simple,
would be the result. But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and an other;
for anything which is in its own self a first and an other implies that an advance has
already been made. Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning
itself, is to be taken as something unanalyzable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy,
and therefore as being, as the completely empty being.264
On Hegel’s account, the beginning of philosophy, therefore, must be aporetic.265 It is not merely
a beginning on the order of immediacy nor mediation but rather, as I have argued – it is prior to
the discursive space in which we could properly name it as one or the other. In other words,
empty being is being that is beyond being (in the sense that it is not merely defined by its
opposition to nothing). Indeed, empty being is that which enables the dialectic between being
and non-being to arise in the first place (paradoxically, empty being holds open the dialectical
tension between being and non-being, while simultaneously unifying them).
Indeed, there is further evidence for this reading a few pages later (here we are still in the
“Doctrine of Being”), when Hegel describes the beginning as one that is prior to mediation. He
writes there:
…for only in what is simple is there nothing more than the pure beginning; only the
immediate is simple, for only in the immediate has no advance yet been made from a one
to an other. Consequently, whatever is intended to be expressed or implied beyond being,
in the richer forms of representing the absolute or God, this is in the beginning only an
empty word and only being; this simple determination which has no other meaning of any
kind, this emptiness, is therefore simply as such the beginning of philosophy.266
If the beginning that Hegel has in mind here is prior to mediation, then how could one call it
either being or non-being considered alone? In other words, empty being seems (at this stage) to
be in some sense ontologically prior to the mediation that enables one to name it as either being
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or non-being.267 On Hegel’s account, this emptiness of Spirit is that of pure substance: conceived
in its truly circular nature, it is both the death as well as the birth of Spirit. It is the place wherein
Spirit is most properly nourished and its true home. This is why Hegel claims that in this
emptiness, what is revealed is the self-reference of Spirit. When Spirit empties itself out, it
actually discovers itself in this purity: emptiness reveals its self-referential nature. The logical
structure of the Subject as such is the dialectic that is born from out of the emptiness beyond
emptiness. After the fact, we can say that the vanishing itself forges a dialectical process: it
opens up the gap between non-being and being while simultaneously serving as the bridge
between the two. When Hegel says that this pure being lacks content, he means to say that it is
beyond the speculative dialectic that would enable one to make a determinate judgment about it.
Dieter Henrich, as we will see, explains that Hegel means to say that the beginning is pure
negativity (but from the other side of things, one could just as equally call it pure positivity). The
beginning is emptiness in the sense that it is considered prior to mediation as such – i.e. pure
being is both pure positivity and pure negativity, but also neither merely one nor the other. In
other words, here Hegel could use any term to represent the lack of determinate content – some
of his choices are “emptiness”, “simple”, “indeterminate immediacy”, “pure being”, etc.
3.8) The Beginning of Philosophy in Aporia268
Thus, although one might initially think that what Hegel means by “indeterminate
immediacy” is emptiness in the sense of the mere lack of any properties (the presence of
absence, i.e. determinate negation) upon further reflection, Hegel means something deeper, and I
hope to show that both Henrich and Nuzzo agree on their interpretation of Hegel here. In what
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follows, I provide more argumentation in favor of my reading (with additional support from
Slavoj Žižek, Dieter Henrich, Angelica Nuzzo, Joseph Cohen, and Markus Gabriel) that the
beginning of the movement in fact implies a fourfold structure (i.e. the beginning is of an
“aporetic”269 nature), and negation here is eventually understood as part of a dynamical process
that constitutes the logical structure of becoming – i.e., philosophy’s own development from out
of the abyss of freedom.
3.9) The Word That is “Nothing” Twice
My first source of support for my reading is Dieter Henrich’s interpretation of the
beginning of the Logic.270 Henrich provides his account of the beginning of the Logic in Ch. 21
(“The Logic of Negation and Its Application”) from his book, Between Kant and Hegel. Here,
Henrich explains the outline of the movement of the Logic including the beginning in negation.
There, he comments on the origin of the Logic in negation. He writes:
Let us take our beginnings with negation alone. In this sense, negation is isolated, and so
autonomous negation. Starting only with negation means having nothing but negation.
Now in order to have nothing but negation, we need negation more than once. For, in
Hegel’s view, negation is relational in the sense that there must be something it negates.
But inasmuch as there is nothing that negation could possibly negate – owing to the
assumption that we have only negation – negation can only negate itself. Accordingly,
autonomous negation can only be a negation of negation. This means that autonomous
negation is originally self-referential: in order to have only negation, we have to have
negation twice.271
Here, I would add that negation only reveals itself as relational after the fact (since Hegel
himself even says that it is immediate in the first place and only subsequently reveals the fact
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that said immediacy is made possible by the sublation of mediation). In any event, the main point
of Henrich’s interpretation here is that in the beginning there is only negation. And from this, one
comes to the insight that negation’s self-elimination is simultaneously that which grants its selfpreservation (i.e. being). In other words, negation’s self-denial in some sense serves as what
establishes and grounds Spirit (significantly, however, as itself ungrounded). As Henrich
continues:
We come now to a typical Hegelian step: to have negation as self-referring means to have
even more than what we have so far said. Thus far, we have said that negation is
relational. The relation of negation to itself, therefore, is not a stable, static, logical state.
It becomes dynamical to negate negation, which means to arrive at the logical state of
having no negation at all. This amounts to saying that the negation of negation is not
having negation. So understood, autonomous negation apparently eliminates itself at the
outset.
We are led unavoidably to the conclusion that the state that is opposed to negation is with
the state to which it is opposed in the relationship of self-reference. Therefore, we are
back at the very beginning. The outcome of the self-elimination of negation is the selfreference of negation.272
This portion of text is crucial to my argument, since it is one place where we see the
incompleteness of the movement most clearly. The very beginning of the overall movement is
negation’s elimination of itself. But if negation’s self-elimination is that which grants the identity
of Spirit, then there is certainly not a completeness of reason (in the sense of a self-reflexive
totality) to the system at all. This is because the self-erasure of negation (as that which opens up
the possibility of dialectical thinking in the first place) cannot be thought in terms of determinate
concepts. I agree with Henrich that the key to understanding Hegel’s overall system is to
understand the beginning in terms of negation.273 However, I furthermore emphasize how the
beginning demonstrates the inherent incompleteness of Hegel’s system.
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Henrich analyzes the overall movement as a movement that begins in abstract negativity.
As Henrich points out, the interpretation of Hegel’s beginning has long been a topic for debate,
even during Hegel’s own time. As Henrich explains in his essay, “Beginning and Method of
(The) Logic,” even during Hegel’s lifetime, Hegel’s followers did not often debate over
interpretations about every particular detail about the entire movement of every particular
“thought-determination [Gedankenbestimmung]” of the Logic, for, to do so would be a truly
massive task and, furthermore, a task in which one could too easily lose sight of the movement
of the work from a broader perspective. For this reason, contemporary followers of Hegel most
often focused on the larger scale movements of the work on the whole. In this discussion, it was
often either the “logic of the determinations of reflection” or the beginning of the movement as
such which most often presented themselves as causes for contention.274 Henrich writes about
how the beginning of the movement of the whole often stood out as a cause for debate:
the only exception on this uneven balance sheet is the debate over the beginning of the
Science of Logic and the development of its first three categories. Within Hegel’s own
lifetime, his followers [Schüler] came into a dispute with his opponents [Gegnern] over
the question of the meaning of the strange formulation [Sinn der befremdlichen Rede]
that being [Sein], as indeterminate immediacy [unbestimmte Unmittelbarkeit], must
equally be thought of as nothing [Nichts], and that both, insofar as each vanishes into its
opposite [jeweils in ihrem Gegenteil verschwinden], have their truth in the thought of
becoming [Werden].275
For our present purposes, what is important about this quote is that the beginning of the Logic
was often a cause of contention even for Hegel’s contemporaries.
In his book, Between Kant and Hegel, Henrich notes how one can think of the movement
along the lines of a movement that begins with negation by itself, since absolute immediacy at
first appears to lack any positive content (Hegel himself often refers to it as “empty being.”)
274
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Henrich’s point is that, if Hegel hopes to show how the movement begins with negation as such
(the lack of any positive content), then this immediacy simultaneously reveals itself as selfaffirming but also different from itself. Henrich further notes how Hegel’s intention behind the
entire project is to think both identity and difference simultaneously:
The secret intention of the Logic of the Notion is to relate self-reference (as one
structure) to otherness (as another structure) so that we may assert their mutual
dependence, while simultaneously preserving their distinctive features.276
In other words, Hegel hopes to show how the logical structure of his system (the structure of
metaphysics) at its core (as demonstrated by the Notion) is such that it displays a movement
between self-identity and difference. Although I agree with the essence of Henrich’s
interpretation of Hegel’s overall purpose, I highlight an important consequence regarding the
nature of the movement: in order for Spirit to be the original negation simultaneously means that
Spirit never fully recovers itself. This leads me further into a discussion of Angelica Nuzzo’s
interpretation regarding the nature of Hegel’s beginning.
3.10) The Beginning as a Movement of Nothingness: Some Interpretations
Angelica Nuzzo’s interpretation is that the first moment (at the beginning) of Hegel’s
dialectical idealism is actually “un-dialectical.” Nuzzo explains that the beginning is most
properly speaking “un-dialectical,” since the empty beginning is prior to a dialectical notion of
nothing as a determinate nothing (it is not nothing on the order of a concept). Additionally, on
her interpretation, Hegel here writes of an objective notion of the “understandable” (das
Verständige) – not a subjective mental capacity. At the beginning, objective “understanding”
(das Verständige) and objective “reason” (das Vernünftige) are together.277 In other words, the
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empty beginning is prior even to dialectics as such and likewise prior to discursive reason. I
consider Nuzzo’s reading to be aligned with the notion of a fourfold structure insofar as she
agrees that “the understanding raises against reason and yet also with reason.”278 However, for
this reason I would argue that if one is to call the beginning “undialectical,” one could just as
equally call it a dialectical beginning as well.279
In any case, in her chapter, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How does Hegel’s
Logic Begin?”, Nuzzo writes:
Instead of bringing to the fore the dialectical movement that opens the Logic and leads on
to its first determination (the common task of all interpretations of this passage), I point
to the radically un-dialectical moment present at the beginning—namely, to the claim
that the understanding raises against reason and yet also with reason.280
Nuzzo’s insight here is to point to the fact that what begins dialectics is actually not dialectical at
all: it is rather the emptiness of emptiness from out of which the dialectic later unfolds. Nuzzo
continues:
Yet, at the beginning of the Logic it is nothingness itself (not our thinking of it) that
moves in the sheer absence of thinking. For here thinking is itself the same as nothing.
The movement of nothing is an immanent movement…281
Here, it is important to note how Nuzzo makes the same conceptual move that Žižek and Gabriel
both make in their interpretation of Hegel insofar as it is a nothingness on the order of substance
that Nuzzo perceives at the beginning of the entire movement. Nuzzo’s interpretation of the
beginning is also consistent with Žižek and Gabriel’s understanding of the fact that Hegel’s
ontology is inherently incomplete. Nuzzo, Žižek and Gabriel all seem to agree that it is the
movement of substance itself that results in the dialectical process. Later on, we will see how
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Gabriel and Žižek describe the movement in particular. But the basic idea is that Hegel differs
from Kant insofar as, according to Hegel, the an sich (in itself) does not stand at a remove from a
knowing subject due to the subject’s limitations, but rather reality itself is inherently incomplete.
For example, as Nuzzo states: “I show, first, how Hegel transforms ‘understanding’ and ‘reason’
from subjective mental ‘faculties’ to formal ‘moments’ of ‘objective thinking’ to internal
functions responsible for the deployment of the logical dynamism.”282 Thus, Nuzzo’s
clarification here is that the beginning of the Logic is not the thought of nothing (thought on the
order of a determinate concept); rather, it is beyond that – it is thought’s participation in
nothingness as such. This interpretation is also plausible if we consider that Hegel had something
like a unity of subject and object in mind, here. When we participate in this state as philosophers,
we participate in the process by which the Absolute Idea instantiates itself in time via finite
thinkers – in other words, the Absolute Idea comes to know itself via philosophy.
Nuzzo claims that it is a common misunderstanding to think that Hegel’s Logic begins
with “Being.” While this is a plausible reading (since Hegel seems to make this claim) Nuzzo
cautions us to pay close attention to how we read Hegel’s usage of the term “Being” (Sein) at the
beginning. As Nuzzo writes,
my starting point is the immanent movement of pure being-nothing or of being-nothing
as a pure movement occurring in the absence of and (logically) before all thinking.283
On Nuzzo’s reading, Hegel’s Logic cannot begin with Being (if being is conceived as the
thought of being), since the beginning of the Logic is actually prior to all thought. Nuzzo
contends that her reading is consistent with Hegel’s tripartite structure of the Logic, Philosophy
of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit, since “At the end of the Logic, the thinking for which
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being-nothing becomes a problem is the ‘subject’ of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit.”284 In other
words, the logical structure of the Logic is later instantiated by finite thinking subjects in the
Philosophy of Spirit and, in doing so, these subjects represent the coming to be of the Absolute
in time.
Nuzzo further clarifies her position and argues her case regarding why she considers the
beginning of the Logic as “un-dialectical.” She writes:
I argue that the movement of nothing with which Hegel’s dialectic begins is in itself a
non-dialectical movement – it is a position that fully represents das Verständige, that it
must be non-dialectical in order for dialectical thinking to begin (to begin absolutely or
‘out of nothing’, so to speak)…285
With what must the science begin?
After a discussion of the relationship between the Logic and the Phenomenology aimed at
assessing the peculiar ‘element’ of the logical science… when we reach the beginning of
the Objective Logic the issue seems finally settled on ‘being’ (pure and immediate). But
in fact it is not.
How does Hegel’s Logic in fact begin?
This is a different question “Sein, reines Sein.” What are we being told here? Nichts is
Hegel’s answer in spelling out—in a sort of in-the-margins comment—what Sein is. For
‘Sein, reines Sein’ is neither properly a saying nor truly Being. The beginning is not with
being as Hegel promised in the introduction, but with nothing. Truly, however, it is also
not with nothing, at least not with the nihil that we know from a long-standing tradition;
and not with the Nichts that Kant analyzes in the ‘Table of Nothing’ appended to the
Analytic of the first Critique.286
On Nuzzo’s understanding, the beginning is not with “Being.” Rather, the beginning is with the
non-dialectical movement of nothingness itself that opens up the possibility for the dialectic to
begin in the first place.287 When Hegel writes “Sein, reines Sein” in the German (or “Being, pure
Being” in English), we are actually to read that as what I have been referring to as the “emptiness
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of emptiness.” It is being beyond being (in other words, being-nothing). Nuzzo refers to this
nothing as “the purely logical movement of the beginning.”288 Significantly, and in agreement
with my reading, Nuzzo claims that this movement is ontologically prior to both being and
nothing when they are considered on the order of dialectic.
Nuzzo’s explication of the beginning is that it is a “vanishing” that discursive reason is
too late to fully capture. She writes: “There is nothing that vanishes but only pure vanishing.”289
Furthermore, Nuzzo continues, “Hegel’s Logic begins with the movement of nothing – neither
with being nor with nothing as ens. Such movement is non-dialectical, and precisely because it is
non-dialectical it is the beginning of dialectic proper – Werden.”290 It seems to me that Nuzzo is
committed to a non-dialectical beginning, since to call the beginning dialectical would seem to
presuppose mediation, which Hegel would oppose as a problematic presupposition. Likewise, for
this reason, she is committed to the notion of the Word beyond the Word, which stands as the
transcendental Ungrund that gives birth to the Word. She writes, “The movement of nothing is
the pre-linguistic movement that grounds all discursive language. There is no Logos or Word in
the logical beginning.”291 On my understanding, there also seems to be an additional dimension
of nuance to Hegel’s position here: that the non-logical beginning attests to the incompleteness
of the system itself. Indeed, it is precisely the failure of the non-logical to be fully captured by
the logical that itself constitutes reality (as Žižek and Gabriel often remind us of as well). I take
this to be why Nuzzo states that “the understanding raises against reason and yet also with
reason.”292
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One significant point of difference between Nuzzo and Henrich’s reading is that Nuzzo
refers to the beginning as “indeterminate” and without relation. She writes, “Nothing is utterly
indeterminate movement, not relation.”293 On Henrich’s reading, the negation of the beginning is
necessarily a function of relation. He writes, “For, in Hegel’s view, negation is relational in the
sense that there must be something it negates.”294 On this particular point, my interpretation
stands closer to Nuzzo’s reading, since I believe it is the emptiness of emptiness that opens up
the possibility for relation in the first place. In other words, Hegel does not presuppose the
function of negation as relational at the start. Rather, it reveals itself as such during the course of
the process. Even so, one could find support for both interpretations in the text. While
commenting on “With What Must the Science Begin?” Hegel soon after states, “here the
beginning is made with being which is represented as having come to be through mediation, a
mediation which is also a sublating of itself.” 295 So, it seems that it is via a “sublation of
mediation” that apparent immediacy is made possible in the first place. In other words, on my
understanding, when we call the beginning (non)-dialectical, we simultaneously acknowledge the
beginning as both non-dialectical and dialectical, since even when we call it non-dialectical, we
acknowledge that dialectics is latent within it. This is how Hegel is able to show that dialectics
emerges from out of the (non)-dialectical.
Nuzzo considers the claim that the beginning is non-dialectical to be significant. If the
beginning were dialectical, then Hegel would seem to presuppose the truth of dialectics from the
start. However, elsewhere Hegel states that the true, genuine beginning of philosophy must be
presupposition-less. As Nuzzo writes:
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The movement of nothing is the non-dialectical beginning, not the presupposition or the
condition of dialectic. For a dialectical-speculative logic to be truly presupposition-less
the beginning itself must be non-dialectical. 296
Nuzzo’s contention is that if the beginning of dialectics were taken to be dialectical, then
dialectics itself would be presupposed from the start. In addition to this, on Nuzzo’s
understanding, at the beginning, thinking unites itself with genuine nothingness. Indeed, Nuzzo
explains, “It is precisely because thinking is itself nothing that the movement of nothing is
immanent.”297 This “immanent” movement of nothingness as such is what enables Absolute
Spirit to emerge in time.
Nuzzo’s discussion of Hegel’s “beginning” here bears some resemblance to Heidegger’s
treatment of the “Nothing” in his essay, “What is Metaphysics?”298 In agreement with
Heidegger, Nuzzo argues that the nothing that stands at the beginning of philosophy is not a
determinate nothing but the indeterminacy of nothingness as such. As Nuzzo explains:
Nichts is not nothing for thinking (for our discursive thinking, for our thinking of
something); rather, thinking (all thinking) is nothing for nothing itself. It is only once the
radical ‘sacrifice’ of thinking is performed that dialectic can begin…299
In other words, on Nuzzo’s account, when Hegel describes the beginning of the Logic as “Sein,
reines Sein,” he calls thought back prior to thinking as such: to the absolute beginning of the
nothing prior to the Logos. Nuzzo provides further support for her reading by pointing to the fact
that here Hegel inverts Kant’s thinking of nothing. She writes:
Hegel overturns Kant’s table of nothing presenting it, this time, as the nothingness of
thinking itself. The movement of nothing in which the understanding is extinguished, is
the most original horizon of dialectical thinking. Nothing is neither nothing of something
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(determinate nothing) nor thinking of nothing (determinate thinking according to the
categories).300
In other words, on Kant’s account, nothing would have to be conceived of as either 1) a nothing
on the order of something or 2) nothing on the order of the categories. Hegel’s inversion is to
allow for an original nothingness (indeterminate nothing) in which thought participates in the
nothing as such. I connect this reading to my previous points in this chapter about the importance
of sacrifice to the beginning. In the beginning, indeterminate nothingness sacrifices itself, and, in
this movement, it simultaneously affirms itself. As a result, its self-sacrifice establishes the
possibility of determinate thinking.
Adrian Johnston agrees with Nuzzo’s reading on the point that the beginning of Hegel’s
system is undialectical. However, he also further elaborates the conclusion of this insight – that
for thinking to begin in the undialectical is precisely what makes it the most dialectical moment
of all. Johnston’s insights on this matter may be found in the “Preface” to his book, A New
German Idealism. There, Johnston states:
Hegel goes even further in his defense of Verstand. He argues that it is exclusively in and
through an unreserved intensification of the understanding’s analytic, divisive, and
dichotomizing tendencies that the genesis of dialectical-speculative Vernunft becomes
possible. Counterintuitively, the determinations of the understanding sublationally (als
Aufhebung) pass over or are transubstantiated into the fluidity of the moments of reason
precisely at the (tipping) point of their maximum degree of ‘fixity’ or ‘rigidity’ (that is,
nonfluidity). In a coincidence of opposites, fixed/rigid Verstand transitions into fluid or
supple Vernunft specifically at the very height of its fixity/rigidity; the understanding
comes closest to reason exactly when the former appears to be at the greatest distance
from the latter, when Verstand contracts into the most extreme, exaggerated versions of
its (seemingly) subrational (qua neither dialectical nor speculative) defining
characteristics (such as the understanding’s insistence on the absoluteness of classical
bivalent logic). 301
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Here, Johnston comments on the relationship between Verstand (the understanding) and Vernunft
(reason) on Hegel’s account. According to Kant, the difference between Verstand and Vernunft
had primarily been one of cognition in terms of determinate concepts versus reasoning on the
order of indeterminate ideas. While the understanding is only able to think in terms of
determinate concepts, reason is able to think in terms of indeterminate ideas. On Kant’s account,
for example, we are able to think of the idea of God as an idea of reason although we do not have
a determinate concept of God, since we do not experience God as a determinate something in our
experience. Johnston’s point is that Hegel shows how it is precisely where the understanding
seems the farthest from reason that it actually comes closest to it. In this sense, the understanding
and reason are inherently bound together.
Johnston sees “a coincidence of opposites”302 at play here – where the understanding
comes to its deepest inherent fulfillment, it actually dialectically crosses over into its opposite:
reason. Here, I draw a connection to Nuzzo’s point about the undialectical beginning. On
Johnston’s account, to call the beginning “undialectical” is simultaneously to show how it is the
most dialectical moment of all. I will explain with an example. For the understanding to attempt
to think a determinate concept of God in the most fixed or determinate way, the understanding
actually must negate all determinate concepts. But in this, it must go a step further – it must also
negate itself, and herein lies its transition into the substance of nothing (and its subsequent unity
with reason). This is why Hegel thinks that Logic stands at the beginning of metaphysics (since it
is via a process, beginning with the negation of determinate concepts as well as its own selfnegation, that the Absolute is eventually able to manifest itself). This is also why Hegel

302

Ibid.

137

conceives that the absolute is retroactively posited from out of a negation of “logical space”303 as
such.
Next, I will examine the similarities between Markus Gabriel’s interpretation of the
overall movement in connection with Johnston and Nuzzo’s interpretations. Markus Gabriel
writes:
Given that transcendent metaphysics conceives the absolute as the entirely other that
transcends the totality of determinations, it cannot characterize it through any positive
predicate. For this reason, the transcendent absolute is traditionally dealt with in terms of
an absolute oneness or absolute identity which cannot positively be described, as this
would make it something determinate and, hence, part of the world, part of the network
of determinate beings. As Hegel has it,
The simple substantial identity of the absolute is indeterminate, or rather in it every
determinateness of essence and Existence, or of being in general, as well as of reflection, has
dissolved itself. Accordingly, the process of determining what the absolute is has a negative
outcome, and the absolute itself appears only as the negation of all predicates and as the void.

It is obvious that the negation of all predicates cannot be a reflection performed by the
negative absolute itself. Otherwise we would have to ascribe some sort of selfdetermining activity to it, a move that would contradict its alleged absolute identity.
Hence, it is our own reflection that accomplishes the negation of all predicates. However,
this entails that the absolute is already determined in opposition to our reflection as that
which does not accomplish the negation itself. This in turn implies that our reflection has
merely been an ‘external reflection’ up to this point. Reflection opposes itself by positing
an absolute: it posits the absolute as if it were not posited by reflection. Yet it is, hereby,
already determined by reflection. This motivates a countermove.
If it makes sense to talk about the absolute at all, we cannot define it in opposition to
reflection, lest this opposition relativize it. Reflection must not ‘stand over against the
absolute identity of the absolute.’ This is why the absolute has to be understood as the
‘ground’ of totality, with no determinate content but that of grounding. For this reason,
the correct determination of the absolute has to be the ‘absolute form,’ which is in and for
itself ‘the absolute content,’ as Hegel puts it. It is nothing but the name for the grounding
relation, by which the finite becomes intelligible as such. Yet, this grounding relation
does not have a content apart from that of being a grounding relation, it is no particular
relation, which would hold between two relata and, therefore, between two entities. An
absolute, which satisfies this prima facie weird condition can only be the movement of
pure thought performed by the Science of Logic itself. The Logic itself is the unfolding,
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the exposition of the absolute. The absolute is both the form and the content of the Logic
and is, hence, not something prior to its manifestation in logical thought.304
Here, Gabriel comments on the general movement that Hegel discovers to be the case in the
Logic. Gabriel uses the analogy of transcendent metaphysics in its attempt to think of the
absolute (as that which is beyond any possible determination in particular or all possible
determinations). This might seem problematic at first glance, since it might seem to raise the
question of how Gabriel’s analogy could apply to Hegel’s Logic (i.e. does the absolute itself pass
through the same movement that Gabriel describes? And if so, in what way is the transcendent
not presupposed from the start?) However, Gabriel’s point is that his analogy holds (as an
explanation of the movement that absolute reflection passes through) since he provides the
contours for the same movement that the absolute passes through in its attempt to know itself (in
its internal self-reflection). If reflection first attempts to think the absolute as a transcendent
absolute, then it must think beyond itself. For this reason, it attempts to think the negation of all
predicates. However, in doing so, reflection merely posits the absolute as a transcendent Other
insofar as the absolute cannot be thought in terms of a determinate predicate (nor, likewise, on
the order of a concept of the understanding). This is problematic since it would entail that the
absolute would be simultaneously undermined in terms of its absoluteness – i.e., it would be
determined as that which cannot be determined (and therefore, it would not be a genuine
absolute).
Hegel’s solution, as we will see (on Žižek’s understanding as well) is the transition from
external reflection to absolute reflection. In this transition, the difference that was originally
discovered (on the order of transcendent metaphysics and external reflection) is subsequently
shown to be internal to the absolute as such. In other words, consciousness discovers that it is the
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absolute itself that moves between self-transcendence and identity. In fact, it is this very
movement that constitutes the absolute.
In his book, Absolute Recoil, Žižek comments on the same fourfold Hegelian dialectical
movement. He writes:
This, then, is the dialectical process: an inconsistent mess (first phase, the starting point)
which is negated, and through negation, the Origin is projected or posited backwards, so
that a tension is created between the present and the lost Origin (second phase). In the
third phase, the Origin is perceived as inaccessible, relativized – we are in external
reflection, that is, our reflection is external to the posited Origin which is experienced as
a transcendent presupposition. In the fourth phase of absolute reflection, our external
reflexive movement is transposed back into the Origin itself, as its own self-withdrawal
or decentering. We thus reach the triad of positing, external reflection, and absolute
reflection.305
Here, I would like to draw out the similarities between Gabriel’s and Žižek’s readings insofar as
they describe Hegel’s dialectic as a movement that moves from an initial negation of all
predicates to the subsequent realization (of thinking) that this moment (which had originally
posited the absolute as transcendent) becomes internal to the absolute as such. In other words, in
the final stage of reflection (absolute reflection), the difference between the immanent and
transcendent is actually demonstrated as internal to the absolute itself, but in such a way that it is
shown to be the case that it was the absolute itself which had distanced itself from itself. Thus,
all three306 contemporary philosophers of German Idealism (Žižek, Gabriel, and Johnston) agree
that it is via an original movement of nothingness itself in Hegel’s Logic that the absolute
exhibits itself: in the terms of Hegel’s Logic, what Kant had discovered to be true of the
understanding and reason (as transcendental capacities related to subjective cognition) is
demonstrated to be internal to the manifestation of the absolute as such (on the order of
subjectivity-objectivity). It is not merely that finite thinkers cannot think of the absolute by
305
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means of a determinate concept (like Kant had thought) but rather that the absolute itself is the
very movement of thought between indeterminacy and determinacy (and vice versa) in time.
Furthermore, Markus Gabriel agrees with both Henrich and Nuzzo on many additional
important points regarding the nature of the overall movement. First of all, he agrees with both
Henrich and Nuzzo that the negation of negation stands at the beginning of the overall movement
(although all three, admittedly, differ on how they interpret the specific meaning of this
beginning). On Gabriel’s reading, the most important point to remember here about Hegel is that
he is a metaphysician of the immanent (and this is especially important when it comes to Hegel’s
conception of the absolute.) Hegel is committed to the notion that the Absolute is not
transcendent in such a way that it would be diametrically opposed to the immanent world of
experience.
In his chapter, “The Dialectic of the Absolute: Hegel’s Critique of Transcendent
Metaphysics,” Gabriel comments on the beginning of Hegel’s system. He writes:
This movement of the negation of negation is precisely what takes place in the chapter on
‘the Absolute’ in the Logic, the introduction and first subchapter (A) of which proceed in
three steps. First the absolute is determined as absolute transcendence, or as absolute
identity which outstrips our conceptual capacities. It can only be paradoxically
determined by the negation of all predicates. Second this movement, which is a
movement of reflection, is made transparent as reflection. In order to steer clear of the
problem of absolute transcendence, the finite is determined as an image of the absolute,
which has being far more than any finite being due to its pure positivity, a position Hegel
ascribes to Spinoza…Third this whole movement is presented as a process by which we
eventually arrive at the form determination of the absolute form, where form and content
of reflection coincide in the ‘self-exposition’ of the absolute, i.e. in the reflection of
reflection. 307
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For our current purposes, what is most important here is that the general outline of the movement
remains the same on Gabriel’s recounting of it. This is to say that, at the beginning stands
negation, the second part of the movement is the realization that this original negation entails a
self-negation, such that in the third part of the movement, there is a realization of a sort of
underlying coherence of the overall movement. For Gabriel, it seems that the most important
insight to remember when reflecting on the Hegelian process is the fact that ultimately, reflection
does not reflect on something completely outside of itself (i.e. it is not an “external reflection”).
At the same time, neither thinker posits completeness either. On the contrary, the two thinkers
agree that the absolute itself is internally incomplete. This fact is key to both Gabriel and Žižek’s
understanding of the movement, since it implies that the Absolute is not pre-supposed from the
start – rather, the transcendent is internal to the immanent in the sense that the Absolute is always
already beyond itself – in fact, it is constituted precisely by its own failure to fully grasp itself. In
other words, the expanse between the transcendent and immanent is actually internal to the
constitution of the immanent-transcendent.
Thus, according to Gabriel’s reading of Hegel, the transcendent is not prior to, outside of,
or beyond metaphysics. Rather, the transcendent is constitutively infused into the immanent. As
Gabriel notes:
The crucial point of Hegel’s dialectic of the absolute is that metaphysical reflection must
not be external reflection. We cannot determine the absolute as absolute substance
ontologically anteceding our conceptualization of it...Therefore, reflection has to become
absolute, i.e. self-referential.308
In other words, it is the absolute itself that passes through the process of its own becoming: the
absolute’s self-realization of its own absoluteness is precisely its realization that part of itself
must always remain beyond itself. This is what it means for the Absolute to sublate its otherness
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in its identity (In the next chapter, I will further explore to what extent this is possible and also
examine similarities and differences between Schelling and Hegel on the question of the
beginning).
Gabriel also highlights the consequences of his reading of Hegel insofar as it implies
additional questions about the infinitude or finitude of the Absolute. Gabriel clarifies that his
reading implies that the Absolute is simultaneously both infinite and finite. He further explains
that it would be a mistake to think that an infinite substance precedes the process of the
becoming of the infinite in time. He writes:
The absolute idea is only grasped in the context of a theory of self-constitution of logical
space, i.e. of the concept in an eminent singular…The answer, therefore, to the question:
how does the infinite become finite? is this: that there is not an infinite which is first of
all infinite and only subsequently has need to become finite, to go forth into
[herausgehen] finitude; on the contrary, it is on its own account just as much finite as
infinite.309
I agree with Gabriel’s reading of Hegel here, since Hegel’s statement that there ought to be no
“presuppositions” at the beginning of his system guarantees that the infinite could not exist as a
preconceived substance prior to the process of its becoming. Rather, Hegel’s position is more
along the lines of this reasoning: as the infinite becomes out of nothingness, it discovers that it
must have always already been the case, although at the same time, prior to its becoming in time,
such a statement would have been nonsensical.
Also, the Absolute’s self-discovery of itself as infinite is simultaneously its discovery of
its tension with the finite as well as the capacity to surpass such limitation: it is simultaneously
that which limits itself and surpasses its own self-imposed limitation. In this way, there can be
parts of itself that are unknown to itself: as Gabriel writes, “For this reason, Hegel conceives the
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infinite or absolute as an ongoing process of self-constitution which is not determined over
against anything external to this very process.”310
On Hegel’s account, the Absolute Idea is the Notion that becomes aware of itself as
Notion. With the Absolute Idea, Hegel hopes to demonstrate a structure that is able to maintain
the relative stability and instability of identity and difference respectively,311 all the while
explaining how this structure (which opens up the dialectic between the two in the first place)
simultaneously remains internal to itself. In other words, the third “thing” that would unite the
two prior moments is actually internal to the overall process. Indeed, we find that Hegel thinks of
the Absolute Idea in this way in his section on the “Absolute Idea” from the Logic:
Now more precisely the third is the immediate, but the immediate resulting from
sublation of mediation, the simple resulting from sublation of difference, the positive
resulting from sublation of the negative, the Notion that has realized itself by means of its
otherness and by the sublation of this reality has become united with itself, and has
restored its absolute reality, its simple relation to itself. This result is therefore the truth. It
is equally immediacy and mediation; but such forms of judgment as: the third is
immediacy and mediation, or: it is the unity of them, are not capable of grasping it; for it
is not a quiescent third, but, precisely as this unity, is self-mediating movement and
activity...312
For our purposes, the important part here is that that which grounds the whole movement from
the position of emptiness (the Ungrund or the non-dialectical “non-ground”) is simultaneously
that which unites itself with itself (by mediating itself with its own otherness) erasing the
mediation, and subsequently returning to the emptiness of substance.
Gabriel’s remarks on the Absolute Idea further support this reading, since he, too, does
not think that Hegel posits an external something in order to achieve the mediation. Gabriel
states:
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The overall end of the Hegelian system in the Encyclopedia is the absolute idea in its
actuality…As Hegel writes, ‘this notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth
aware of itself (S 236) -- the logical system, but with the signification that it is
universality approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality.313
In other words, by the end of the system, the Absolute Idea has discovered itself in its otherness,
and therefore it has achieved the realization of its existence (as the “self-mediating
movement,”314 as Hegel puts it).
Gabriel is keen to note how the existence of the Idea is guaranteed by a tripartite overall
system: the Logic is also tied to Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature as well as his Philosophy of Spirit.
Gabriel writes, “In order to attain actuality, the idea is strictly speaking dependent on nature and
spirit. It has to form a system, which can only occur in the historically bound situation of finite
thinkers.”315 This is significant because it implies that the Idea must become in time and in a
system that is together from the start with nature and spirit. On Gabriel’s understanding, Hegel’s
Logic does not provide some sort of account of an ontological process that could possibly take
place outside of the limits of history. Rather, the system of Logic, Nature, and Spirit are all
united in the historical reality of time. Indeed, he states, “Here, absolute spirit does not refer to
any transcendent entity or teleological guarantee concealed by the potentially misleading
appearances. It is nothing but the activity of putting the system together.”316 Absolute Spirit
comes to be in time.
One reason Gabriel thinks that Hegel is able to defend his position regarding the Absolute
is that Hegel’s position entails that the Absolute is not static. Rather, the very movement in the
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process of thinking of finite thinkers from one manner of thinking of the Absolute to the next
itself constitutes the Absolute. Gabriel notes:
The absolute does not stand still but continues to manifest itself as that which performs
the shifts from one determinate conception of the absolute to another. This very insight
however does not change in the same way as the definitions of the absolute change.
Hegel thus tries to secure the critical position of philosophy by, at the same time,
subjecting it to the patterns of change that it discovers in critical self-reflection.317
In this way, Hegel is able to allow for a reflection internal to the Absolute to play a crucial role
in its self-constitution. The continual reflection of the Absolute on its self-transcendent nature is
internal to itself in a way that pays heed to the boundaries of relative transcendence and
immanence, respectively.
3.11) Conclusion
Furthermore, such a reading of Hegel has significant implications when it comes to the
traditional presentation of one of Schelling’s main critiques of Hegel. The question becomes: is it
a fair critique for Schelling to argue that Hegel’s Idea remains bound to the order of the purely
virtual or the ideal, given that Hegel is committed to the notion that the Idea has to become in
history? If the Idea is constituted by its passage through otherness (and by losing itself in the
emptiness of emptiness) does it not achieve genuine actuality? What might these questions imply
about the actual similarities between Schelling’s and Hegel’s starting point for philosophy? In
what ways, then, could their starting points actually be united at heart and in their deepest insight
(since both overcome the subject-object divide)? These sorts of questions will occupy my
thinking in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HEGEL AND SCHELLING ON THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF THE ABSOLUTE
4.1) Introduction
To briefly recap, in Chapter One, I argued that Spirit learns of its self-sacrificial nature at the
end of the PhG. In Chapter Two, I argued that this same insight guides the beginning of Hegel’s
SL insofar as an emptiness of emptiness constitutes the beginning of the system. In Chapter
Three, I conducted an in-depth investigation into the nature of the beginning as “(un)dialectical.”
In this chapter, I argue for the metaphysical consistency between Hegel’s and Schelling’s
position on “the beginning” when we consider Schelling’s 1811 draft of his text, Ages of the
World, in combination with Hegel’s beginning from his text, Science of the Logic (published
between 1812 and 1816).
The main thesis of this chapter is that both thinkers demonstrate how identity and difference
ought to be conceived together from the beginning. In Hegel’s SL, there is a doubling of
emptiness at the beginning of the system. In Schelling’s WA, at the very beginning, the Godhead
dwells in its “lucid purity” (Lauterkeit).318 On Schelling’s account, as the Godhead enjoys itself
in its nothingness, two equiprimordial wills arise. The first is a “will that wills nothing.” Coeternal with the “will that wills nothing” is a second will – a will that desires to become
something. Now, the second will is actually subordinate to the first, because it exists in order that
the first will may come to experience itself in actuality. However, the first will is actually so
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profound that it harbors within itself the possibility either to be or not to be. In order that the first
will may experience its nature as freedom, then, the second will must take on the object of
“nothingness,” however not in a one-sided sense. Rather, the second will must empty itself out so
entirely, that the first will may inhabit it. In this way, the first will may experience itself as
freedom. In this sense, Schelling argues that the two co-eternal wills are bonded together by love.
Schelling’s famous quote here helps to illustrate the point – “this is the mystery of love that it
combines what could be by itself and yet is not and cannot be without the other.”319 The two, coeternal wills are bonded together by love, since their relationship is one of freedom and necessity
thought simultaneous with each other. Schelling’s position on the beginning is therefore
metaphysically consistent with Hegel’s, since a doubling of emptiness (by means of which the
divine may come to know its self-sacrificial nature) stands at the beginning of Schelling’s system
as well.
As a sub-thesis for this chapter, I also argue that Hegel would agree with Schelling that
the purpose of the entire movement is for the revelation of the Absolute as love (this point is
implicit in Hegel’s system). However, Schelling explicitly comments on the movement as one of
the divine’s revelation of itself as love – God repeats nothingness out of an act of love. This is
because on Schelling’s account, the original will contracts (or negates) itself so completely that it
is, properly speaking, “nothing”: love is absolute self-sacrifice. Similar to in Hegel’s system, the
process Schelling describes is one of the Absolute learning about its nature. Along these lines,
both thinkers are aware of the mysterious and enigmatic nature of the divine throughout their
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philosophical thinking. However, it is equally true that the two thinkers develop this insight (and
what it means for their overall philosophical systems) in different ways.
4.2) Some Traditional Readings of Hegel and Schelling on the Beginning
Many of the more “traditional” German Idealist readings tend to place Schelling and
Hegel’s positions on the beginning of metaphysics and what it entails for understanding their
overall systematic positions (or lack thereof) as relatively opposed to one another. For example,
if Schelling is traditionally presented as the figure who stands for the ontological priority of the
Real (as a “proto-existentialist”),320 then Hegel tends to be presented as the figurehead for the
ontological priority of the Ideal (in the sense that, as these readings claim, Hegel ultimately
sublates material otherness via the Idea in what is presented as a sort of rational totalization).
Let us consider, as one example, Manfred Frank’s reading of Schelling’s critique of
Hegel as he presents it in his, “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the Beginnings of Marxian
Dialectics.”321 Frank’s contention in this piece is that Schelling’s main critique of Hegel aims at
Hegel’s failure to fully acknowledge the boundaries of rational thought in a way that adequately
pays homage to the genuine other (of history) as that which the rational Idea can never fully
grasp or totalize: Schelling’s critique of Hegel, according to Frank, is to point out that there is
always an irreducible remainder of the Real that the Idea will never be able to completely
sublate, since said otherness is constitutive of the Idea as such.322 According to Frank, Schelling
argues that Hegel is ultimately bounded by the order of the rational, since, in the final analysis,
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the Absolute Idea sublates all difference into a sort of higher-order identity on the order of the
rational.323
Frank repeats this concern in his German text, “Die Reduktion des Seins auf Reflexion in
Hegels ‘Logik.’” There, he writes:
Die Logik , so wird man sagen, bezieht sich, wenn immer sie von >Sein< spricht, auf den
>Begriff des Seins<; und nur von ihm behauptet sie, er bestimme sich von selbst weiter
zur Reflexion. Ist dies der Fall, so scheint unsere These, Hegel reduziere die Bedeutung
von Sein auf die negativer Selbstbeziehung und logifiziere so ein prinzipell
Außerlogisches, in einer Fehleinschätzung des Geltungsbereichs logischer Aussagen zu
gründen.324
Frank’s main point here is that when Hegel speaks about “Being” in the Logic, he only ever
refers to the “Concept of Being.” On Frank’s contention, Hegel utilizes the Concept to play a
role that it simply cannot fulfill – a logical concept cannot fulfill an extra-logical
(“Außerlogisches”) role. Frank contends that this is problematic for Hegel’s account, since Hegel
cannot therefore explain the coming to be of the Concept as such.
Frank continues on:
Offensichtlich verweist uns dieser Einwurf an die Natur- und die Geistesphilosophie als
diejenigen Teile des >Systems<, die >außer der Logik< zu gelten beanspruchen. Er
befindet sich dann freilich in einem gründlichen Mißverständnis gegenüber der Funktion
der Logik im Gesamt der Enzyklopädie. Das, was jenseits ihrer Konstitution über die
Idee des Logischen hinausgeht, erweist sich als deren eigene Entäußerung: Natur und
Geist sind selbst nur Weisen des Sich-Anderswerdens und Insichzurückkehrens der Idee,
fallen also selbst in deren >Sphäre<. Mit Recht hat darum Schelling auf den zu Beginn
der Logik erhobenen Anspruch hingewiesen, mit dem Postulat der >Zurückziehung auf
das bloße Denken< dies zu meinen, >daß der Begriff alles sey und nichts außer sich
zurücklasse<. Wäre etwas anderes intendiert, Hegels System hätte wenig Grund zu der
Gewißheit, gerade mit einer logischen Begründung des Seienden etwas gegenüber seinen
Vorgängern durch und durch Neues begonnen zu haben.325
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Frank’s main argument here is that, on Hegel’s account, the Idea has a totalizing nature. In
Hegel’s EL, the philosophies of nature and spirit represent the mere “divestment” of the Logical.
Frank’s critique seems to be that there is no genuine otherness on Hegel’s account: ultimately
everything is the Idea in its return to itself. Frank further notes how: “Schelling discerned with an
ingenious accuracy the circulus in probando in Hegel’s proceedings. If the concept is, at the end
of its development, to attain recognition of itself as itself, it would have to implicitly possess this
self-knowledge from the beginning.”326 However, on my reading, this is not a serious concern for
Hegel’s view, since he nowhere posits self-knowledge of a totalizing nature. The type of
“knowledge” that the Idea gains is merely an awareness of its transcendent, self-sacrificial
nature. Furthermore, the sort of “knowledge” that the Idea attains is in fact retroactively attained
via an experiential process. In this way, Hegel’s account does not imply complete knowledge of
the subject as itself from the start.
4.3) Hegel’s Conception of Rationality (as fundamentally constituted by otherness)
Along these lines, my main concern with this sort of critique of Hegel is that it seems to
be grounded in an incomplete conception of the way in which the Absolute Idea is rational
according to Hegel’s view. On my reading of Hegel, the fact that the Absolute Idea is “rational”
does not entail that the Idea ultimately overcomes all otherness once and for all, demonstrating a
rationality of a totalizing nature.
That said, I concede that there is certainly something correct about Frank’s position. I
agree with Frank on the point that there is “nothing” besides the Idea. However, where we seem
to disagree is on the point of how to interpret the meaning of the nothing to Hegel’s overall
system. On my reading, “nothingness” itself plays an active role in the constitution of the Idea
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itself. My understanding is that the Idea is constituted by a movement on the order of an
emptiness of emptiness. Therefore, I do not think that Frank’s critique is actually problematic for
Hegel, since I do not think that Hegel claims that thought or being are reducible to the Idea in a
fully explicable sense. Rather, on my understanding, the Idea itself is incomplete (qua the
movement of nothingness – an emptiness of emptiness which divides itself into thought and
being and subsequently sublates the difference between the two). To put it simply, the nothing is
not a determinate nothing on Hegel’s account, but rather its very movement constitutes the
possibility of dialectics in the first place.
For this reason, the nature and function of “sublation” (Aufhebung) is key to my
understanding of Hegel. On my reading, sublation does not entail a totalizing transformation that
merely transforms reality into ideality. Rather, on my reading, the play between the real (the
genuine otherness of actuality) and the ideal remains internal to, and constitutive of, the Absolute
Idea as such. Indeed, the Absolute Idea first arises from out of the emptiness of emptiness in the
first place. It is my contention that Hegel’s account of the Idea retains within it an internal
openness that pays heed to the other. As Žižek, Johnston, and others often remind us, the
distinction between the real and the ideal is not merely a one-sided opposition on Hegel’s
account.
Along these lines, in order to further explicate my reading, one of the primary ways that I
would like to revise the traditional reading is to revisit the meaning of the “rational” for Hegel. If
one is to argue that Hegel stays bounded by the order of the rational, then one equally ought to
admit that, according to Hegel, the constitution of the rational itself is given by a process in
which rationality develops from out of internal indeterminacy. In other words, on Hegel’s
account, both indeterminacy and uncertainty are constitutive of reason (the Absolute Idea
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develops from the interplay between uncertainty and certainty). This is to say that reason is
neither completely deterministic nor completely certain. Similarly, on Hegel’s account, time
itself is always at issue when it comes to the nature of reason – the development of reason
necessarily takes place via time. But, due to the genuine nature of time in its relation to
otherness, there may be moments of utter and genuine uncertainty and a lack of self-knowledge.
All the same, this evokes Spirit’s desire to become its genuine self via a process of development
and discovery: the identity of Spirit does not preclude the truth of uncertainty. Rather, the nature
of Spirit is to embrace and love the uncertainty of time as such (like we saw in Chapter One, for
instance).
The fact that Hegel believes this to be the case is also evident in subsequent chapters
when Hegel discusses how the Idea comes to be from out of the emptiness of emptiness (see
Chapter Three of this dissertation on the topic of how the transcendence of substance is
immanent to subjectivity’s self-constitution). Furthermore, just as the dialectic repeatedly returns
to a more original nothingness, Hegel acknowledges that thought is repeatedly confronted by
difference throughout its activity. As Žižek points out, the birth of the dialectic is simultaneously
that which prevents thought from ever being able to fully grasp from whence it came:
At a more formal level of his logic of reflection, Hegel uses the unique term ‘absoluter
Gegenstoss’ (recoil, counter-push, counter-thrust, or, why not, simply counter-punch): a
withdrawal that creates what it withdraws from.327
We will revisit this theme in more detail later on, but in essence, Žižek writes here of the notion
that the subject’s identity is generated by a process that simultaneously engenders a more
original emptiness. Reason cannot grasp from whence it came because there is no subject given
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at the beginning. Rather, it is the negative’s distance from its own lack that constitutes
rationality328: reason eventually discovers emptiness as one with its identity.
Žižek’s understanding of the fourfold dialectical process is, for him, akin to “the
necessity of Christ.” As he explains in a footnote, “therein resides the necessity of Christ...Christ
stands for the self-alienation of substance itself—our distance from substance is the distance of
substance from itself.”329 For the purpose of this dissertation, what is important here is the notion
that, from the standpoint of absolute reflection, reason comes to perceive how the negation of
negation is a difference internal to itself. The transcendence of substance (“the difference of
substance from itself”330) is therefore internal to the constitution of the subject as such. This
raises a related question of whether or not Hegel and Schelling consider the rational as reducible
to the real. I argue that both Hegel and Schelling are committed to the notion that reason is not
completely reducible to the material Real.331 For Subject to “know” itself as Substance means
that subject is substance as its self-transcendence. Therefore, on Hegel’s conception, Subject’s
full immersion as Substance precludes the possibility of reducibility.
On a separate (but related) point in support of the irreducibility of reason, I agree with
Dieter Henrich that Hegel hopes to achieve a system of relative stability and instability and to
think both identity and difference at the same time.332 However, I differ from Henrich in terms of
the implications of this goal. Hegel is certainly aware of the importance that rationality’s “other”
plays in its self-constitution. As Adrian Johnston often notes, for Hegel, transcendence is
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“transcendence-in-immanence.”333 Indeed, what makes the Absolute Idea rational in the first
place is its confrontation with its own “death,” and its subsequent becoming out of the emptiness
of emptiness. But, since this is the case, Hegel’s notion of rationality is arguably not a rationality
conceived as a consummating totality, at all. Rather, I agree with Žižek’s claim here:
Hegel knows very well that every attempt at rational totalization ultimately fails, this
failure is the very impetus of the ‘dialectical progress’; his ‘wager’ is located on another
level – it concerns, so to speak, the ‘squared totalization’: the possibility of ‘making a
system’ out of the very series of failed totalizations, to enchain them in a rational way, to
discern the strange ‘logic’ that regulates the process by means of which the breakdown of
a totalization itself begets another totalization. (Žižek 2002a, 99-100)334
Here, the overarching thesis is the historicity of Hegel’s system. This is to say that even if a basic
necessary structure is eventually revealed by rationality’s failures to achieve totality (and the SL
unveils a pattern regarding the nature of these failures), it remains equally true that Hegel allows
for a developmental conception of an Absolute that reveals itself in time. Indeed, Hegel
proclaims that the SL itself requires history.
Moreover, when it comes to Hegel and Schelling on the historicity of the Absolute, I
argue that the important point for the purpose of my dissertation here is actually one of
connection: Hegel and Schelling both agree that it is the Absolute as Spirit that stands at bottom
(so to speak) of the entire process. Indeed, although Schelling realizes that there must always be
an irreducible remainder of the Real that will never be fully captured by Reason (and thus the
importance of history), he never wavers on his thinking of the original source of the remainder
(and therefore, from whence this remainder most properly arrives): the divine.
According to Schelling, the most original source of everything is, in fact, the Godhead
(“die Gottheit”) – that in God which is beyond God, and yet, equally immanent to God, and the

333

Adrian Johnston, Adventures in Transcendental Materialism, 33.
Quote provided in Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of
Subjectivity (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 131.
334

155

most divine in God.335 In other words, and here is my most crucial point – what unites Schelling
and Hegel is not that they agree that the highest unity is to be found on the order of Reason –
rather, it is actually their agreement that the highest unity is to be found beyond the Rational (the
true heart of the rational is to be found beyond reason) – in God’s self-transcendence – a
transcendence irreducible to either the ideal or the real. On the contrary, the two thinkers agree
that the transcendent is a “transcendence-in-immanence,” and they are united by their
commitment to the notion that the Absolute reveals itself in all of experience – a crucial point.336
Next, I will compare Hegel’s discussion of the “beginning” from his SL and Schelling’s
discussion of the “beginning” from his 1811 draft of The Ages of the World in order to further
illuminate the connection. Hegel begins his Science of Logic (as I previously mentioned in
Chapter Three) with the disappearing of an original nothingness in its own movement (the
emptiness of emptiness). Hegel then shows how this original nothingness leads to dialectics. For
this reason, Hegel’s system has been called a “dialectical materialism” by thinkers such as Žižek
and Johnston.337
Spinoza influences Hegel, like Schelling, to the extent that Hegel agrees with the
consequence of Spinoza’s system: that the transcendent must be understood as simultaneously
immanent if the infinite is to be grasped as a genuine infinite.338 In other words, although the
Absolute is transcendent, it is equally immanent, since it reveals itself as transcendent throughout
all of experience. Hegel’s task is to provide an explanation for how a monistic “substance”
(which in the beginning is nothing but the emptiness of emptiness as such) in fact produces
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something like subjective consciousness from out of itself internally. On my reading, as we will
see, Hegel’s beginning (as “the emptiness of emptiness”) is aligned with Schelling’s account of
God’s original “indifference.”
4.4) Schelling’s Project Post-Freiheitsschrift (Post-1809)
Before delving into Schelling’s Ages of the World text explicitly, I will first address
Schelling’s project as he conceived it post-1809 (from his Freiheitsschrift onward). In his post1809 works, Schelling is primarily concerned with providing a genetic account of how a
conscious, transcendental subject arrives on the scene from out of unconscious substance or
nature.339 Schelling’s contention is that this sort of description is lacking from Kant’s
philosophy. As Adrian Johnston states:
Whereas Kant’s transcendental system implicitly treats the subject, embedded in
experiential reality and its world of constituted objects, as always already existent and
operative, Schelling seeks to account for the very emergence of such subjectivity, for the
origins of this agent-function. That is to say, Schelling, especially in his texts from 1809
and after, attempts to sketch the (transcendental) subject’s (ontogenetic) pre/protohistory.340
On Schelling’s account, Kant does not adequately address this question, as evinced by his
Critique of Pure Reason. While Kant addresses what guarantees genuine cognition for the
transcendental subject on the order of concepts and intuitions, he does not provide a satisfactory
account as to how or why the transcendental subject arrives on the scene. This is to say, Kant
leaves unaddressed the following questions: how does the transcendental subject first arise? How
is it possible to have genuine cognitions at all?341 As Johnston notes, Schelling himself once
wrote in his Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, “How it happens that things comes to be
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represented at all, about that there is the deepest silence.”342 That is, while Kant’s account
addresses what makes for genuine cognition on the order of representations, he does not address
the prior meta-transcendental questions of how or why these cognitions are possible for a
transcendental subject at all.
Upon perceiving a lack in Kant’s account, Schelling sets out to provide an account for
why and how it is the case that transcendental subjectivity arises from the material “real” in the
first place. Even so, Schelling never argues that transcendental subjectivity is reducible to the
material real. Rather, Schelling (along with Hegel) claims that the material real harbors within
itself that which separates it from transcendental subjectivity – indeed, it is this very separation
(or gap) that leads to the production of subjectivity (as the identity of its own lack, since the
difference is eventually shown to be an internal, and generative, difference). As Adrian Johnston
writes:
Generally speaking, Schelling seeks to delineate the process wherein more-than-material
subjectivity (as spiritual transcendence or transcendental ideality) immanently emerges
out of a substantial material base (as the real ground [Grund] of ‘productive’ nature). And
yet, although Schelling maintains that subject arises from substance, he nonetheless
insists that, following this movement of genetic emergence, the subject thus produced
remains thereafter irreducible to the materiality of its (now-occluded) source(s).343
In other words, although subjectivity arises out of substance, it is not reducible to substance.
Schelling’s project (at least in large part) becomes one regarding the explanation for how
it is the case that transcendental subjectivity (along the lines of a Kant) could arise on the scene
from out of one substance (a monism on the order of substance) without thereby reducing the
existence of subjectivity to mere substantial reality (upholding the irreducibility of subject to
substance).344 As Johnston writes:
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The Schellingian task…is to formulate a genetic transcendentalism, a system in which the
gradual emergence of the transcendent(al), along with its corresponding modes of
experience, is grasped as a philosophically explicable process immanent to a monistic
ontological register.345
Furthermore, Johnston notes how Žižek is also united in this task during the development of his
ontology. He states:
This is a task that Žižek, too, can be seen to take up via his combined use of German
idealism and psychoanalysis in the effort to forge a transcendental materialist theory of
the subject according to which, to put it in Schellingian language, the seemingly
transcendent ideality of subjectivity is a rupture in the fabric of being immanently
produced within and by the inconsistent, unstable [proto]-materiality of the Real-asground.346
In other words, according to both Schelling and Hegel (and Žižek, for that matter), it is the
movement of the material real as such (in its self-disappearing, i.e. the emptiness of emptiness)
that produces transcendental subjectivity as well as the appearance of transcendental subjectivity
as divided from substance in the first place. For this reason, the transcendence of subjectivity
may be understood as immanent to a monistic substance. That said, it is also crucial to note that
Schelling is committed to maintaining the irreducibility of the Ideal to the Real. As Johnston
notes:
But, as becomes clear in Schelling’s later texts… although I emerges from R, and
although the Ideal medium of the epistemological subject’s experiential reality harbors
within its own heart a primordial kernel of the Real (the existence of experience reflects
both levels simultaneously as I/R), this kernel is nonetheless lost in terms of its direct
accessibility for the subject (in the style of Schelling’s 1809 notations, experiential reality
as I/R, although having arisen out of the Grund of R, is nevertheless irreducible to R –
that is, I/R ≠R).347
This is to say that, although the Ideal is produced by the Real, it is never fully reducible to it. This
leads one to the following question: how does Schelling address how it is the case that the Ideal
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arises in such an irreducible fashion? Later in this chapter, I will examine Schelling’s response to
this question of origination (with respect to both why and how) as he presents it in the 1811 draft
of his text, The Ages of the World.
Before delving into that text explicitly, I will first comment on Schelling’s starting point
as opposed to that of Kant. Rather than working from the initial position of the transcendental
subject (as Kant does in his Critique of Pure Reason), Schelling aims to provide an account of
the creation of such subjectivity in the first place. Schelling’s alternative to Kant’s system, then,
would seem to require a “meta-transcendental” account of how the transcendental subject arrives
on the scene in the first place.348 And this brings Schelling’s task close to Hegel’s in that they are
both concerned with how it is the case that the transcendence of reason is one with the actuality
of substance as such.
As a result, Schelling’s thinking also deviates from Kant’s with regard to the distinction
between the noumenal and phenomenal (especially the Kant of the Prolegomena). As is well
known, Kant posits a strict dichotomy between noumenal and phenomenal reality. However, on
Schelling’s account, the transcendent is ultimately conceived as a “transcendence-inimmanence”349 (just as it is for Hegel). By thinking in this way, the noumenal is thereby
conceived as the immanently noumenal. As Johnston explains:
Instead of positing a link between thing and object as two external entities otherwise
opposed to each other, Schelling, deviating from the standard Kantian notion of das Ding
an sich being a transcendent exteriority beyond or behind the experienced object,
insinuates that the Real, ontological level of the an sich is itself immanently embedded
within the reality of the subject’s experiential field (as Žižek puts it, the Schellingian Real
is the obfuscated originary/primordial underbelly of reality that nonetheless repeatedly
‘insists’ within the fragile, framed field of experience, an unruly proto-materiality
constantly threatening to irrupt within the domain of mundane reality – the ‘existence’ of
reality is to be opposed to the ‘insistence’ of the Real).350
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Here, Schelling differs from Kant because his claim is not that the “in-itself” is transcendent due
to its inaccessibility (as what is outside of, beyond, before, or prior to experience). Rather,
Schelling’s thought here is that the in-itself is transcendent precisely as the immanence of
transcendence. In other words, our experience of the transcendent is precisely the experience of
nothingness,351 i.e., we experience the transcendent (in-itself) insofar as we merge (in the sense
of becoming one) with the emptiness of substance (this is what Žižek described above as the
fourth stage of absolute reflection). The experience of the transcendent (as an immanence of
otherness) is, therefore, a “transcendent-immanent” experience.
Schelling and Hegel agree regarding this topic insofar as they both posit a monism on the
order of absolute substance in order to explain how this is possible. Thus, rather than dividing
epistemology from ontology, according to both Schelling and Hegel, epistemology and ontology
are fundamentally bound together and mutually develop (I commented on this notion in earlier
chapters when I mentioned how form and content are primordially bound together and develop in
a harmonious interplay). Since both Schelling and Hegel note how epistemology and ontology
are bound together at core, in this precise sense they are both post-Kantian thinkers (Kant had
fundamentally divided epistemology from ontology, since according to Kant what could be
known was always on the order of representations relative to the thinking of a finite subject).
Both Schelling and Hegel describe a process through which the primordial Real (in its
self-disappearing) generates the Ideal from out of itself, and yet, the Ideal that is generated
cannot subsequently be reduced to the Real from which it arose (since the Real itself is no
longer).352 On Hegel’s account, the primordial Real begins as the emptiness of emptiness
(emptiness before it becomes known as the substance of experience). For the Schelling of his
351
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Weltalter, as we will see, the beginning is the “indifference” of the Godhead in its eternity. That
said, both thinkers agree that the Absolute becomes in history. The two thinkers also both agree
regarding substance monism and the corresponding consequence that the transcendent is most
properly conceived as a “transcendence-in-immanence.” That is to say, neither of the two
thinkers posits a strict dichotomy between the transcendent and immanent.
Furthermore, Schelling’s account more explicitly addresses the principles that follow
from the Absolute’s original indifference. Schelling goes on to provide a more explicit
discussion than Hegel as to why the Absolute is prompted to develop itself from out of an
original indifference in the first place (on Schelling’s account, it is for the purpose of the
expression of freedom, as we will see in Chapter Five). Whereas Hegel’s SL primarily examines
the logical, internal structure of the movement, Schelling’s account strives beyond that insofar as
he further aims to address the question of why the movement takes place. This is true, despite the
fact that Schelling, like Hegel, recognizes the importance of not making any inordinate
presuppositions at the beginning of ontology. In other words, they are both committed to the
notion that something like “God’s own law”353 guides the process along.
4.5) “The Will that Wills Nothing”354: The Love of Freedom
On Schelling’s account of the “beginning,” as he provides it in his Ages of the World, the
Godhead, as pure love, stands at the very beginning of the entire movement. In the beginning, the
Godhead, as that which is most divine in God, ruminates within itself as a “lucid purity”
(Lauterkeit).355 As Schelling writes, “But the Godhead is not God. It is instead the radiance of
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the unapproachable light in which God dwells, the scorching heat of its purity (Reinheit)...”356 In
the beginning, then, it is the Godhead’s joy to simply dwell in itself – as a celestial and heavenly
love (in this sense the Godhead is beyond being).357 As Schelling writes, “Unable to distinguish
itself from itself, it cannot be truly aware of itself. It is a going into itself, a playful searching for
and finding of self, that is all the more blissful the more soulful it is.”358 On my reading, this
moment of Schelling’s account is akin to that of the emptiness of emptiness in the Hegelian
movement: from within its “lucid purity,” the Godhead repeats itself out of its own nothingness.
We see this same movement in Hegel’s account with “Being, pure being, --"359 at the beginning
of the SL. As we will see, on Schelling’s account (in agreement with Hegel’s) God’s expansion
is equiprimordial with God’s contraction.
From out of the Godhead’s original lucid purity, there arise two opposed and co-eternal
wills. As Schelling writes:
In this way [the Godhead] gives rise to (erzeugt) the lustful desire to have itself and to
perceive itself externally.360
From out of its pure bliss, the Godhead develops a desire to come to know itself as freedom in an
experiential sense. Schelling describes a process guided along by freedom in which God desires
to express itself and to come to know itself as a determinate something. The will that wills
something is thus derived from the will of the divine to experience itself as freedom. In other
words, if the second will is the desire to have an experience of a particular object, in this case the
object that the second will desires to experience is precisely freedom (an objectless object). The
second will signifies for God the ability to experience its own nature as freedom.
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The Godhead is the depth of freedom from out of which both wills arise. The Godhead is
both infinite affirmation and infinite negation thought together with the unity of both (which
simultaneously implies it is the indifference of both.) In this precise sense, the Godhead
represents absolute freedom. As Schelling writes:
The godhead, as what in itself neither is nor is not, is necessarily consuming No in
relation to external being. However, as what in itself neither is nor is not [it cannot be a
No unless] it is also necessarily eternal Yes, empowering love, essence of all essences...
But just because the godhead is the whole and undivided, eternal Yes and eternal No, it is
also neither the one nor the other, and the unity of both.361
For this reason, the Godhead is freedom as such – both divine affirmation and negation as well as
neither. The second will (the will that wills a determinate something) arises in order that the
Godhead may experience itself. However, since the will that wills nothing is actually the unity of
absolute negation and absolute affirmation, the second will must actually take on the form of
freedom itself, if the Godhead is to experience the nature of freedom. In other words, in this case,
the form that the second will (the will that takes on the form of a determinate something) takes
on, is actually the form of nothingness as such. In short, just as in Hegel’s SL there is a repetition
of emptiness at the beginning of the system, here too, we find a repetition of emptiness at the
very beginning.
Schelling’s interpretation of the beginning, then, is that divine love (in its purity)
eventually develops a will to know itself not merely internally, but also externally. He writes,
“…In its original state of soulful inwardness, each and every nature is nothing other than a quiet
inner reverie (ein stilles Sinnen über sich selbst).”362 At the beginning, the soul is at peace in its
internal state. But out of this internal peace, love generates a will to express itself externally.
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Along these lines, Schelling develops an interesting (and paradoxical) position on the
relationship between love and being. He writes:
Everyone agrees that the Divinity is the being within every being (Wesen aller Wesen).
As such, it is the purest love, infinite outpouring and communicability. But at the same
time, everyone wants to maintain that the Divinity, as such, exists. But love by itself does
not find its way to Being (Seyn). Existence is separation, the singularity of what is one’s
own (Eigenheit). Love, however, is the negation of the singular (das Nichts der
Eigenheit). It does not look out for what belongs specifically to it. For this reason it can
never attain existence on its own.363
Schelling’s reflections here help to further demonstrate his position (in agreement with Hegel)
that the identity of the divine is constituted by its transcendence of itself. Schelling’s explanation
as to why this is the case is that it allows for the divine to experience itself as love. From out of
love’s negation of a particular identity, the divine moves through emptiness to establish its
identity in union with otherness.
Schelling sometimes speaks about this movement in metaphorical language. Schelling
notes how freedom itself somehow draws the lower principle in God to the service of freedom.
To put it differently, God (out of love) expresses a potency of manifestation that ultimately
makes itself subordinate to eternal freedom. (As Schelling says elsewhere, the lower will stands
in service of the higher will [to freedom]. Likewise, even the potencies are ultimately in service
of divine freedom). God lovingly develops a will to manifest itself from out of its eternal
potencies. Paradoxically, that which God desires to experience, however, is the nature of its own
freedom. Therefore, when God opens up the space within itself to be able to manifest itself, it
must simultaneously allow for the possibility that it does not become at all.
Schelling’s point here is that pure love is infinite expression and expansion, so much so
in fact that it is also infinite negation. If love were merely the will to express oneself (the will to
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infinite self-affirmation), then it seems that love could never exist at all (since it would not exist
as a particular something), and therefore, no individual particular or finite being could
experience it as such. Schelling’s solution to this dilemma is to philosophize that God posits its
own otherness from out of itself internally in order to come to know itself as freedom: God’s
taking on the form of emptiness is that which enables it to come to know its nature as freedom,
since in doing so, God experiences the indeterminacy of Being.
The paradox is that somehow, and in some way, Being comes forth at all from out of the
purity of God’s love in its seeming ontological nothingness as “the will that wills nothing”
(eternal freedom). Schelling, like Hegel, wonders how this is possible at all. Just as Hegel, in his
Science of Logic, addresses the question of how emptiness can negate itself (as the emptiness of
emptiness) in order to become something, Schelling, likewise, wonders: how, from the
nothingness beyond being, does being possibly arise at all? Schelling’s response to this question
is essentially the following: in eternal freedom (conceived as a will of indifference) there is a
loving unity between two wills: a will of infinite affirmation (which is simultaneously a will to
infinite negation) and a will to individuality. These two wills are eternally bound together and
one in their essence. The divine is composed of both wills and utilizes them for its purpose of
self-development. Furthermore, beyond these two wills stands the Godhead – as the “will that
wills nothing,” somehow (and in the service of love), the Godhead provokes from within itself a
desire to express itself, which is how the potencies arise. Even the potencies thus ultimately
stand in service of divine freedom – they allow for divine freedom to experience itself as
actuality. On Schelling’s account, it is not contradictory to state that eternal freedom is both of
the lower wills also, since God’s essence can be both of these wills (and neither) and in different
aspects.
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Along these lines, the question as to “why is there something at all rather than nothing?”
is one possible point of contention between Schelling and Hegel. On Hegel’s account, an original
contradiction (conceived as the emptiness of emptiness) leads to the generation of experience.
The fact that anything exists at all is ultimately bound up with the fact that there is an original
affirmation contained within the original negation. In negating itself, God finds its selfaffirmation on the other side of the abyss, so to speak. God’s crucifixion is simultaneously God’s
resurrection, etc.
Schelling’s solution is in fact similar to the one provided by Hegel. However, Schelling
thinks beyond Hegel insofar as he provides an explanation as to why this is the case. Schelling’s
thought is that God’s eternal beginning, and the continuous process of finite beginning(s), must
be united by the higher order will of eternal freedom. Eternal freedom is so free that God must
have sacrificed itself into the fullness of existence. The proof of this fact is Nature herself. One is
astounded before the actuality of nature’s existence. God’s death to itself is simultaneously
God’s resurrection. Eternal freedom ultimately reveals itself as that which was and is guiding the
process along throughout.
Schelling’s description of the overall movement is akin to the self-affirmation of the
original nothingness in the Hegelian movement that opens up the possibility for dialectics in the
first place. In this process, Schelling allows for an excess of material nature that is irrecoverable,
since there is always a part of God that remains beyond God (and therefore, unconscious). In
other words, the highest notion of God (the Godhead) is beyond thought (yet, not in a onesidedly transcendent sense). Rather, God remains God throughout the entire process (since the
entire process is one of God’s self-transcendence in-and-as immanence). For this reason, even if
Schelling allows for an irrecoverable remainder of substance that cannot be fully captured by
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reason, ultimately all of substance is one with God (on the order of an absolute monism). Thus,
my claim is that both Schelling’s and Hegel’s accounts (à la dialectical materialism) are united at
heart on the order of an absolute monism – both thinkers ultimately consider the process as one
of divine revelation.
Here, a more explicit consideration of Schelling’s “beginning” from the WA text will aid
my interpretation. In the “Introduction” to Draft I of his 1811 draft of The Ages of the World,
Schelling writes:
The animating principle of the highest form of philosophy can only be the original living
being itself (das Urlebendige), that being that has no being before it and is therefore the
oldest of all beings, the very heart of reality as such (Wesen).
This original living being, since there is nothing before or outside of it from which it
might be determined, can develop itself only freely, living out of itself and out of its own
will and instinct. But for precisely this reason it develops itself not lawlessly, but in
accord to its own inner law. There is in it no caprice. It is a nature in the most complete
sense of the word, just as human beings are a nature, not only irrespective of their
freedom, but even more because of it.364
Note here, significantly, how Schelling describes the “principle” at the essence of philosophy as
a living being (a primordial living being, “das Urlebendige”). In agreement with Hegel’s
ontological beginning, Schelling argues that this original living being must have “no being
before it.” Schelling’s position here is similar to Hegel’s, since Schelling, too, does not want to
presuppose anything from the start. Rather, the original principle must be a principle that
develops from out of itself internally. As a result, Schelling agrees with Hegel that the genuine
transcendent is a transcendence-in-immanence. If the Absolute that Schelling has in mind is to be
a transcendent one, then it must somehow be transcendent from within itself, since otherwise, it
would not be a genuine Absolute (since anything that is one-sidedly transcendent would actually
be limited by that which stands outside of itself).
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Consequently, Schelling agrees with Hegel that this original living being must develop
itself in accordance with its own “law.” The inner law of this original living being is its freedom
– the law of highest love in its purity. Thus, Schelling’s task, like Hegel’s, becomes the
explanation and elaboration of how this process unfolds – how does the Godhead as “the will
that wills nothing” come to know itself as such? The answer is bound up with the manifestation
of itself as freedom.
Schelling even explicitly comments on how he reverses the order of philosophy,
returning it back to primordial, unconscious spirit before it comes to know itself as conscious
subject. Unlike Kant, who begins with the transcendental subject, Schelling begins with
unconscious spirit. As Schelling writes:
The science of philosophy no longer has to begin from the remote distance of abstract
thoughts, in order to climb down from there to nature. The direction is now the reverse.
Beginning with the unconscious existence of the eternal, philosophy leads it upward
toward its highest transfiguration in a consciousness that is divine.365
In other words, philosophy is the development and evolution of the unconscious divine coming
to a conscious knowledge of its divinity. As we will see, this is the significance of history to
Schelling’s account.
Schelling’s account entails that all of experience is infused by divinity. Although it is true
that divine love is that which enables the possibility for existence as such (and, therefore, at the
heart of all experience), it is also true that there is part of God that remains unaware of its divine
nature: this is the part of God that has not yet undergone a “transformation into...love.”366
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4.6) God’s Internal Dialogue
Along these lines, on Schelling’s account, what follows next is a discussion of dialogue.
According to his account, within the human soul, an internal dialogue takes place. This dialogue
mirrors an eternal dialogue that originally takes place on the order of the Absolute when it
desires to know itself. Indeed, the Absolute’s desire to know itself is what drives creation
forward from the start. As Schelling writes:
This division, this doubling of ourselves, represents a clandestine intercourse in which
there are two beings, one that questions and one that answers, one that knows – or is
knowledge (Wissenschaft) itself – and one that, not knowing, always struggles for clarity.
The real secret of the philosopher is this inner art of dialogue. Dialectic, its external
correlate, derived its name from it, but is at best only its imitation. Where it becomes a
mere form it is no more than a shadow and empty appearance.367
First and foremost, here I find Schelling (as well as Hegel, for that matter) speaking to the notion
that the psyche is not fully transparent to itself. For this reason, internal dialogue is
fundamentally important. In this way, dialogue reflects the process of creation itself. Just like in
the process of creation, during the process of dialogue, there is both a part that is concealed and a
part that is made unconcealed. Interestingly enough, I am reminded here of Nuzzo’s reading of
Hegel, since on Nuzzo’s interpretation, the original nothingness “says” in a way that precedes
dialectics, i.e. the Logos itself is bound to a more original dialogue. I agree that one could find a
similarity with Hegel’s overall movement here, since the beginning of the movement (as the
emptiness of emptiness) must be an actual experience on Hegel’s account, and not merely a
formal one, i.e. subjectivity itself is constituted by the emptiness of emptiness. To put it briefly,
Schelling agrees with Hegel that there is a more original dialogue prior to dialectics and
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discourse as such. On Schelling’s account, this knowledge is knowledge on the order of an
internal movement of the Absolute.
This is important, since it entails a number of related implications. First of all, there is an
internal “dialogue” in the sense of a movement that precedes its external expression as discourse.
Second, there is an original unconsciousness in the sense that there is always a part of God that
remains beyond God – it is the striving to know itself that drives it forward and simultaneously
assures its self-transcendence. (In fact, we will see later that God freely “decides” to conceal part
of itself as unconscious due to its nature as freedom.) In other words, even if there is a part of
material nature that can never fully recover itself as conscious knowledge, it still belongs to
God’s nature: God’s unconscious knowledge of itself belongs to God’s nature. Lastly, the point
about dialogue as living dialogue is also crucial. Schelling’s point, in agreement with Hegel, is
that the essential nature of genuine dialectics is that it must take place in time – it cannot be
reduced to a mere atemporal sequence of symbols.
Schelling’s comments about the dialectical nature of philosophy as an original (un)dialectical dialogue are also related to his understanding of transcendence as “transcendence-inimmanence” (incidentally, Schelling agrees with Hegel on this point). As Schelling writes, “All
knowledge and comprehension begins where things become internalized.”368 This is a crucial
comment, since it portrays Schelling’s stance on genuine knowledge (as well as experience, for
that matter, since epistemology and ontology are primordially bound together for Schelling).
This means that what is transcendent may be understood in its transcendence by means of the
analogy of an internal dialogue. If this is so, then what is beyond experience is defined by its
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transcendence in the sense of a conversation in which certain aspects of oneself transcend one’s
conscious dialogue.
According to Schelling, the entire process is one of eternal freedom coming to know
itself. By placing the unconscious absolute at the beginning of the process, Schelling conceives
of an Absolute that is Absolute the whole way through, even if there are times when it loses itself
or is not fully aware of itself in the process. In a similar vein, Hegel’s claims about the
connectedness of epistemology and ontology imply that if the genuine beginning is the emptiness
of emptiness, then the transcendence-in-immanence of the Absolute that emerges cannot be
reduced to the material Real. Schelling agrees with Hegel on this point. As Johnston writes, “In
fact, Hegelian dialectics is both an epistemology and an ontology, namely, a mobile, dynamic
knowledge-process that, in its functioning [and, more importantly, malfunctioning],
simultaneously reveals the very configuration of being itself.)”369
On both Schelling’s and Hegel’s accounts, the overall process demonstrates God’s selfmovement. On Hegel’s account, God’s genuine self-sacrifice is one with God’s resurrection – by
dying to itself, God finds itself as one with life. Schelling’s starting point is very similar in the
sense that the Godhead’s original indifference implies that it is both everything and nothing.
Schelling states:
For most people, because they have never felt within themselves this highest freedom, the
highest thing imaginable must itself be a subject, a “something” that is being (ein
Seyendes). For this reason they ask: what could be above being? – and then answer:
Nothingness, or something similar to it.
And yes truly it is a nothing, but in the same way that <sheer (lautere)> freedom is a
nothing. It is like the will that wills nothing (der Wille, der nichts will), having not a thing
it desires. Indifferent to all things, it is for this very reason moved by nothing. Such a will
is nothing and everything. It is nothing insofar as it neither desires to become active for
itself nor hungers for anything actual. All the same, it is everything, for all strength
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derives from it – as from eternal freedom alone. Because it has all things under it, it
commands everything and is commanded by nothing.370
Schelling’s point here is that, for many of us as human beings, it is difficult to imagine what the
highest freedom of the Godhead could be, since we have not yet experienced it. One tends to
imagine that the highest freedom takes on the form of a subject due to our lack of experiential
awareness of the divine presence as nothingness. On the other hand, one finds that the highest
freedom is in fact nothing, but for that reason it is equally everything: the pure love of divinity is
equally present in all of experience. Schelling’s remarks on dialogue are further evidence for the
incompleteness of his philosophy. If Schelling posits something akin to the movement of the
unconsciousness of God at the beginning of philosophy, then he surely does not posit the closure
of reason.
4.7) The Pure Heart as Closest to Divinity
Schelling sees that God’s original indifference – as both nothing and everything – is
God’s divinity. Likewise, Schelling understands that there is a part of God that remains hidden
from itself, precisely because it is so pure, that the only way for us to experience it is to return to
the primordial ground in which we are united with the divine. By embodying our divine nature,
we connect with an experience of the transcendent. Hegel agrees with Schelling that this
experience must be an actual one, and not merely an imagined or otherwise self-created one.
Another important point of unity for Schelling and Hegel, is that for both thinkers, this is
a divine process the whole way through. The fact that (1) the transcendent cannot be reduced to
the material real (2) that this is an internal process and (3) that God’s nature entails a knowledge
that lies beyond our fully conscious grasp are all consistent with a divine process. On Schelling’s
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account, even if there is a part of the material real that is not fully recovered in conscious
knowledge, our unity with that material real implies that it, too, belongs to God’s internal
knowledge of itself. In other words, the divine is present in all of nature. When we connect to the
eternal freedom of the divine, the divine reveals this to us in our surrender to it.
Indeed, this is precisely what Schelling says shortly after. He writes:
How can we even begin to describe such lucid purity (Lauterkeit)? To do so is impossible
unless we first ask what it is that, within a person, precedes all actual and all conditioned
being. For what is supreme within a human being is what, in God and in all things, is the
innermost heart of reality. It is eternity, properly speaking… we have elsewhere called
the supreme the true and absolute unity of subject and object; because it is neither the one
nor the other, it is yet the power to be either, or both. It is pure freedom in itself, the calm
bliss (die gelassene Wonne) that, oblivious of itself, is so full and content with itself that
it has nothing to think about. It is the quiet soulful inwardness (Innigkeit) that takes joy in
its own nonbeing. Its essence (Wesen) is nothing but grace, love and simplicity. It is the
humanity in human beings, the divinity in God.371
Schelling’s key point here is that within each and every human being there is a part of us that is
one with our divine nature and essence. There are many names for this divine nature: eternity,
the divine, compassion, pure freedom, pure love, the heart, nothing and everything (it is, in fact,
both and neither), etc. Ironically, it is our divinity that brings out the fullness of our humanity
and the fullness of our humanity brings out our divinity.
Indeed, Schelling is highly aware of this divine nature, and the way in which he writes
about it indicates that he himself had experienced it. We know this from the fact that Schelling
indicates that the one who is able to be one with his divine nature has emptied himself out
completely, such that what remains is precisely the fullness of the divine nature. It is here where
humanity “meets” divinity and divinity “meets” humanity. But such a “meeting” is not to be
understood merely as a coming together of two disparate things. Rather, it is a meeting as many
mystics have described it – unification with the divine heart and an embodiment of divine
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essence. As opposed to a physical meeting, such a coming together is more analogous to a flower
blossoming into the fullness of the truth of its internal nature. Likewise, the more one dwells in
the truth of the divine presence, the more and more one embodies harmony with his or her
divinity. As Schelling writes, “But the Godhead is not God. It is instead the radiance of the
unapproachable light in which God dwells, the scorching heat of its purity (Reinheit), which a
human being can approach only with an equally immaculate heart (mit gleicher Lauterkeit des
Wesens).”372 Here, in Platonic fashion, Schelling describes how only the pure-hearted one is able
to connect with his or her divinity. Schelling knows this to be the case, since he himself had
experienced it;373 Schelling had gone through the process of emptying himself out to become one
with the divine nature within himself.
I would furthermore like to highlight Schelling’s comment about divinity as neither
merely subject or object but “the power to be either or both,” as I quoted above. Here, Schelling
is speaking of eternal freedom. Schelling’s point is that freedom is the movement of life itself.
Freedom “walks the fine line,” so to speak, between existence and non-existence – it holds itself
open to the possibility of its own non-existence. Hegel and Schelling are both concerned with
how to philosophize about such a genuine and absolute freedom.
Significantly, the epistemology at work here is an epistemology of the heart. Indeed,
Schelling even writes that the way for one to know when he has found the God within himself is
by means of an inner experience. He continues:
this is what provokes the universal question, how is it possible to recognize such lucid
purity? The only possible answer is to let emerge in yourself an equally lucid purity – and
to feel and recognize it as the highest in you. In doing so, you will immediately
understand that it is what is absolutely highest. If on the other hand you are distracted and
torn in many directions, how can you possibly hope to experience the supremely simple
372
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as something real?374
Schelling is able to provide his readers with this advice from a first-person point of view. He had
found the highest within himself through a process of self-sacrifice and internal death, so to
speak. To put it in other words, Schelling so fully immersed himself in the divine presence that
the divine truth could shine forth from out of the Divine Itself. This process is excruciatingly
painful at times. It entails the death of the ego self, which can sometimes feel like a genuine
death. However, when one experiences this process, one eventually finds that what remains at
bottom is the genuine living God – the God which never dies, but merely changes from one form
to the next.
In his discussion of time, Schelling even describes how each subsequent form (of the
ages) conceals the one that came before it:
We can see a series of ages, whereby one has followed upon the other, always obscuring
its predecessor. Nowhere does anything original show itself. A wealth of slowly piled up
layers, the work of many millennia must be taken away in order finally to come to the
ground.
If the world that lies before us has finally attained its form only after going through so
many intermediary periods of time, how, without knowledge of the past, are we to
recognize even just the present for what it is?375
This leads Schelling more and more towards his notion of the Absolute as a living being,
expressing eternal freedom. The true self cannot perish, since it is eternal. Its essence (as
freedom) is, at bottom, unchanging. One discovers, in other words, that the Divine Itself is
evolving. And one becomes a participant in this divinely beautiful process of self-transformation.
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4.7.1) Concluding Remarks
The difference between Schelling and Hegel on this topic is primarily a difference
regarding the place from which each philosopher writes (on an experiential level) of the topic.
Both philosophers are humble in the sense that both Schelling and Hegel recognize that there is
an unconscious and unknowable part of the divine that is continuously revealed to us as humans
and yet, never in a complete or totalizing sense. While Schelling and Hegel arrive at similar
conclusions, each reaches these conclusions in a different way. The Hegel of the SL approaches
his conclusions more from the level of the logical mind (here I am speaking of the general style
of his approach),376 yet simultaneously he recognizes the fact that the Notion is the movement of
emptiness in its process of becoming. As for Schelling’s stylistic approach, he philosophizes
more from his heart space, in the sense that he is more primarily concerned with his inner
experience – indeed, he even says in his Ages of the World text that it is the one who has
experienced “lucid purity” within himself who is able to see it, as I quoted above. In other words,
Schelling is more primarily concerned with the insights gleaned from his heart. On the other
hand, even Hegel’s mind-level philosophical approach arrives at the same insight that Schelling
has observed from his heart. In this sense, the difference is more one of style than a fundamental
discord.
4.8) Philosophy’s Arrival from Unconscious Spirit (qua Nature)
In his Ages of the World draft from 1811, Schelling writes of the shift that was occurring
during his time in the discipline of philosophy, and interestingly, this shift is demonstrated by
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both Schelling’s and Hegel’s works insofar as they are both ahead of their time. Schelling writes
of how the order of the beginning of philosophy has now been reversed: philosophy can arrive at
itself directly from unconscious spirit instead of attempting to construct the arrival of nature from
distant, abstract concepts. Schelling and Hegel are actually both united in the task of describing
the beginning of philosophy as arriving from out of Spirit herself: Hegel writes about this as the
beginning of dialectics in the emptiness of emptiness. On Schelling’s terms, as we will see, this
is the process of the becoming of divinity as the play of Love between the simultaneous
possibilities of “to be” or “not to be”: the heart’s internal dialogue and rumination. According to
Schelling, divine Love is both everything and nothing: God’s love is so profound that it entails
the possibility of God’s self-negation so as to allow for the experience of divinity as freedom.
Since eternal freedom is present at the heart of all things, Schelling describes a harmony
between the world of thought and the world of nature. He writes:
It seems to have been reserved for our own age to open for good the path to this
objectivity of philosophical science. As long as philosophy restricts its concern to what is
inward it must lack the natural means of an external form of exposition. But now things
have finally changed. After having so long gone astray, philosophical science has recalled
the memory of nature and of its own previous unity with her. And this is not all. Hardly
were the first steps taken to rejoin philosophy with nature, when the enormous age of the
physical became apparent. Far from being what is last, it is much rather what is first. It is
that from which everything begins, including the development of the life of divinity. The
science of philosophy no longer has to begin from the remote distance of abstract
thoughts, in order to climb down from there to nature. The direction is now the reverse.
Beginning with the unconscious existence of the eternal, philosophy leads it upward
toward its highest transfiguration in a consciousness that is divine. Even the most
supersensible thoughts now attain physical strength and life. And nature, conversely, can
be recognized ever more clearly as the visible imprint of the loftiest concepts. In due
time, the contempt with which ignorant people alone still look down on the physical will
pass away. Once again the truth of the old saying will be acknowledged that the stone
which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone. Then popularity, so often sought
after in vain, will come of itself. At that point there will no longer be a gap separating the
world of thought and the world of actuality. It will be One World (Eine Welt). The peace
of the golden age will make itself known for the first time in the peaceful union of all
fields of knowledge.377
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On my reading, Schelling’s insight here is primarily with regard to the starting point of his
philosophy as the eternal freedom present within nature. This connects Schelling’s task in the
Ages of the World to Hegel’s task in the Logic, since both are concerned with the development of
accounts in which nothing is presupposed from the start. Schelling hopes to show how
unconscious nature becomes conscious of itself as divinity. In this respect, I would also like to
highlight the significance of Schelling’s reference to the biblical phrase, “the stone that the
builders rejected has become the cornerstone.”378 Schelling employs this famous biblical adage
here to emphasize that unconscious Spirit had previously been rejected, but in Schelling’s
philosophy it will rise to prominence once more as the beginning of philosophy. On Schelling’s
understanding, the world of unconscious Spirit is equally as important as the world of thought,
since it, too, speaks to the truth of eternal freedom. If the world of thought had previously been
prioritized, it will now “bow down,” so to speak, before the world of the heart’s actuality.
Significantly, Schelling calls for a resurrection of the world of actuality, and in doing so, he
hopes to reveal the internal unity between the two worlds. The heart imbues the physical with
meaning. Divine nature reveals God in the physical. While previous philosophical eras had
rejected the knowledge of the heart, Schelling considers his era as one that can pronounce a
future revelation of unity: “there will no longer be a gap separating the world of thought and the
world of actuality.”379
4.9) Schelling’s Conception of the Ultimate Form of Philosophy
Indeed, Schelling considers his epoch as the anticipation of a future time in which this
goal could be achieved. The evidence that such a period has not yet arrived in Schelling’s era is
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that the form of philosophy is still primarily conceived as one of research. In the future time that
Schelling anticipates, a narrator could exist who would speak directly from the unity of heart and
mind. According to Schelling, research is not the ultimate form of philosophy.380 In research, one
seeks information to support his or her argument and to argue for a particular point of view.
Schelling’s thought is that the genuine philosophical narrator would be one who is capable of
speaking directly from an internal experience of unity with all of nature. Research alone can only
achieve at best a partial awareness of unity, since it does not speak from the place of a living
unity. If research is not coupled with lived experience, then one is incapable of speaking from a
place of truth.
Since the current historical epoch has evolved after Schelling and Hegel’s era, it remains
an open question as to what extent we can now be the genuine narrators that Schelling has in
mind. This is a question that each person must ask himself: How could I be the narrator that
Schelling describes? Who is the genuine philosophical narrator? This leads to a related question:
what would it mean to be such a narrator? Schelling writes of such a narrator: “Perhaps the one is
yet to come who will sing the great heroic song, comprehending in spirit, like the famed seers of
old, all that was, is, and will be.”381 Here, Schelling’s vision of the genuine philosopher is the
one who speaks from his or her direct knowledge of the unity of heart and mind. He has
internally experienced such a unification of himself with Spirit as such. For this reason, Schelling
also writes that the genuine philosophical narrator grasps the nature of time on a spiritual level.
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Such a narrator contrasts with the researcher: whereas the researcher primarily speaks from the
past and lacks a view of the whole, the narrator speaks from the wholeness of his or her heart.
While commenting on the contrast between the narrator and the researcher, it is also
noteworthy to mention that Schelling places Freedom above Being in an ontological sense. The
researcher is limited to the extent that her comprehension is primarily focused on the past. The
researcher differs from the narrator, since she does not open herself to the unity of all experience
as the unity of the past, present, and future. In constructing her philosophical argument, the
researcher is primarily concerned with gathering evidence from the past.
On the other hand, the living God must be capable of dying to its Godself in such a
profound way that the present unfolds from out of a genuine abyss (of freedom). This death in
fact allows for the past itself to be fundamentally transformed in its meaning. While the
researcher understands her experience from the point of view of a linear conception of the past,
the narrator speaks from the unity of the whole, in which her conception of time itself is capable
of changing. In other words, the philosophical narrator writes from the unity of her mind and
heart, using the mind as a tool to express what he or she experiences from a heart-level
awareness. Significantly, the philosophical narrator speaks from a place of connection between
her heart and the heart of divine love due to her awareness that the divine heart is the highest
essence of humanity and the existential Ungrund of all of experience.
4.10) The Primordial Nature of Eternal Freedom
As mentioned previously, Schelling considers eternal freedom as metaphysically more
primordial than even the becoming of being in time (incidentally, Hegel also demonstrates this
sort of prioritization as evinced by my earlier comments about whether Hegel’s beginning is
“(un)dialectical”). In any case, my interpretation of Schelling’s point here is that God’s infinite
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love (and freedom) ontologically transcends God’s finitude. However, Schelling is also aware
that we, at times, speak of different aspects of things and sometimes in a seemingly contradictory
way. Schelling holds that this is perfectly legitimate due to the nature of time. As one example,
one can legitimately exclaim that God is both finite and infinite and one’s words are not
therefore empty of meaning. As Schelling writes:
The true meaning of that unity which was originally asserted is therefore this: one and the
same (=x) is the unity as well as the antithesis; or the two opposites, the eternally
negating and eternally affirming potency, and the unity of the two constitute the one,
indivisible primordial essence.382
This statement implies that there must be a third thing (the copula) that unites these two
seemingly contradictory aspects. The living essence of the divine (as it reveals God in time)
allows for the union of these two seemingly contradictory principles. Coupled with such a
relation is another relation of difference as well. These two, thought together, allow for God’s
movement between both and the sublation of both. God continuously manifests divinity as the
possibility either to be or not to be. God can be an infinite possibility of options, and endlessly
so. Despite this fact, the freedom of eternity also implies that God is present in each and every
possible option at the same time: infinity transcends finitude in such a way that its very
transcendence over finitude simultaneously implies the immanence of infinitude within finitude.
The reason that this is important is that Schelling’s philosophical edifice (at least up until this
point in his career) is aimed towards the unification of 1) a logic of being (understood as
recollection) with 2) the revelation of God.383 Schelling’s goal is to demonstrate how creation
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itself (as elaborated by his “metaphysical empiricism”384) also represents the nature of the divine
in its eternal freedom.
4.11) Conclusion
Thus far, I have attempted to show how Hegel’s Logic of “Being” from his SL is
consistent with Schelling’s WA. In these two works, both Schelling and Hegel proclaim the dual
task of metaphysics (as the description of a structure on the order of identity (“re-collection”) as
well as difference (“revelation”)). Although on the surface, Hegel’s Science of Logic is a logic of
being, it is actually much more than that, since internal to Hegel’s entire system is the nature of
difference. In other words, if Schelling’s project aims to unify logic and history385, then my
argument throughout this dissertation has been that Hegel’s conception of metaphysics is (at a
minimum) consistent with that of Schelling; Hegel does not remain constrained merely to the
order of logic, since the Notion itself is inherently historical.
Along similar lines, Schelling’s epistemology is one with his ontology (just as we also
saw was true of Hegel’s epistemology). On Schelling’s account, knowledge of the transcendent
(as a beyond) is simultaneously immanent knowledge (and therefore, available via phenomenal
experience). To put this in another way, freedom transcends Being in such a way that freedom is
present in all of experience while simultaneously existing as more than all possible experience.
Schelling elaborates on this topic:
Only one thing is to be heard in all of the best and most sublime teachings: being (das
Seyn) is a debased (tiefer) condition of the original being, whose most primordial,
unconditioned state towers above all being. As for being itself, we all have the feeling
that necessity clings to it like a disastrous fate (Verhängnis). All being (alles Seyn) is
caught up in the urge for manifestation and development. Everything that is (alles
Seyende) is agitated by a thorn that prods it forward and makes it spread itself out, hiding
within it an infinity that would like to express itself. For whatever is and has being
384
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demands more than its inner existence. What a thing is internally, it must be yet again,
externally. True, eternal freedom only dwells above being. Freedom is the affirmative
concept of eternity, or of that which is above all time (dessen, was über aller Zeit ist).386
The freedom that is “above all of time” is the freedom that is simultaneously everything and
nothing: it is the freedom of becoming and nothingness in their internal unity. It is also true that
freedom as such moves in and as becoming, but never in a way that it could be fully delimited –
it is absolute freedom. As desireless desire, it is the divine love present in all of experience but
which could never be reduced to any particular experience; it is the eternal life of the divine.
Schelling also comments on the difference between philosophy conceived as a discipline
that merely dissects and analyzes past experience versus philosophy understood as a discipline of
life. Schelling hopes for the day when the discipline of philosophy will return to the freedom of
its genuine essence. Schelling’s point is that ultimately, the only wisdom worth having is the
wisdom of the divine speaking from out of its eternal Spirit: the wisdom of divine freedom. He
writes:
For human beings, philosophical science is always a remembering. This is not the case,
however, for eternity, which can never fade into the past. Man alone has to be set free, so
that his true nature (sein Wesen) might become again what it is in itself: a flashing forth
(Blick) of the most pristine (lauterste) divinity, in which a subject or an object can be
distinguished so little as in the heart of divinity itself. For this reason, insight into the
ultimate is completely unique with regard both to its immediacy and its soulful
inwardness.387
The philosopher speaks from out of the unity of himself with the divine heart.
This passage is also significant to the rest of my dissertation, since it connects Schelling’s
philosophy to Hegel’s ontology once again. On Hegel’s account, subject and object are unified
from the beginning as the emptiness of emptiness. According to Schelling, subject and object are
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unified from the beginning in the divine heart – to philosophize from divinity is to philosophize
from the presence of eternity in which subject and object are indistinguishable.
The main purpose of this chapter was to argue for the metaphysical consistency between
Hegel’s beginning in the SL and Schelling’s beginning in the WA. Both thinkers agree that a
repetition of emptiness is bound up with the process by which the divine comes to learn of its
nature. Furthermore, on both accounts, God’s nature is self-sacrificial. However, significantly,
Schelling explains the way in which God’s self-sacrificial nature relates to God’s freedom in the
WA. In the next chapter, I pursue this topic further in the context of divine revelation and
Schelling’s response to the purpose of the entire movement.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE ACTUALITY OF DIVINE LOVE (AS FREEDOM)
5.1) Introduction
In this concluding chapter my main goal is to analyze Schelling’s 1827 critique of Hegel’s
conception of the Absolute. I demonstrate that Schelling’s critique is not problematic for Hegel’s
account, provided that we read the beginning of Hegel’s SL as I have suggested throughout this
dissertation. Consequently, I argue that Hegel’s and Schelling’s positions on the beginning are
actually closer together than even Schelling himself contended. Both thinkers agree that the
actuality of love (qua freedom) implies both a beginning in emptiness and a return to emptiness.
In this sense, both the SL and the WA present the inherent incompleteness of a system of the
absolute.
As a sub-goal of this chapter, I conduct a meta-reflection on the placement of logic in
Schelling’s and Hegel’s systems of philosophy, respectively. For both thinkers, logic is
important to ontology. In previous chapters, I identified the same overall schematic movement in
the metaphysics of Hegel and Schelling. The two thinkers agree that the Absolute is
fundamentally (in)complete and that God’s nature is to transcend God Itself. As we will see,
Christ is the symbol of such self-transcendence. That said, Schelling more explicitly addresses
the question of why the absolute is self-divestment in the first place: co-eternal with the “will that
wills nothing” is God’s desire to know and experience divinity as love. Therefore, while
Schelling and Hegel agree on the schematic question of how the Absolute unfolds from out of its
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own freedom, Schelling thinks beyond Hegel insofar as he provides an explicit response to the
question of why.388
5.2) Hegel and Schelling on Logic and Metaphysics
To pinpoint one specific point of possible contention between Hegel’s and Schelling’s
accounts of metaphysics, I look to the question of whether or not each thinker contends that a
logic of Being is sufficient to the task of metaphysics. As Frederick de Wolfe Bolman notes in
his “Introduction” to Schelling’s Ages of the World, Schelling agrees with Hegel that a “logical
analysis of being must be carried through prior to positive knowledge of existence.”389As
Bolman states, “certainly the seeds of philosophical difference between Schelling and Hegel lay
as far back as 1804, yet it was not until after 1827 that Schelling precisely stated the
difference…”390 Bolman notes how Schelling’s own conception of God changed in his post-1804
works.391 Schelling then realized that he had not been able to think through an understanding of
God as both subject and object in a comprehensive sense in his works from the period prior to
1804. Bolman states:
In effect, Schelling blamed Hegel with having made the same error. In his logic, Hegel
started from what is most negative or logical, the notion of pure being, that in which there
is nothing of subject. But, claimed Schelling, while Hegel proceeded to ascribe immanent
movement to pure being, the notion is immovable if it is not the notion of a thinking
subject, i.e., if it is not a thought, and further, the movement Hegel described as
immanent has a terminus ad quem, the actual world, which unconsciously affects the
course of such philosophizing.392
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Schelling’s thought is that in his pre-1804 works he had considered God as an Absolute Subject.
The problem, Schelling reasons, is that God qua Subject is incapable of attaining to genuine,
objective reality. In 1827, Schelling said of his own works prior to 1804, as Bolman quotes,
“God was that subject which remains as subject, victorious over all, which can no longer fall into
the object.”393
5.3) My Analysis of Schelling’s Critique
The Schelling of 1827 charges Hegel with the same philosophical misconception, since
“pure being without subject with which it is identical or for which it is object is an
impossibility.”394 In other words, to put it simply, Schelling’s critique (as formulated in 1827) is
that Hegel’s system remains relegated to the order of subjectivity and the thinking of essence – it
is thought bereft of being. As Bolman quotes from Schelling, “real thought is that whereby
something opposed to thought is overcome. Where one has only thought, and abstract thought,
for content, thought has nothing to overcome.”395
To elaborate on this point, Schelling further argues that Hegel’s account of the Absolute
remains an inherently subjective one (like Schelling’s own in his pre-1804 works). As one
example, Schelling takes issue with Hegel’s account of how the absolute Idea externalizes itself
as Nature. Schelling argues that Hegel presupposes agency in his account of Nature as the
externalization of the Absolute Idea.396
Schelling agrees with Hegel that logic is important to metaphysics. Where Schelling
differs from Hegel (on Schelling’s understanding) is that Hegel considers logic sufficient to the
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task in and of itself. That is, according to Schelling, Hegel does not couple logic (the analysis of
being) with a positive philosophy that is constructive and seeks wholeness as opposed to the
dissection of the logical Concept. In Schelling’s later works especially (the seeds for which he
planted as early as the WA), he realizes the need for a negative philosophy to be coupled with a
positive philosophy.397 As Bolman writes, “While he considered Hegel correct in asserting that
logic in the metaphysical sense must be the real foundation of all philosophy, Schelling held that
Hegel failed to recognize that the logical is merely the negative aspect of existence.”398 Bolman
quotes directly from Schelling:
The whole world lies, as it were, in the nets of understanding or of reason, but the
question is how it came into these nets, since something else and something more than
mere reason, indeed, even something striving beyond these limits, is evidently in the
world.399
The task of the positive philosophy is to explain how it is the case that time allows for the
actuality of the divine to be revealed in experience. According to Schelling, the logic of Being (à
la Hegel) ultimately remains on the order of negative philosophy, since it provides an answer to
the question of what exists and the developmental structure of Being. Schelling claims that Hegel
leaves unaddressed the higher-order question of how reason could know Being at all. Bolman
continues, “Hegel’s logic, then, was the science in which the divine idea completed itself in mere
thought before actuality, and the idea was thus logically result.”400
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The point of contention seems to hinge on whether Hegel’s account in the SL is able to
genuinely (in a way that is true to lived experience) account for the actuality of existence. As
Bolman continues:
Hegel, [Schelling] said, tried to make pure thought or logic account for existence. But
existence for Hegel did not have the character of natural object, but only that of an object
of thought, which, since Hegel denied the real illogicity of existence at the outset, could
only characterize reality essentially, not existentially.401
Now, in order for us to assess whether Schelling’s 1827 critique of Hegel’s system of philosophy
holds, we need to assess whether or not it is true that Hegel ultimately remains barred to the
order of thought alone. Does Schelling’s critique of 1827 apply as a valid critique of Hegel’s
Science of Logic?
To re-iterate what I have discussed previously, I do not think that Schelling’s critique of
1827 is problematic for Hegel. I have my reasons, which I have noted throughout this
dissertation (my reading of Hegel is that he is not a thinker of mere Subject. I hold that Absolute
Spirit is inherently historical, etc.) Furthermore, I am not alone in my view that Schelling’s
critique of Hegel misses the mark.
Consider, as one example, Stephen Houlgate’s commentary on Schelling’s critique.
Houlgate, a prominent contemporary Hegel scholar, makes a similar argument (although his
reading differs from mine) that Schelling misunderstands the beginning of Hegel’s SL. In
Houlgate’s paper, “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Houlgate writes:
Hegel accepts Schelling’s claim against Fichte that being is not merely there for
consciousness, but that it exists prior to consciousness. In that sense, Hegel agrees with
Schelling that being is independent of thought. But he insists against Schelling that
thought is directly aware from within itself of the very thatness of being.402
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Houlgate’s point throughout his paper is that Schelling’s critique of Hegel does not hold. First of
all, Houlgate argues, Schelling charges Hegel with presupposing (or otherwise anticipating) the
movement from Being to Becoming in his account in the SL. However, Houlgate claims that
Schelling’s charge is grounded in a faulty understanding of Hegel’s position, since Hegel’s
account is not a movement that is anticipated by a subject nor a movement on the order of mere
thought bereft of being. Rather, the movement is an immanent one – it is thought’s participation
in being and its reflection on itself as simultaneously same and other. I agree with Houlgate that
Schelling’s critique of Hegel is off the mark here. However, my interpretation differs slightly
from Houlgate’s. On my reading, the movement that Houlgate aims to describe is not merely
thought’s internal awareness of external being. Rather, the disappearing of Spirit from itself is
the basis for thought as being. For this reason, my argument is that Hegel’s and Schelling’s
accounts (understood via dialectical materialism) are actually much more similar than even
Schelling himself contended.
Let us further consider the charge that Hegel presupposes agency in his account of how
the absolute Idea externalizes itself. One relevant passage here comes from “The Absolute Idea”
section at the end of the SL. There, in a discussion about how the Absolute Idea is also nature,
Hegel writes:
The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea freely
releases itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. 403
Original German Text:
Das Übergehen ist also hier vielmehr so zu fassen, daß die Idee sich selbst frei entläßt,
ihrer absolut sicher und in sich ruhend.
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On my reading, the fact that the Idea “freely releases itself” (sich selbst frei entläßt) does not
imply independent, subjective agency. As a side point, Hegel’s discussion of actuality as the
“unity of essence and existence”404 provides further support for my reading. In any case, on my
understanding, for the Absolute Idea to “freely release itself” is for the Absolute Idea to express
its essence. Or to put it in other words, the expression of the Absolute Idea as Nature (as an
expression of otherness) is its essence.
The relationship between the absolute Idea and Nature is fundamental in assessing
whether Schelling’s critique holds when it comes to the question of whether Hegel’s system
remains on the order of an absolute Subject lacking genuine actuality. In his paper, “The Logic
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Nature, Space, and Time” by Edward Halper, Halper
comments on the relationship between the absolute Idea and Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature.
Everyone seems to agree that Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is a result of the externalization of
the absolute Idea, but the question is how this is possible in Hegel’s system, to what extent
Nature is in fact an externalization of the Idea and whether or not this implies closure to the
system. If Nature is completely external to the Idea (as Schelling’s objection to Hegel would be),
then Hegel is hard-pressed to explain how the Idea arrives at Nature as Nature. On the other
hand, if Nature is entirely internal to the Idea, then how does Hegel’s account pay heed to the
genuine otherness of Nature? Halper explains that Hegel’s solution is actually that the absolute
Idea is simultaneously same and other to itself – it is both a particular category (the absolute) and
indifferent to all categories (as a universal). As Halper writes:
Again, the content of absolute idea is the conceptual transformations between all the
logical categories, and its form is just its character as a particular category. Absolute idea
is the culmination of logic in so far as its form is identical with its content; that is, in so
far as its individuality is just the totality of the transformations of all categories.
However, it is also a category that is distinct from all other logical categories: it is a
404
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single universal that differs from the logical categories contained within it and from their
complex conceptual development. In this latter respect, absolute idea is indifferent and
external to the processes of conceptual unfolding that constitute logic. It is precisely this
externality of absolute idea’s form from its content that defines the realm of nature. So it
is that absolute idea, in being just what it is, is also something else.405
Here, I find further support for the notion that Hegel and Schelling are metaphysically united
insofar as they are both dialectical materialists (as philosophers who think beyond the divide
between materialism and idealism).
Hegel’s solution to the problem of how the absolute Idea externalizes itself as Nature is
that the absolute Idea could be thought akin to a “category”406, but since it is also a category of
all possible categories, it is simultaneously indifferent to all of the changes on the order of
particular categories. Hegel’s thought on the absolute Idea here is actually very similar to
Schelling’s thought of the two co-eternal wills (a will to indifference and a will to particularity)
in his WA. The content of the absolute Idea is to be beyond, other, or external to itself and its
form is to be as all possible categories. Yet, Hegel thinks of form and content together, so the
Idea must be somehow both universal and absolute. As Halper goes on to explain, “absolute idea
does not develop; it is its own self-unfolding.”407 In this sense, the Idea is simultaneously same
and other to itself – its identity is to be always already beyond itself. To put it simply, Hegel
wants to say that the Idea is always already mediated, since it exists on the order of both thought
and being. In this sense, Nature is not merely an expression of all-consuming thought. Rather,
Nature is an expression of the absolute Idea’s movement, as a movement of both thought and
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being. The entire movement implies a circular return, repeatedly back to the nothingness of “pure
being.”
Along these lines, Žižek makes a similar argument that Schelling’s critique of Hegel is
based on a misconception of the nature of this moment (the externalization of the Idea as Nature)
of the movement. He writes:
Schelling was the first to criticize this move as illegitimate: after Hegel completed the
circle of logical self-development of the Notion, being aware that all this development
took place in the abstract medium of thought, outside real life, he had to somehow make
the passage to real life. There were, however, no categories in his logic to accomplish this
passage, which is why he had to resort to terms like ‘decision’...This critique clearly
misses the way that this act of releasing the other is immanent to the dialectical process
and its conclusive moment: the sign of the conclusion of the dialectical circle.408
Here, Žižek agrees with my reading that the absolute Idea’s expression of itself as Nature follows
directly from (as an expression of) its essence (as both thought and being).
In addition, I argue that Hegel’s account of the actuality of existence (incidentally, he
considers essence and existence as fundamentally bound together) is actually close to Schelling’s
own account, since, as we will see, Hegel agrees with Schelling about the ontological
prioritization of the actual. As Karen Ng notes, “like Aristotle, Hegel invokes the priority of
actuality over possibility because thought always begins with an actual object of thought, with
reality and the thing itself...thinking begins with the unity of thinking and the thing thought.”409
Hegel and Schelling both agree on this broader point that the unity of thought and being is most
primordial to ontology.
Furthermore, I disagree with Schelling’s claim that Hegel (as Bolman puts it) “denied the
real illogicity of existence at the outset.”410 Hegel even says in this same section (on “The
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Absolute Idea”) that “the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion.”411
Indeed, contradiction lies at the heart of the Notion, since contradiction is what drives the
process forward.412 Without an account of the importance of contradiction, it seems that Hegel
would be hard-pressed to explain how God develops at all. If the Absolute Idea were fully selfcomprehending in a subjectivistic sense, then it seems to me that Hegel would be unable to
provide a convincing account for the processual nature of the Absolute in the first place.
Along similar lines, I contend that Hegel’s SL has a negative and positive philosophy
internal to it. Similar to Schelling’s account, the logic of being (negative philosophy,
recollection) ought to be coupled with the actuality of a lived history (positive philosophy,
revelation of God).413 To put it in other words, Hegel agrees with Schelling that there is an
irrevocable indeterminacy internal to the process of becoming – God is the freedom of Spirit that
actualizes divinity in time. Hegel therefore agrees that the negative philosophy is inherently
bound up with a positive philosophy (conceived as the revelation of Geist in time). Crucially,
Hegel, even in his Logic of Being (qua the SL), realizes that a mere negative philosophy is not
sufficient for a comprehensive ontology. In fact, this is why the Notion is emptied out as the
emptiness of emptiness. However, on Hegel’s conception, what the Notion finds on the other
side of the abyss is its necessary existence. When the Godself dies, God discovers the necessity
internal to its freedom. It seems to me, then, that Hegel and Schelling actually come to similar
conclusions although they perhaps arrive at them from different perspectives.
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5.4) Aristotle’s Prioritization of Actuality in Metaphysics
In further support of the notion that some of the main features of metaphysics remain
fundamentally similar for both Schelling and Hegel, it is also noteworthy that both thinkers are
heavily influenced by Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics. Although Schelling charged Hegel
with thinking of a logical science that is bereft of being, my argument is that there is a positive
philosophy internal to Hegel’s account. In this sense, both philosophers are influenced by
Aristotle’s prioritization of actuality in metaphysics.
In his Philosophy of Revelation (1841) Schelling remains concerned that Hegel’s
dialectic remains a mere “negative science.” There, he states:
Hegel has re-asserted the concept of dialectic in philosophy. For Plato it is the royal art,
i.e. a divine one. But one ought not to apply it merely to the logical, negative science, as
Hegel does. Aristotle used διαλεκτικός and λογικός synonymously, but he did so because,
for him, the logical presupposed the actual. In the negative philosophy, dialectic has at
most a formal significance. Actual dialectic is found only in the realm of freedom: it
alone is able to solve all riddles.414
Here, Schelling’s concern seems to be that Hegel utilizes dialectic in what Schelling would
characterize as a mere “negative” science. The question becomes whether or not Hegel
sufficiently prioritizes actuality in his metaphysics. If Hegel does not prioritize actuality
sufficiently, then Schelling’s critique would be that Hegel’s logic remains on the order of
thought and does not follow from a genuine living unity of thought and being.
In response to Schelling’s concern here, part of my argument is to argue that both
Schelling and Hegel agree on the primordial nature of actuality to ontology (we saw this at the
beginning of Hegel’s SL with “Being, Pure Being –” as an emptiness of emptiness.)
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In fact, both thinkers agree with Aristotle that existence and essence are bound together
by actuality. As Robert B. Pippin writes in his book, Hegel’s Realm of Shadows: Logic as
Metaphysics in the Science of Logic:
Again, as for Aristotle, the task of metaphysics is not to say of any particular thing what
it is. It is to determine what must be true of anything at all…415
Furthermore, Pippin rightfully points out that Hegel conceives of logic as metaphysics in the SL.
As Pippin quotes from Hegel, on Hegel’s account, “ ‘logic’ has taken the place of the old
metaphysics.’”416
Further on, Pippin continues:
In his lectures on Aristotle, Hegel aligns himself with the goal of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
as the ‘science of that which is insofar as it is and what belongs to it in and for itself…As
Aristotle puts it in a canonical formulation from Metaphysics Z:
And since the existence of the thing must already be given, it is clear that the question
must be why the matter is so-and-so…417
Here, I would particularly like to highlight Aristotle’s notion that “the existence of the thing must
already be given” (my emphasis). Even beyond this fact, in the SL Hegel is concerned with
existence as such. For this reason, he must ontologically prioritize actuality (just like Schelling
does as well). In the SL, what we ultimately discover (retroactively) as already given from the
start is the disappearing of emptiness as such. It seems to me, then, that Hegel would agree with
Schelling that a positive philosophy ought to complement a negative philosophy. However,
admittedly, each philosopher elaborates on the details of the relation between positive and
negative philosophy differently. For Schelling, such a division requires two separate branches of
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metaphysics whereas on Hegel’s account the two could be conceived as internal to a science of
Logic, conceived as the Ur-grund of metaphysics.
There is further evidence in support of the notion that Hegel prioritizes actuality in an
ontological sense in his EL. Pippin later quotes from section 142 of Hegel’s Encyclopedia where
Hegel draws a contrast between Aristotle and Plato. There, Hegel writes:
On this head, it must be remarked that actuality certainly does form the principle of
Aristotle’s philosophy, but his actuality is that of the Idea itself, and not the ordinary
actuality of what is immediately present… More precisely, therefore, Aristotle’s polemic
against Plato consists in his designation of the Platonic idea as mere δύναμις, and in
urging, on the contrary, that the Idea, which is recognized by both of them equally to be
alone what is true, should be regarded essentially as ἐνέργειᾰ, i.e. the inwardness that is
totally to the fore, so that it is the unity of inward and outward. In other words the Idea
should be regarded as actuality in the emphatic sense that we have given it here. (EL,
section 142Z)418
On Hegel’s account, Aristotle’s argument against Plato is that the Idea is more properly
understood as ἐνέργειᾰ than as δύναμις.419 On my understanding, this means that the Idea is
actuality as both essence and existence, which means that it is also neither merely one nor the
other. If Hegel were to conceive of the Idea as δύναμις, then he would prioritize one side of the
dialectic.
Pippin further clarifies the task of metaphysics on Aristotle’s conception:
For Aristotle, the task of metaphysics is not to say of any particular thing what it is, nor
does it deduce what beings there are… Metaphysics’ task is to determine what must be
true of anything at all, such that what it is in particular can be determined.420
On Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics, an account of universal ontology on the order of
actuality ought to precede an account of the essence of a thing. So, both Schelling and Hegel are
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influenced by Aristotle’s view of metaphysics in terms of his influence on the overall structure of
their philosophical thought.
In Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic, there is further evidence of Aristotle’s influence on
Hegel, and correlatively, one can draw out further connections between Schelling and Hegel. For
example, Hegel writes in the EL, “God communicates, God reveals what he is and, indeed, first
through and in nature.”421 Here, it is significant that Hegel agrees with Schelling that God reveals
the Divine Itself in nature. Along these lines, Hegel’s conception of actuality brings him close to
Schelling, and as we will see, also to Schelling’s thoughts on God’s highest essence as one with
God’s existence. Hegel writes:
Actuality is that unity of essence and concrete existence [Existenz], of inner and outer,
that has immediately come to be. The expression [Äußerung] of the actual is the actual
itself, so that in the expression it remains something equally essential and is something
essential only insofar as it is in immediate, external [äußerlich] concrete existence.422
Here, the fact that Hegel conceives of essence and existence as united in actuality also helps to
shed light on why Hegel begins the “Doctrine of Being” with the emptiness of emptiness.
According to Karen Ng, the emptiness of emptiness is simultaneously “the most concrete and the
most abstract.”423
5.5) Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation (1841): God’s Highest Essence is Existence
Along similar lines, Schelling states in his Philosophy of Revelation that God’s highest
essence is existence. He writes:
He is that which only as the ability to necessarily be [nur-nothwendig-seyn-Könnende].
But even that which necessarily has Being is in itself the potence of that which has Being
as the highest essence [das-höchste-Wesen-Seyns]. That which has the ability to be as the
highest essence, or the highest essence, has the necessary existence as part of its potence.424
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But, if God’s highest essence is bound up with necessary existence, then this also supports the
idea that the positive philosophy in some sense precedes the negative philosophy and makes it
possible. Therefore, I consider Hegel and Schelling in agreement on this point.
Schelling’s conception of the relationship between the positive philosophy and the
negative philosophy is akin to Hegel’s understanding of how dialectics arises from the
(un)dialectical. Schelling explains the difference between the positive philosophy and the
negative philosophy in his Philosophy of Revelation (1841). He says there:
the negative philosophy was an a priori science because its activity of thought preceded
all Being. The beginning of the positive philosophy is the Being that precedes all activity
of thought. It moves from Being, which is not preceded by a concept, toward the concept,
toward ‘that which has supra-Being [‘Ueberseyenden’].425
Here, we can clearly see the connection to Hegel’s beginning in the SL with the emptiness of
emptiness as an (un)dialectical movement. Schelling’s beginning of positive philosophy with the
unprethinkable is akin to Absolute Spirit in its self-disappearing at the beginning of Hegel’s SL.
At this point in his life, Schelling conceives of the negative and the positive philosophy
as two branches of metaphysics. The negative philosophy grows out of, and presupposes, the
positive philosophy. However, it is equally true that the culmination of the negative philosophy
is the positive philosophy (this is similar to Hegel’s understanding of the relationship between
the Understanding and Reason). Likewise, the positive philosophy implies the negative
philosophy. The goal of metaphysics is the conscious harmony of both as the external expression
of their natural, unconscious harmony. When one understands this relationship, it is clear why
Schelling reasons that the divine is revealed on the order of a tetralemma: it implies a fourfold
movement along the lines of identity, difference, the affirmation of both the former and the latter,
and the negation of either the former or the latter. Furthermore, Schelling’s explanation that the
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precise reason why necessity appears first in the ontological order (in order for its eventual
sublation) in the revelation of the divine as freedom is a new step that goes beyond Hegel’s own
conception. In other words, if Hegel’s thought remains primarily at the level of metaphysical
structure, Schelling’s philosophy passes on to the purpose behind it all – God’s revelation of
divinity as eternal freedom.
5.6) Is Hegel’s Notion Actual?
On Schelling’s account, the unity of thought and being is best explained by the notion
that eternal freedom guides the process of life along. When one questions why we are able to
make sense of reality and why anything exists at all (which is relevant to the positive
philosophy), we would do well to remember our divine origin and to see the divine at work in all
of life. In the SL, Hegel, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the development of a
Logic, and in doing so he begins with “pure Being.” In the beginning of the Logic, he
demonstrates how the emptiness of emptiness is actuality. When the divine Notion completely
empties itself out, the possibility of its internal existentiality is laid bare. In other words, the fact
that Spirit is emptied out as material reality is actually what constitutes existence as such.
In Section 6 of the “Introduction” to his EL, Hegel writes:
On the other hand, it is just as important that philosophy come to understand that its
content [Inhalt] is none other than the basic content [Gehalt] that has originally been
produced and reproduces itself in the sphere of the living spirit, a content turned into a
world, namely the outer and inner world of consciousness, or that its content is actuality
[die Wirklichkeit].426
Soon after, Hegel goes on to provide a quote of a statement that he makes in his Philosophy of
Right (p. XIX) in which he states, “What is rational, is actual, and what is actual, is rational.”427
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Hegel notes how this statement has generally been received in a negative light, so here Hegel
would like to clarify his position. He states: “we may presuppose that the reader is sufficiently
educated to know [wissen] not only that God is actual – that he is what is most actual, indeed that
he alone is what is truly actual –"428 In this sense, Hegel clarifies that when he refers to actuality
in the highest sense, he is referring to the actuality of God.429
Prima facie, Hegel’s statements here from the EL may seem to be at odds with my
argument throughout this dissertation. Namely, if what is rational is actual, then does Hegel posit
a complete account of the rational? However, my argument throughout this dissertation has been
that in order for Hegel to provide an account of rationality, he must in fact resort to the
discussion of a self-sacrificial Absolute that does not maintain a complete or totalizing
understanding in terms of self-knowledge. Furthermore, I have also argued that the reason why
Hegel would make such a claim regarding the actual as rational is that Hegel’s more demanding
argument is actually to argue for the unity of thought and being, which never implies a complete
whole. For this reason, the reader ought to be careful here. Furthermore, I have argued
throughout this paper that Hegel’s actual notion of rationality (insofar as he develops it in the
SL) is incomplete in a four-fold, “aporetic”430 sense.
In the final section of the Science of Logic, Hegel himself comments on the
“incompleteness” of the genuine beginning. He writes there: “the method of truth, too, knows the
beginning to be incomplete, because it is a beginning; but at the same time, it knows this
incompleteness to be a necessity, because truth only comes to be itself through the necessity of
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immediacy.” 431 In this section of the Logic, Hegel reflects back on how the beginning of the
Logic is the pure immediacy of the Notion. Hegel’s statement here is further support for my
reading that the Notion’s self-comprehension nowhere implies a full and complete selfknowledge. Rather, the Notion’s self-comprehension is more akin to a knowing on the order of
Spirit.
In any case, the notion of freedom seems to be at stake in Schelling’s critique of Hegel.
Schelling’s criticism of Hegel is bound up with his preoccupation that Hegel’s dialectical
metaphysics ultimately lends itself to a metaphysics on the order of reason, and is therefore one
of a processual formalism, but that it perhaps fails to adequately acknowledge the truth of eternal
freedom which stands at its core.432 To put it differently, Schelling’s charge is that the movement
of the Notion on Hegel’s account is ultimately immanent to an Absolute Subject (and therefore
not adequately transcendent). This is to say that the movement of the Notion (according to
Schelling’s critique) is inadequate to the actuality of a genuine Absolute. As Bolman quotes
Schelling, “real thought is that whereby something opposed to thought is overcome. Where one
has only thought, and that abstract thought, for content, thought has nothing to overcome.”433
The question is whether or not Hegel’s system allows for an adequate transcendence of Spirit as
freedom.
5.7) The Metaphysical Consistency of Hegel’s and Schelling’s Beginnings
I take issue with Schelling’s criticism of Hegel because Hegel was not such a one-sided
thinker, even in the development of his Logic qua the SL. This is to say that, in the SL, what
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grounds the actuality of the Notion is not that the Notion is conceived on the order of mere
thought-determinations. Rather, what originally “grounds” the Notion is the disappearing
movement of the Absolute and the Notion’s self-transcendence.
Consider, for instance, Hegel’s discussion of logic from the section on “Absolute Idea” at
the end of the SL. There, Hegel states: “Thus then logic, too, in the absolute Idea, has withdrawn
into that same simple unity which its beginning is; the pure immediacy of being in which at first
every determination appears to be extinguished or removed by abstraction...” 434 Here, Hegel
reminds the reader that the beginning of the Logic is the “pure immediacy of being.” In other
words, he does not say that the beginning of the Logic is with reason, but rather with, as we have
seen, “pure being” – something akin to Spirit’s divestment (this does not imply completeness).
Therefore, on my reading, Hegel’s conception of ontology is actually much more closely
related to Schelling’s conception than it appears on first glance. While Hegel thinks of
metaphysics as co-extensive with a logic of being, Schelling, on the other hand, starts with the
eternal freedom of the eternal past and shows how the divine will guides along the process of
creation. Schelling ultimately concludes that both moments (the memory of eternal freedom as
the irrecoverable past, along with the divine’s continued presence) are of the utmost importance.
My argument (as other contemporary thinkers such as Žižek and Johnston have also
noted) is that Hegel, like Schelling, is aware that the reality of history is fundamentally bound up
with ontology. Indeed, on Hegel’s account, history as such is internal to Logic. I have argued
throughout this dissertation that one way to make sense of the similarities between the two
thinkers’ accounts is therefore in terms of a theological conception of ontology.
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For both Hegel and Schelling, it makes sense to speak of God’s self-negation as crucial to
God’s revelation in the world. On my reading, the difference is that Schelling is more attuned to
the dimension of freedom at work in God’s self-revelation and this leads him to develop his
notion of the potencies in God (along with God’s eternal will which transcends them) from the
eternal beginning. This is to say that Hegel and Schelling have similar ontological frameworks in
terms of structure, but Schelling more explicitly comments on how the eternal freedom of divine
love is at work throughout the entire process.
Consider Schelling’s discussion of the Godhead, for example. Schelling says that the
Godhead is both eternal Yes, eternal No, and the unity of both Yes and No.435 The idea is that the
Godhead (in one aspect) is both affirmation and negation, but in another sense it is also neither at
the same time. Schelling’s point is that although God is latently all of Being and all knowledge,
God is not yet manifest as such externally. On Schelling’s conception, by a free act, God chooses
to conceal part of Godself such that God can freely manifest divinity in time as actual. Thus, it is
via an act of divine love by which God wills to begin in the emptiness of the eternal No. It is via
this beginning in the eternal No that we are pointed back to God’s eternal freedom, which is the
true nature of the divine. As Schelling writes:
Just because it is eternal freedom, the godhead can stand to being only as No, as Yes, and
as the unity of both. For it must be explicitly remembered that these differences are not
differences of essence but only of relationship, of the relation of the one essence to being.
But also inversely, only because it stands thus to being, is it eternal freedom. If the
godhead were merely Yes or No, then it would have to take the part of being in one way
or another, to affirm or negate it. That it is both, and both with equal essentiality, is the
reason why it is the highest freedom. All this had to be so, in order that a necessary
ground of the world would never be found, and that it would become evident that
everything which is, is only by the most free divine will.436

435

Schelling, F.W.J. The Ages of the World (1815 draft), trans. Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1942), 188-189.
436
Ibid.

205

Here, I see Schelling in agreement with Hegel that nothing can be presupposed at the start.
Schelling’s insight above should be coupled with his interpretation of the importance of
revelation. Recollection is always to be coupled with revelation, since there is a relationship of
God to Godself by which God (by the will of freedom) restricts the power and expanse of selfrecollection in order that the revelation of divine nature may proceed via the actuality of time.
To put this in other words, Schelling contends that God eternally ordains (via a free act of
love) that God’s self-negation will simultaneously serve God’s self-resurrection. As Schelling
continues:
In the same act, therefore, when God determined on revelation, it was then determined
that God as eternal No was to be the ground of existence of the eternal Yes. And thereby
it was determined at the same time that God, as the eternal negation of external being,
should be conquerable by love.
But no compulsion may be considered anywhere in the godhead; everything must depend
on the highest voluntariness. Consequently God, in so far as he is the eternal No, cannot
be overpowered, he can be compelled only by goodness to give way to love, to make
himself love’s ground.437
In other words, it is precisely God’s free decision to deny Godself that simultaneously acts in
service of God’s free will. God’s infinite self-constriction and negation is the necessary ground
that God’s freedom overcomes. God’s freedom makes it such that God transcends Godself out of
its own emptiness to lay its own ground: God’s free act of self-negation becomes its own ground.
Out of a free act of infinite denial, God negates Godself in order to reveal its nature as love. The
relationship between eternal No and eternal Yes is therefore fundamentally bound up with the
revelation of divine love.
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Schelling contends that it is precisely God’s freedom that makes time crucial to God’s
self-revelation. Were it not for time, then there could be not be real freedom and vice versa. As
Schelling writes:
It had to be recognized in one and the same indivisible act that, if God wanted to reveal
himself, he could do so only as eternal No, as eternal Yes, and as the unity of both. It was
recognized in the same act that this revelation could only happen in different times, or in
a succession, and that just that would have to be posited as beginning which had just been
overcome, the necessary [character] of God’s freedom, the No of all external being and
thus far of all revelation (for without an overcoming there is no beginning). All this was
contained in one and the same resolution, at once the freest and most irresistible, by a
miracle of eternal freedom which is sole ground unto itself and is therefore its own
necessity.438
On Schelling’s account, in God’s essential nature, God is eternal No, eternal Yes, and the unity
of both. Time is also discovered in the nature of God, since the triune relationship reveals the
necessity of time. Freedom simultaneously lays the ground for God’s internal necessity. This
also implies that God has the freedom to reveal divinity in an infinite number of ways in
actuality. God is so free, in fact, that God is even able to transcend the seemingly most necessary
aspect of freedom (being beyond finitude is likewise united with finitude). This is also why
recollection by itself could never be sufficient to a complete, developed ontology. Schelling’s
thinking here raises a related question: how does the pure Godhead make its way out from pure
possibility as actuality? If God is everything in pure potentiality, then how does God come into
being?
In this discussion, Schelling thinks that God does not need to reveal itself – in the sense
that God’s revelation is fundamentally necessary-contingent. If God’s self-revelation were
completely determined, then God would not truly be free. In this sense, God’s self-revelation
ought to be understood as an act of freedom. As Schelling writes:
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a being is free in that it does not have to reveal itself. To reveal one’s self is to act, just as
all acting is a self-revelation. The free, however, must be free [either] to halt at mere
ability, or to pass over into act. If it necessarily passed over, then it would not become
real as what it is, namely, as the free.439
Schelling’s solution between the paradox of possibility and actuality, then, is to develop two
senses of time: time as succession and time as eternity, conceived together. He continues:
If the godhead were eternally actual (in the sufficiently defined sense of ‘externally
manifest’), then it would not be the power to realize itself. But since it can only realize
itself out of its free eternity, so, in order that the latter remain free and untouched, there
must be something between free eternity and the act of realization, something which
separates the latter from the former. This can only be time—not time in eternity itself,
however, but time coexisting with eternity…For eternity must be considered not as those
moments of time taken together, but as coexisting with each single one, so that eternity
sees only itself in each individual moment.440
This is where we clearly see Schelling’s conception that the eternal, infinite divine is present in
every instant of creation. It is equally true, however, that God is coming to know the Divine
Itself in every moment: the coming to be of God via revelation in time does not preclude the
possibility of the Godhead’s eternal perfection. Rather, God’s freedom results in God’s decision
to reveal divinity in time in order that God may demonstrate the divine’s eternal, infinite nature
in each particular, finite moment.
God’s revelation is the final cause of creation on Schelling’s account. And yet, precisely
for this reason, it is also the case that time is real. The succession of the potencies in time is the
coming to be of the infinite as the finite in time. Symbolically understood, it is God’s
Incarnation. The fact that God is internally three main principles, the eternal yes, the eternal no,
and the unity of the two, lends itself to God’s revelation in time. Schelling comments on this,
saying, “With respect to his highest self, God is not manifest; he reveals himself. He is not real;
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he becomes real, just that he may appear as the most free being of all.”441 Creation is therefore of
a circular nature.
God’s internal essence is determined as the principle of negation, the principle of
affirmation, and a higher unity – that of love – which allows for the unification of both
principles. God’s nature (as freedom) is precisely that which allows for God to have both a
nature by natural necessity (the potencies) as well as to transcend this nature (the freedom of the
will is also internal to God’s nature). Here is where Schelling’s thinking connects to the idea of
“transcendence-in-immanence.” It is not a contradiction for Schelling to posit that God has a
nature by necessity and to simultaneously hold that God is free, since it is precisely God’s nature
that allows for God’s freedom. In fact, God’s freedom is the higher will that lays the ground for
its necessity to become actualized. Along these lines, Schelling writes: “We can therefore also
consider this sequence of revelation as a succession of potencies through which being passes to
its perfection [“Vollendung”].”442 The passage of the principles (or potencies) from potentiality
to actuality (their revelation in time) allows for the coming to be of the divine.
Hegel and Schelling agree that from the standpoint of the question of ontology (when
considered as a logical analysis of pure being) in the “beginning” God is as a negation of
negation. Where the two thinkers seem to differ is about the limitations of ontology when one
considers its role in their overall system of philosophy. Schelling is more keenly aware of the
fact that God’s will as the eternal freedom of divine love in some sense precedes even
nothingness. On Schelling’s account, God’s will sets the process in motion: God voluntarily dies
to the Godself in order to come to know the Divine Itself as love.
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For this reason, both Schelling’s WA and Hegel’s SL are metaphysically consistent.
Hegel’s work is consistent with Schelling’s system, since Hegel agrees with Schelling that pure
being’s self-reflection is concurrent with its self-transcendence. However, one could
simultaneously argue that Schelling’s WA has a more profound vision than Hegel’s SL in terms
of the role of ontology as part of his larger overall system. Schelling has a grander vision, since
he believes that God’s eternal will is what sets the entire process in motion from the start. In
other words, it is not sufficient to remain thinking from the level of an ontology of pure being
and nothingness. A philosophical system that remains on the level of ontology begs the question
as to why it is the case that nothingness doubles itself in the first place.
Schelling’s solution to the question as to why ontology begins with pure being and
nothingness is that God ordains it as such via divine will. As Schelling writes:
The eternal exists only by his will. Only by free determination does he make himself into
that which is in being…The decision to reveal himself, and to posit himself as the
superable eternal No, was only one and the same decision. Therefore, as this decision is a
work of the highest freedom, so it is also a work of the highest love.443
On Schelling’s understanding, the revelation of God in creation is a work of love. This is the
case, since creation is the eternal revelation of transcendence-in-immanence. In each and every
moment, freedom is revealed as that which is at the heart of existence. For this reason, there is
always the possibility for things to be otherwise. Freedom is love, since it is the perfect union of
being-for-self and being-for-other (the revelation of the divine in its self-transcendence). As
Schelling wrote in his Freedom Essay, “this is the mystery of love that it combines what could be
by itself and yet is not and cannot be without the other.”444

443

Ibid., 200.
As previously noted, for the full quote and context, see F.W.J. Schelling, “Philosophical Investigations
into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters,” trans. Priscilla Hayden-Roy in Philosophy of
German Idealism: Fichte, Jacobi and Schelling, ed. Ernst Behler (New York: Bloomsbury, 1987), 278.
444

210

God reveals the Godself as the perfect relation between self and other. In fact, God is the triune
relationship – the three principles considered together in their internal unity.
The question that Schelling hopes to address in this section of his Weltalter, namely,
“why (in terms of a final cause) does God create at all?” is not of primary concern to Hegel in his
SL. Rather, there Hegel aims to address how it happens – his primary aim is to provide a logical
analysis of being. One could also speak about this in terms of causes. On Hegel’s account in the
SL, the final cause toward which the work is oriented is the revelation of the Idea as such (and
Hegel does think that God reveals Godself in Nature). However, in the Ages of the World,
Schelling’s final cause is more expansive, since Schelling argues that the purpose of the
revelation of Spirit is to reveal God as love. Although Schelling and Hegel arrive at ontology
with different aims in mind and different systematic visions, each philosopher arrives at similar
conclusions (at least when it comes to the principles that are involved in ontology and the
internal structure of absolute Spirit).
5.8) Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation (1841): God’s Law of Self-Negation
According to Schelling’s account in his Philosophy of Revelation (1841), in God’s eternal
past, there is a law (prior to God’s Being and prior to thought) such that the Godhead constricts
itself internally and infinitely so (Schelling refers to this as God’s internal law of self-negation).
In this internal law of infinite negation, there is so much self-constriction, that one could refer to
it as the emptiness of emptiness (emptiness prior to a logical domain of thought or Being).
Indeed, it is the emptiness of emptiness, since it is not even a conscious activity of emptying.
Here, Schelling makes it a point to emphasize the actuality of God’s nature prior to thought.
He writes:
The accidental in that which unforethinkably has existence was to be shown. It precedes that
which exists, that which has existence itself, so that it is not even posited as essence but
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rather is posited altogether ecstatically, outside of itself, is straightforwardly [geradezu] that
which has Being. The essential nature has not emptied itself [entäussert]; rather, it is emptied
before it thinks itself [sich denkt]. It is the antipodal to all idea, but in this opposition it is
itself idea on account of this complete reversal.445
Schelling’s main point here is to argue that God’s ecstatic nature (as that which is beyond God)
precedes God’s own conception of the Divine. In fact, Schelling’s account is so extreme that he
claims that God’s Spirit is empty before conceptuality even arrives on the scene.
From out of an internal emptiness, God develops a will to self-expression (as the nothingness
that it is) – and to manifest itself in actuality as infinite constriction. In fact, the actus of the
infinite negative potence is the ability to either express itself in existence or to remain in a state
of potence – for this reason, the existence of the potence itself implies both the expression of the
potence and its remaining latent at the same time. Thus, one with the original nothingness is the
expression of an infinite, both as potence and as actus.
Once God comes to existence from out of the Godhead, however, there is a moment
of recoil just as in Hegel, in which one is unable to discern that things could possibly have been
otherwise. For this reason, God must have been there both in its unprethinkability and as its
conscious manifestation as Being. This leads Schelling into a tetralemma type of argument, in
which the Godhead is in four ways throughout its self-development:
1) The law of the Godhead – infinite constriction as infinite self-negating potence. *
2) From step 1, infinite self-negating potence is simultaneously a potence and
an actus of the infinite self-negating potence, and therefore also as the actus of Being.) In
other words, step 1 implies that internal to the infinite constriction qua the potence of
infinite negation is also Being as actuality – the actuality of either infinite self-negating
potency or infinite self-negation as expressed in Being.
3) Internal to the latter (the affirmation of the self-negation in Being), however, is
simultaneously the affirmation of existence, since in order to experience itself as selfnegation it would have to exist. God desires to express itself as the actuality of this
“either or…” Therefore, it embodies both options.
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4) Finally, God becomes conscious of its divinity as the entire process (as the unity of
the “both…and” and “the either…or” .. (This is the reasoning behind Schelling’s
assertion of the tetralemma.)446
* According to Schelling’s account, the reason that the first step is a necessary one is that God
first posits its necessary nature in order to ultimately sublate it (in order to show itself as
freedom).
Here again, Schelling’s beginning from his Philosophy of Revelation is similar to Hegel’s
beginning in the SL, since both thinkers agree that God’s actuality (as the emptiness of
emptiness) precedes God’s consciousness of Godself. Schelling’s thought here also connects up
with his beginning in the WA, which we saw in the previous chapter. The notion of a will to
indifference that develops a desire to experience Godself as freedom is here analogous to the
infinite self-restricting potence.
Schelling surpasses the Hegel of the SL with his argument that God freely wills to
incarnate in order to “raise up” the finite to the infinite via an act of divine self-revelation.
Through a process of revelation combined with recollection, God is able to reveal the Divine as
Love. During this process, there is a two-fold mirror relationship at play. First, there is a part of
God that is unconscious that comes to consciously reveal Divinity in creation. Secondly, there is
the notion of the unconscious in human beings that comes to know itself over time as one with
divine revelation. God awakens us from our slumber in order that we may come to an awareness
of our divine nature within.
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5.9) God as a Mystery to the Divine Itself447
Schelling and Hegel both consider Christ as an essential symbol in terms of the revelation of the
divine. As Žižek writes in his book, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?448:
That is to say: it is precisely because God is an enigma also in and for himself, because he
has an unfathomable Otherness in himself, that Christ had to emerge to reveal God not
only to humanity, but to God himself – it is only through Christ that God fully actualizes
himself as God.449
Here, I highlight Žižek’s insight that the nature of God is mysterious – not only to humanity—
but in and of Itself. Žižek notes how Christ’s Incarnation is pivotal, since in the Incarnation, the
Divine reveals Itself as the One whose nature is to be beyond Itself – as the unity of the finite and
infinite. When Christ dies on the cross, Christ’s death symbolizes God’s own passage into
nothingness. Here, God undergoes such a passage out of love. God dies to the Divine Itself in
order to come to know Itself. Christ Himself passes through His own mystery for the purpose of
self-revelation. Christ reunites with the Godhead to symbolize to humanity our own eternal
freedom: our freedom to be our divine selves.
I would also like to connect some of Žižek’s further remarks from the same chapter with
the quote from Schelling above about how God’s decision to reveal its nature is a “work of the
highest love.” Žižek agrees with Schelling’s insight. Drawing from Lacan, Žižek writes, “love is
always love for the other insofar as he is lacking—we love the other because of his limitation.
The radical conclusion from this is that if God is to be loved, he must be imperfect, inconsistent
in himself; there has to be something ‘in him more than himself.’”450 Žižek’s point here is that
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Christ both symbolizes and embodies that in God which is beyond Godself. God reveals the
Divine as that which is to be both Godself and other. The reason that God’s revelation is a work
of love (on both thinkers’ accounts) is that God passes beyond mere identity to reveal differencein-identity. In other words, God’s revelation is not merely the revelation of identity or difference
but also both (and therefore, simultaneously neither). In other words, God dies to Godself in
order to reveal the life that is one with death. In this way, the Symbol of Christ allows for the
revelation of the Godhead.
Along these lines, Žižek also connects this premise to Hegel’s insight about Christ as the
“vanishing mediator.” As Žižek writes:
Hegel’s underlying premise is that what dies on the Cross is not only God’s earthly
representative-incarnation, but the God of beyond itself: Christ is the ‘vanishing
mediator’ between the substantial transcendent God-in-itself and God qua virtual spiritual
community.451
Christ’s death symbolizes God’s passage through infinite emptiness. By taking on such a role,
Christ is able to demonstrate that in God which is more than God – in doing so, he
simultaneously makes God immanent. Christ “vanishes,” so that God is able to reveal itself as
freedom in actuality. The love that is demonstrated by God’s own passage through the abyss of
freedom is the same love that is available to humanity. God’s passage from the unconscious to
self-consciousness mirrors the passage that takes place in humanity. When Christ dies, the Spirit
of love is revealed as actual – as a substance that transcends itself and returns to nothingness.
This is the actuality of infinite love.
Žižek considers Hegel’s project to be the inquiry into how it is possible that God as
Subject emerges from the emptiness of emptiness. As he writes:
Eckhart’s goal is to withdraw from the created reality of particular entities into the
‘desert’ of the divine nature, of Godhead, the negation of all substantial reality,
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withdrawal into the primordial Void-One beyond Word. Hegel’s task is exactly the
opposite one: not from God to Godhead, but from Godhead to God, i.e., how, out of this
abyss of Godhead, God qua Person emerges, how a Word is born in it. Negation must
turn around onto itself and bring us back to determinate (finite, temporal) reality.452
As I reflected on in earlier chapters of this dissertation, Hegel is concerned with providing an
account of how it is the case that the primordial double negation is the movement of “Substance
as Subject.”
Schelling agrees with Hegel on the importance of this point. However, as I mentioned
previously, Schelling provides more of an explicit explanation in the WA in response to the
question of why this is the case. As Schelling explains:
…God is negating power only in order to make a ground for himself as eternal love. But
this negating power does not know itself, therefore also not its own state, does not know
the freedom of decision, by virtue of which it is what alone is active. It had to be thus.
This higher life had to sink again into unconsciousness of itself, in order that there might
be a true beginning…453
Schelling’s explanation for as to why God functions as a negative principle from the beginning is
that it allows God the genuine possibility of establishing Godself from out its internal
unconsciousness – it allows for the possibility of a true beginning from out of an eternal past that
is unknown, even to the Divine Itself. In fact, on Schelling’s account, the Divine occludes part of
Godself from Itself for the sake of love.
Both Schelling and Hegel agree that a true ontological beginning must start without any
presuppositions. As Schelling continues on in the WA:
Here, too, it holds that the beginning must not know itself. This means it must not know
itself as beginning. Nothing is or discerns itself at once as merely ground or beginning.
Whatever is a beginning must regard itself not as beginning but as essence (something
which is for its own sake), in order to be a true beginning.454
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Schelling’s statement here coincides with what Hegel says in the SL – that for a beginning to be
a true beginning, there can be no presuppositions on the order of reason.
The distinction between Hegel’s and Schelling’s accounts here also applies to the
distinction between their systems of philosophy considered in a more general sense. Both
thinkers arrive at similar metaphysical accounts in terms of broad structure. Both thinkers agree
that absolute subjectivity is constituted by a doubling of an original nothingness. That said,
Schelling is more explicitly aware that the entire movement is a condition for the possibility of
the revelation of the divine as love.
Schelling is keen on the fact that, via this process, God reveals divinity as love. God
buries Godself deep in the earth as a “seed” in which its nature is an actual-potential but has not
yet been fully realized. Freedom draws out and educates these potential natures of God, such that
God grants Godself the ability to come to be in time. Schelling writes:
Then what is this unity? The answer: It is the eternal seed of God which is not yet an
actual God, but only a God with respect to [its] powers. Therefore it is the state of
possibility (of potentiality) in which God has voluntarily placed himself, and which must
necessarily precede the actual God (revealed in reality) if there is to be a becoming, a
sequence, a gradation in this revelation or birth of God into actuality.455
God’s free nature is that which allows us to become participants in God’s self-actualization in
time. Out of pure love, God freely decides to serve as the “vanishing mediator” in time.
5.10) Schelling and Hegel on the Contingency of Reason
In his paper, “Determinacy, Indeterminacy and Contingency in German Idealism,” by G.
Anthony Bruno456, Bruno sets up a fruitful discussion regarding Hegel and Schelling in terms of
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their respective positions on the question of contingency and necessity in their systematic
philosophies. Bruno contends that the difference between Hegel and Schelling is primarily one of
the value and placement of necessity in the ambition of a German Idealist system. The structural
framework of Bruno’s paper (in terms of the distinction between determinacy and
indeterminacy) is helpful for drawing contrasts between some of the systematic works of the two
thinkers.
On Bruno’s account, the primary difference between Schelling and Hegel is ultimately
one of meaning when it comes to contingency. As Bruno writes:
By removing Fichtean presuppositions from the system of a priori conditions, Hegel
provides a deeper solution to the rhapsody problem. Nevertheless, his solution exhibits
yet a deeper contingency, for systematicity raises the question of its value, the
indeterminacy of which, Schelling will argue, reveals reason’s insuperable limits.457
According to Bruno, Schelling thinks beyond Hegel on this point insofar as Schelling is aware
that the contingency of freedom (attributable to the divine will) precedes even the systematicity
of reason. On Bruno’s reading, Hegel’s account of reason is one of necessity and determinism.
As Hegel writes, the categories of the understanding (which for Hegel are objective categories)
must be “deduced from thinking itself,”458 and therefore must be explicable on the order of
reason (even if dialectically, so) i.e. dialectic locates contradiction as internal to reason (and
necessity is thereby saved, according to Bruno’s interpretation). Indeed, on Bruno’s assessment,
“Hegel rejects haphazard or rhapsodic limits on reason’s power for explanation in order to
demonstrate its absolute freedom.”459 Bruno seems to equate Hegel’s desire to maintain the
absolute freedom of reason with a desire to uphold the determinism and necessity of reason.
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Here, however, I think that we must be particularly cautious. I think that we equivocate on
meanings if we maintain that Hegel’s version of dialectics in the SL rescues or otherwise aims to
maintain absolute necessity on the order of reason.
For this reason, my reading of Hegel here subtly differs from Bruno’s reading. The key
difference hinges on whether or not Hegel’s claim that reason must be absolutely free
simultaneously implicates him in affirming the determinacy of reason in an unqualified sense.
Bruno and I both agree that Hegel considers dialectics as rational. For Hegel, as Bruno points
out, “a condition thus negates itself through the contradiction that it contains.”460 However, I
think that Hegel’s conception of rationality is actually defined in relation to its other. On my
understanding, this implies that dialectics is neither a purely deterministic nor necessary system
of reason. I maintain that Hegel is aware of the contingency of reason (as internal to his system
of dialectics) at the start of his Science of Logic. Bruno himself even notes how the SL starts with
the “indeterminate immediacy”461 of pure Being. On my interpretation, Hegel’s beginning here
means that the beginning of his logic is to be found in the emptiness of emptiness (which is
therefore not absolutely deterministic, by any means). This allows for Hegel to develop a
conception of reason that is actually both contingent and necessary but also neither (as I stated in
my original thesis, and furthermore, Hegel agrees with Schelling on this point). To state this in
another way, the Notion is best understood as its own justification in a historical sense. In other
words, on Hegel’s account, contingency (which one could consider as freedom in this context) is
internal to the constitution of Absolute Spirit.
On a separate point, I agree with Bruno’s assessment that, for the Schelling of this period
(post-1809, in his Freedom Essay and later), he is mostly concerned with the freedom of the
460
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divine will as the original “unground”462 of reason.463 As Schelling writes: “Thus nothing should
rest on mere necessity, and the highest voluntariness, even in the first beginnings of life, should
witness to the unlimited freedom of God.”464 Schelling, therefore, agrees with Hegel on the point
that indeterminacy is internal to (and constitutive of) a logic of Being. However, he differs from
Hegel on the specifics insofar as he provides an account for as to why this is the case.
On Schelling’s account, the explanation for this fact is that God ordains the
(in)determinate non-ground of reason from the start, for the purpose of divine revelation as love.
Due to eternal freedom and divine love, God makes it such that reason cannot grasp a
determinate ground of divinity. Rather, out of a loving will, God freely ordains a process in
which reason comes to be from out of an eternal past that is (by its nature) never fully
recoverable.465 Rather than this leading one to despair, however, reason’s task becomes creative
and imaginative in recognition of the freedom of the will.
5.11) Conclusion
It remains important to question how the philosophies of each thinker (both Schelling and
Hegel) could serve as effective practical guides for contemporary humanity. For example, which
philosophy would better allow for us to live a good and meaningful life? To me, it seems that the
answer to this question largely depends on if one chooses to adopt the worldview of an apophatic
theology on the order of reason (Hegel) or a theology that knows God on both the level of the
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mind and the heart (Schelling). If one chooses to embody the former, then the world of
experience could still potentially serve as the embodiment of the divine, but one does not claim
knowledge of a deep heart-level intuition of this fact. On the other hand, if one chooses to
embody the latter, then one affirms a world of beings grounded in the divine heart and sees the
divine at work in all of experience.
Schelling’s philosophy is consonant with a society in which we recognize the divinity of
all beings – we all (as divine beings and in union with nature) participate in the process of divine
revelation in time. I recognize fellow human beings and respect their freedom, not from a place
of recognition of their rational autonomy, but rather from an eternal co-knowledge
(Mitwissenschaft) of our union with the Godhead—that which is beyond determinate reason, but
forever reveals the Divine in the world throughout history.
In addition, humility is naturally upheld as an experiential value to a member of such a
society for a number of reasons. First of all, I am humble out of my recollection of the
mysterious and enigmatic nature of the divine at work in all of experience. I recognize that other
beings, like myself, also hold within themselves a co-knowledge of eternal creation. For this
reason, there are aspects of myself that others may perceive better than I am able to perceive
myself and vice versa. Likewise, God’s nature as mysterious implies that there are parts of God
that are continuously revealed throughout time. Time, and life itself, is a gift granted by the
divine. Union with the Godhead is not purely of a rational nature. Rather, it is a unity on the
order of the wholeness of my spirit and being with nature. Also, God’s nature is evolutionary
such that I am continuously growing in both my spirit and being. To pay heed to the Divine is to
unify myself with the Godhead. We are all in service of the divine in its revelation as love –
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beyond the one who knows on the order of determinate concepts is the one who lives in service
of love.
I end this fifth, and final, chapter with the following quote from Schelling:
“Everything divine is human, and everything human divine.”466
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CONCLUSION
“In the end, it is love that will stand alone as the true existent, as what has been revealing itself
through the entire process...” 467
In this dissertation, I hoped to demonstrate a fundamental point of agreement in terms of
Hegel’s and Schelling’s beginnings in their systems of metaphysics. I argued that Hegel and
Schelling both begin their systems with the same insight: that an emptiness of emptiness (as the
self-emptying of Absolute Spirit) stands at the beginning of metaphysics.
In Hegel’s Science of Logic, we saw this as the emptiness of the Word that is nothing
twice in “Being, Pure Being, --”468 In Schelling’s Ages of the World, we saw this in the coeternity of two wills – a will that wills nothing co-eternal with a will that wills something (which
subsequently takes on the form of nothingness out of love and for the purpose of the revelation
of divine freedom). I argued that Schelling’s conception of ontology (while structurally similar to
Hegel’s) differs insofar as he provides an answer to the question of why the structure is as such in
the first place. Schelling’s response to this question is that the conditions for the possibility of
ontology are bound up with God’s decision to negate Godself for the purpose of the revelation of
eternal freedom and God’s nature (as love) in time. Ultimately, on Schelling’s account, we
discover that love has been “revealing itself”469 all along – it is by an act of highest freedom and
therefore, of love, that God “dies” to Godself in order that it may come to be in time.
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In further works, I could explore in more detail the relationship between Schelling’s
Philosophy of Revelation and Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. These two works
would seem to provide an additional philosophical research area related to my interests. For
example, Hegel’s lectures there are on the topic of the Incarnation and its relevance for
philosophy. In particular, the third volume from these lectures includes Hegel’s in-depth
discussion of God’s self-emptying as in Phillipians 2 from the Bible and in connection with
kenosis.470 Hegel uses the term Entäusserung (“divestment”) in this discussion in connection
with Christ’s self-emptying, and the relationship between divine and human form. So, that
volume could serve as a helpful resource for further study.
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